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PREFACE
This dissertation was born from two desires. The first was a desire to help in some
small way to alleviate the suffering of the many undocumented immigrants I have had the
privilege to know and work with in my fifteen-year career as a community organizer in
Chicago. The undocumented immigrants I worked with expressed over and over again
how unjust it was that society was fine with them working here but refused to grant them
the basic rights that should pertain to all people in society. I have seen the fear of
deportation and the frustration at the daily injustices and difficulties stemming from their
lack of legal residency.
The second desire was to live in solidarity with African Americans. As a
community organizer in Chicago, I worked in multi-racial coalitions most of my fifteenyear career, and through those organizations I developed close relationships with a few
African American leaders, through whom I had the opportunity to learn about the daily
crushing effects of racism on African American individuals and the whole African
American community. Through my work in these coalitions and elsewhere, I have
become convinced that racism against Blacks will leave them forever at the bottom of the
social ladder, unless people from all races actively work to undo racist policies and
practices.
The father of liberation theology Gustavo Gutierrez has said that theology “must
be a love letter to God, the Church and the people we serve.” This dissertation, with its
iv

often very technical bent, is my love letter to God, the Church, and the Black, Latino and
undocumented immigrant communities. My prayer is that this work will in some way
foster understanding, solidarity, and yes love between our communities, so that we may
prevail together against sin and suffering.
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ABSTRACT
The U.S. and Mexican bishops, in their influential pastoral letter Strangers No
Longer, frame immigration ethics through the lens of solidarity with the immigrant. This
frame leads them to erroneously interpret the preferential option for the poor and ignore
potential harm to poor U.S. citizens caused by recent undocumented immigration from
Mexico and other countries. A better framework to immigration ethics is a specified
common good approach, which is created in this dissertation. This approach uses the
definition of the common good found in Catholic social thought and concretizes it
through using a theological anthropology based in Martha Nussbaum’s human
functioning capabilities approach and through developing a Common Good Index (CGI).
This CGI is a set of twelve sociological indicators that measures the common good
through measuring to what extent basic levels of human capabilities are ensured for all
people in society.
Using the specified common good approach, the ethical focus becomes more
balanced and true to original Catholic intent, attending to the needs of poor U.S. citizens
as well as poor immigrants. The bishops’ policy recommendations are affirmed through
the specified common good approach, but additional policies are advocated – ones that
aim to promote the capabilities of poor U.S. citizens that are threatened by immigration.
Solidarity thus becomes a two-way street.

xi

INTRODUCTION
Immigration has been an important public issue worldwide for centuries, and it
has been the subject of religious ethical rules and reflection since God commanded Israel
to treat the stranger as a native-born. Recently in the United States, the most widely
distributed Catholic reflection on immigration has been the U.S. and Mexican bishops’
pastoral letter, Strangers No Longer. This letter presents a summary of Catholic social
thought (CST) on immigration and makes specific policy recommendations concerning
U.S. immigration policy. In this dissertation, I challenge the bishops’ ethical
methodology and conclusions and present an alternate framework for Catholic
immigration ethics that I call the “specified common good approach.”
This approach evaluates social conditions through the lens of a specified common
good. In order to do so, it develops CST’s definition of the common good (the sum total
of those social conditions that promote human flourishing) by defining human flourishing
through a set of “human functioning capabilities” – universal human capacities for love,
good health, thought, and other activities. I then numerically quantify what percentage of
the population has secured a minimum level of ability in all areas of human functioning
through an index of sociological indicators measuring those capabilities. I call this index
the Common Good Index. The information provided in it, coupled with the principles of
solidarity and the preferential option for the poor, direct the use toward ethical
evaluations and solutions that foster the common good.
1

2
Outline of Dissertation
I begin this dissertation with an analysis of Catholic social thought concerning
immigration. I review the primary source documents, including Exsul Familia
Nazarethana, Gaudium et Spes, Pastoralis Migratorum Cura, and Ecclesia in America,
and I examine the U.S. and Mexican bishops’ treatment of these documents in their
pastoral letter Strangers No Longer, which is a key text promulgated widely to U.S.
Catholic parishes as part of the U.S. bishops’ Justice for Immigrants campaign. I
demonstrate that the bishops’ immigration ethic is above all centered in solidarity with
the immigrant, aimed toward protecting immigrant rights and wellbeing. This ethic aligns
with the many primary themes in the source documents, such as the right to subsistence,
human rights and dignity, solidarity, and the preferential option for the poor. However, it
is unsatisfying practically because it fails to offer proper guidance to those who are trying
to sort out conflicting claims about immigrant versus U.S. wellbeing, and theologically
because it leads to a misconstrual of the preferential option for the poor: one that equates
the option for the poor with an option for immigrants. This narrow focus has led the
bishops to ignore potential harms to other vulnerable communities, in this case poor U.S.
workers and their families, which result from immigration.
Instead of focusing its attention solely on immigrants, a Catholic social
immigration ethic should be framed through the lens of the common good. Such a
framework includes a preferential option for the poor, but it balances out concern for
immigrants with concern for others other vulnerable groups. In this way, the common
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good enables a more balanced, complete and truly Catholic response to the complexities
of this issue.
There is a problem with using the common good as a primary moral framework,
however: its lack of specificity. The common good is defined in Catholic social thought
as the sum of social conditions that promote the flourishing of individuals and their
groups. This definition, while shedding some light on the concept, is nonetheless
imprecise. A survey of the common good as delineated in Catholic social teaching has
found it to suffer from “a lack of tight conceptual definition” and describes it as
“embarrassingly fuzzy.” 1
I undertake, therefore, in Chapter Two, to bring greater specificity to the common
good. My understanding of the common good, like the bishops’, is grounded in Aquinas
and is informed by CST. I use CST’s definition of the common good (the sum of social
conditions that promote the flourishing of individuals and groups) 2 and define human
flourishing through an amended set of Martha Nussbaum’s human functioning
capabilities. These capabilities comprise a broad spectrum of human abilities shared by
all people, such as the capacity for love, self-determination, and being in good health.
Human wellbeing relies on opportunities to realize each and every capability. Human
functioning capabilities give substance to the aim of the common good, namely human
wellbeing. The common good, with its attendant preferential option for the poor, requires
1

Dennis P. McCann, "The Common Good in Catholic Social Teaching: A Case Study in
Modernization," in In Search of the Common Good, ed. Dennis P. McCann and Patrick D. Miller (New
York: T & T Clark, 2005), 122.
2

Vatican Council II, Gaudium et Spes, (Rome: The Vatican, 1965),
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vatii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html (accessed December 16, 2010).
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that every person have access to realizing at least some minimum level of functioning in
each capability.
Rather than stopping the process of specification of the common good there, in
Chapter Three I present a proposal for quantifying the common good. I model my effort
off of the work of one of the most prominent Catholic theologians of the early twentieth
century, Mgr. John A. Ryan, who sought to apply Catholic social teaching to the practical
issues of his day, and in so doing he took the Catholic doctrine of subsistence and turned
it into a proposal for a living wage, arriving at an actual dollar figure of how much money
a family needed in order to live in dignity. I then develop a proposal for a Common Good
Index that measures the common good. The Common Good Index is modeled after the
Index of Social Health developed by Marc and Marque-Luisa Miringoff, which quantifies
social wellbeing through 16 sociological indicators such as infant mortality, violent
crime, poverty and teenage drug use. The Common Good Index itself contains twelve
indicators that measure human functioning capabilities. These indicators are: voter
turnout, high school drop-outs, homicide, household median income, infant mortality,
suicide, teen birthrate, uninsurance, carbon dioxide emissions, poverty, unemployment,
and the importance of religion. This index evaluates on a scale of 1 – 100 the extent to
which the common good is being realized in society. A higher score means that more of
the population is closer to achieving minimum levels of functioning in all human
capabilities. A lower score means that the population as a whole is further from realizing
those basic levels of human functioning.

5
One can use the Common Good Index to evaluate whether a given social dynamic
or policy affects the common good positively or negatively. In Chapter Four I apply the
Index in such a way to the current immigration situation. I ask the question, “How have
recent undocumented Mexican immigration and U.S. immigration policies affected the
common good?” Note that this question differs from the more frequently-asked question,
“How has recent undocumented Mexican immigration affected the common good?” I
include U.S. immigration policies under the microscope, because people’s capability
levels are affected not only by changes owing to the migration of individuals, but also by
laws and policies that form the political context within which they are seeking to realize
those capabilities. I find, briefly, that immigration overall positively affects Mexican
immigrants and residents, but that it negatively affects United States residents, and that
the international common good declines slightly in the presence of these recent
immigration trends. I then present some policy proposals and directions for addressing
the declines in human capabilities. These proposals are guided by the aim of increasing
people’s abilities to meet a basic level of human functioning in all areas.
In the Conclusion, I reflect on the significance of the specified common good
approach for Catholic immigration ethics. I also address the limitations of the Common
Good Index and make suggestions for its further development. The specified common
good, as I demonstrate in this dissertation, is a rigorous tool for Catholic social ethics that
falls within the Catholic tradition of the common good. In addition, it offers several
advantages over the bishops’ ethical framework, in that it fosters a more comprehensive
application of solidarity and the preferential option for the poor, offers a more precise
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social analysis and provides a clear aim: the assurance of human functioning capabilities
for all.
Mexican Migration to the United States
Before beginning the analysis of Catholic immigration ethics, it is necessary to
provide some context. I offer in this section a brief overview of who undocumented
Mexican immigrants are, and I also provide a short history of U.S. immigration policy
vis-à-vis undocumented Mexican migration to the United States. First, however, I offer
clarification of key terms used in this dissertation.
Migrants, most simply, are people who migrate, i.e. who move from one country
or region to another. Migrants are commonly people who move for work. 3 An emigrant is
one who emigrates, or who leaves her country or region of origin, and an immigrant is
one who immigrates, or who enters into and establishes permanent residence in a new
country. In this dissertation, the terms migrants, immigrants and emigrants all refer to
Mexicans who have moved to the United States from Mexico. 4
When qualified by generation, the term immigrant may refer to someone born in
the receiving country (in this case, the United States), but who has recent immigrant
ancestry. Specifically, in this dissertation “second generation” immigrants refer to the
U.S.-born sons and daughters of immigrants. “Third generation” immigrants are the U.S.born children of second generation immigrants.
3

"Migrant," in Merriam Webster (2010), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/migrant
(accessed March 7, 2011).
4

Mexican migration shifted from a circular, temporary pattern to a pattern of permanent residence
after the passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act law. Douglas S. Massey et al., Beyond
Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration (New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 2002), 131.
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Some immigrants reside legally in the United States; others do not. This
dissertation concerns Mexican immigrants who live, i.e. reside, in the U.S. without legal
permission. I use the terms undocumented Mexican immigrants, unauthorized Mexican
immigrants, and undocumented Mexicans interchangeably to refer to this group of
people.
I use the term Mexicans to refer to Mexican residents, i.e. Mexican nationals
residing in Mexico. The term Latino, on the other hand, refers to people of Latin
American descent living in the United States. Latinos may or may not be immigrants, and
Latinos may be of any race. I use the terms African American and Black interchangeably
to refer to U.S. residents of African descent.
Who are Undocumented Mexican Immigrants?
There are an estimated 11.1 million undocumented immigrants residing in the
United States today. I examine specifically undocumented Mexican immigration in this
work, because this is the group that has been the topic of most concern in immigration
debates. Indeed, Mexicans are the single largest immigrant group in the United States,
comprising 59 percent of all undocumented immigrants and 18% of the total foreign born
population in the U.S. 5
Mexican immigrants are actually not the poorest or least educated Mexicans.
They come from average economic backgrounds, and their education levels are higher

5

Jeffery S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States,
(Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2009), 21, http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf (accessed
March 9, 2010).
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than the Mexican average. 6 That being said, their average income falls far below the
U.S.’: they come from families with average incomes under $15,000 per year, 7 compared
to the U.S. average of $48,000 per year. They are also considerably less educated than the
U.S. public 64% of unauthorized Mexican residents between the ages of 25 and 64 did
not graduate from high school, versus 8% of the native-born population of the same age. 8
Undocumented immigrants represent approximately 4% of the U.S. population. A
relatively young population, they represent 5.4% of workers. 9 Unauthorized workers
come from agricultural or blue-collar professions, and once in the United States they are
largely focused in low-skilled work, comprising a disproportionate number of workers in
low-skilled industries. 10 They represent 25% of farm workers, 19% of building, groundskeeping and maintenance workers and 17% of construction workers. 11 While
undocumented Mexican workers represent a high portion of agricultural workers, the
share of Mexican workers who work on farms has declined over time; in 2000 only 15
percent of Mexicans worked in agriculture. 12 Others are concentrated in the blue-collar
professions mentioned above.

6

Daniel Chiquiar and Gordon H. Hanson, "International Migration, Self-Selection, and the
Distribution of Wages: Evidence from Mexico and the United States," The Journal of Political Economy
113, no. 2 (2005).
7

In Purchasing Power Parity, which reflects purchasing power in the United States.

8

Passel and Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States, 12.

9

Ibid., 4.

10

Ibid., 5.

11

Ibid.

12

David Card and Ethan G. Lewis, "The Diffusion of Mexican Immigrants During the 1990s:
Explanations and Impacts.," in Mexican Immigration, ed. George Borjas (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2007).
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Compared to other undocumented immigrants, undocumented Mexican
immigrants have much lower educational and income levels. 13 Sixty-four percent of
unauthorized adult Mexican immigrants did not complete secondary school, versus
twenty-five percent of all other unauthorized immigrants. 14 And their median household
income in 2007 was $32,000, versus $45,000 for all other unauthorized immigrants. 15
A Brief History of Mexican Immigration and U.S. Policy Responses.
Mexican migration to the United States has been a subject of public policy since
the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ceded Mexican territories to the United
States (now the states of Texas, California, Arizona and New Mexico), ending the
Mexican-American war. Since then, U.S. response to Mexican migration has been
inconsistent, at times permitting or encouraging immigration for the sake of providing
low-cost workers, and at other times hand pursuing policies to close the border and
deport immigrants. For example, Mexican workers were imported after the Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882 to help build the railroads. Also, throughout the 1920s the U.S.
had no numerical restrictions on Mexican immigration, even though it had established
caps to European immigration in 1921. 16 In the 1930s during the Great Depression,

13

Passel and Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States, 21.

14

Ibid., 22.

15

This is due in part to the lower labor force participation of female undocumented Mexican
immigrants; the labor force participation for male undocumented Mexican immigrants is approximately the
same as other undocumented immigrants (95 percent, versus 91 percent). Ibid.
16

Massey et al., Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic
Integration, 29.
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however, the U.S. reversed course and mounted a series of deportation campaigns that
reduced the Mexican population by 41% by the end of the decade. 17
Following the same give- and take- dynamic, in 1942 the United States created
the Bracero program, offering temporary work visas to Mexicans to work in the fields –
at its peak 450,000 Mexicans worked in the United States under this program per year. 18
And yet, in the midst of this program, the United States deported close to one million
undocumented Mexicans in 1954 under an initiative known as Operation Wetback. 19 The
Bracero program ended in 1965 under pressure from civil rights organizations, unions
and religious organizations who viewed it as an “exploitative and discriminatory system”
that impeded efforts to raise wages for native-born farm workers, and under noncompliance from growers, who under the bureaucratization of the program turned to
hiring workers illegally instead. 20
After this program ended, Mexican migration to the United States continued. The
bracero program had created linkages between Mexico and the United States, which
continued after its end. 21 Because the avenues for legal migration became severely
restricted, Mexican migration became increasingly illegal. In 1976 the number of legal

17

Ibid., 34.

18

Ibid., 37.

19

Juan Ramon García, Operation Wetback: The Mass Deportation of Mexican Undocumented
Workers in 1954 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1980).
20

Massey et al., Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic
Integration, 41.
21

Eighty-seven percent of the Mexican hometown associations in the United States in 2002 were
from sending states associated with the bracero program. Gordon H. Hanson, "Illegal Migration from
Mexico to the United States," Journal of Economic Literature 44, no. 4 (2006): 879.
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visas for Mexicans was reduced to 20,000 per year (from 450,000 in the late 1950s). 22
The rate of Mexican migration remained essentially unchanged, however, from 1976
through 1985. 23
In 1986 the United States government passed the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA), which combined both the liberal and restrictionist tendencies into
one law. It increased border security and made it illegal to knowingly hire an
unauthorized worker, but it also granted legal amnesty to undocumented immigrants who
had resided in the country since 1982. 24 Three million immigrants were granted amnesty
under this program. Since 1986, the number of undocumented immigrants in the country
has grown to 11.1 million, 6.7 million of whom are Mexican. 25 As a result, over half of
all Mexican immigrants residing in the United States are undocumented (55%). 26 If the
three million IRCA immigrants are included in those totals, nearly 80% of all foreignborn Mexican U.S. residents are either currently unauthorized or were at one time.
Since the mid-1980s, national policy has largely swung toward preventing
undocumented immigration and limiting the rights and privileges of undocumented

22

This number was brought into alignment with caps for other countries in the Western
Hemisphere under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Massey et al., Beyond Smoke and Mirrors:
Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration, 43.
23

Ibid., 44.

24

The terms unauthorized and undocumented immigrants are used interchangeably in this
dissertation.
25

The total number of undocumented immigrants peaked at about 12 million in 2007, but has
declined in the wake of the recession. Jeffery S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, U.S. Unauthorized Immigration
Flows Are Down Sharply Since Mid-Decade, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2010),
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/126.pdf.
26

Mexican Immigrants in the United States, 2008, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center,
2009), 1, http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/47.pdf.
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immigrants. The Immigration Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act (IRRIRA) of 1996 dramatically increased the number of border patrol agents,
established a fence along the U.S. border at San Diego, and created a bar for immigrants
found illegally residing in the country. Those who are determined to have been illegally
in the country for six to twelve months are barred for three years. Those who have been
here longer are barred for ten years. 27 The 1996 Welfare reform act restricted legal
immigrants from receiving federally subsidized services such as Medicare or welfare
within five years of arrival (undocumented immigrants are never eligible).
However, the nation is far from united on immigration policy. Numerous “proimmigrant” laws have been attempted at the national level, although not passed, including
efforts to legalize current undocumented immigrants and to allow undocumented students
access to federal student loans. Furthermore, in recent years many states and
municipalities have passed laws supportive of immigrants. As many as 32 municipalities
have been identified as “sanctuary cities,” having passed laws indicating that they will
not report undocumented immigrants to the federal authorities. 28 Furthermore, eleven
states have passed laws allowing undocumented students to pay in-state tuition at public
colleges and universities. 29

27

Jessica Vaughan, "Bar None: An Evaluation of the 3/10-Year Bar," Center for Immigration
Studies, http://www.cis.org/articles/2003/back1003.html.
28

Stephen Dinan and Kara Rowland, "Justice: Sanctuary Cities Safe from Law," The Washington
Post, July 4, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jul/14/justice-sanctuary-cities-are-noarizona/ (accessed January 23, 2011).
29

Alan Gathright, "Senators Push In-State Tuition For Undocumented Students,"
TheDenverChannel.com, January 19, 2011, http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/26540925/detail.html
(accessed January 17, 2011).

13
The divide between the two sides of the issue is apparent in Arizona’s recent
immigration law and national responses to it. The “nation’s toughest bill on illegal
immigration,” passed in April 2010, required among other things that police detain
people they reasonably expect to be undocumented residents and made it a state
misdemeanor for an immigrant to not carry proof of legal residency at all times. 30 While
there was broad public support for this measure in Arizona and elsewhere, there was
large public outcry elsewhere in the nation. 31 Boycotts were called by major cities,
musicians and sports organizations, and President Obama criticized the law as being
unfair and promoting mistrust between citizens and law enforcement personnel. 32 The
day before the law was to go into effect a federal judge blocked the provisions listed
above, although her ruling left intact other provisions such as prohibitions on day labor
street pick-ups or on sanctuary cities.
The issue of undocumented Mexican immigration is contentious and polarized,
and the public policy proposals outlined above demonstrate the lack of common ground.
This dissertation enters into this debate through examining undocumented Mexican
immigration and U.S. responses to it through the lens of the common good. In so doing it
seeks to provide a place for people from both sides to meet in the middle and to address
the issues brought forward by all. This balanced emphasis distinguishes a common good
30

Randal C. Archibold, "Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration," New York Times, April
24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html (accessed January 2, 2011).
31

Sean Alfano, "Arizona Immigration Law SB 1070 Has Support of 55% of Americans, New Poll
Shows " NYDailyNews.com, July 28, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2010/07/28/201007-28_arizona_immigration_law_sb_1070_has_support_of_55_of_americans_new_poll_shows.html
(accessed January 30, 2011).
32

Archibold, "Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration."
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framework from the U.S. Catholic bishops’ framework on immigration, which
emphasizes solidarity with the immigrant. In Chapter One, I review Catholic social
teaching on immigration and examine the U.S. and Mexican Bishops’ theological
framework on immigration ethics, finding it inadequate.

CHAPTER ONE
ANALYSIS OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING ON IMMIGRATION
In the introduction I presented some basic information about undocumented
Mexican immigrants and immigration, and about responses in the United States. I move
now to a discussion of the Catholic Church’s immigration ethic, which responds to this
context but is grounded in a history of Catholic social teaching. I begin this chapter with
a review of Catholic social teaching on immigration and then examine the U.S. and
Mexican bishops’ 2003 pastoral letter on immigration, Stranger No Longer, the most
comprehensive, accessible and widely published statement of Catholic social teaching on
immigration as it concerns the United States. Strangers No Longer is the orienting
document for thousands of Catholics involved in the USCCB’s Justice for Immigrants
Campaign; hence, it is highly influential and important document.
I demonstrate in my analysis that the overarching ethical framework conveyed in
Strangers No Longer is solidarity with the immigrant. While this framework maintains
continuity with Christianity’s centuries old tradition of concern for the immigrant, I argue
that it is insufficient as a social immigration ethic, because it creates an ethical tunnel
vision preventing the bishops from attending adequately to the concerns of other
vulnerable populations. The stress on immigrant solidarity trumps concern for the
common good and leads to a breach of the preferential option for the poor, creating an
incoherence with these central principles of Catholic social teaching.
15

16
Key Catholic Texts on Immigration Ethics
Strangers No Longer is best understood in the context of Catholic social teaching
on immigration, and so I turn first to a review of key Catholic texts concerning
immigration ethics. The modern era of the Church’s theological reflection on
immigration ethics began with Pius XII’s Exsul Familia Nazarethana in 1954. Central
texts since then include Paul VI’s motu proprio Pastoralis Migratorum Cura issued in
1969 and the Instruction Erga Migrantes Caritas Christi, published in 2004 by the
Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People. 1 Other
documents in Catholic social teaching that also provide theological underpinnings for the
immigration ethics in the Church include Gaudium et Spes and, in the Americas, Ecclesia
in America. These documents form the primary body of work from which Strangers No
Longer draws its five principles of Catholic social thought.
Exsul Familia Nazarethana
Exsul Familia is the first document in the modern era of Catholic reflection on
immigration ethics. 2 It provides a comprehensive history of the Church’s activities,
associations and proclamations concerning immigration, establishes the Office of
Delegate of Migration Affairs, whose function is to oversee the work of the Church in
promoting the spiritual development of migrants, and institutes rules and regulations for
attending to the spiritual needs of migrants. In terms of immigration ethics, its main
1
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contribution lies in tying the right to emigrate to the right to subsistence and property.
“We did speak of the right of people to migrate, which right is founded in the very nature
of land.” 3 Pius XII references Rerum Novarum in using a natural law argument to
contend that the land is meant to sustain people in their physical and social needs. By
natural law, the head of the family has the right and obligation to provide for his family
and ensure his family’s future wellbeing. These rights precede the state and therefore
should not be removed by the state. Whereas Leo XIII in Rerum Novarum uses the
primacy of the family as a social unit to argue that human beings have a right to private
property, however, Pius XII uses it here to argue for the right to migration. Based on the
right to sustain his family, every person has a right to land, and if such land cannot be
acquired in one’s original homeland, one has the right to emigrate to find it. 4
Gaudium et Spes
Gaudium et Spes stands outside of and above the “immigration documents” of the
church, because it is one of the constituting documents of the Roman Catholic Church
resulting from the Second Vatican Council. It visits the issue of immigration on several
occasions, however, and forwards a number of principles that orient successive works on
immigration. 5 Included is an affirmation of the right to emigrate. 6 Furthermore, the
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document emphasizes the dignity of the migrant, insisting that they be treated in
accordance with that dignity and not just as “tools of production.” 7 It calls for economic
and social development and for reforms that ensure equality between nations, in order to
advance the “total vocation” and development of the whole human person, body and soul,
i.e. physical, mental and social needs such as food, shelter, education, health and
employment, in addition to spiritual needs. 8And it calls on all people to be good
neighbors to immigrants. 9
Pastoralis Migratorum Cura
In 1969, Pope Paul VI updated the norms for the Church’s immigration work
through his motu proprio Pastoralis Migratorum Cura. Using Gaudium et Spes as a
foundation, he expanded the theological underpinning the Church’s defense of migration
through bringing in the themes of Gaudium et Spes. He recognizes that the right to
migrate is based not just in the right to subsistence, but in the right of people to obtain the
means to pursue their own perfection.
Man [sic] has the natural right to use material and spiritual goods in order to more
fully and easily reach his own perfection. When a State, affected by lack of
resources or an excess of inhabitants, cannot provide these good to its inhabitants,
or when it imposes conditions that are harmful to human dignity, man[ sic] has
the right to choose a new home in another country, in order to attain the
conditions for a more dignified life. 10
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Furthermore, he grounds migration in human rights. He echoes Leo XIII in recognizing
the rights to dignified working conditions and social security, but he also borrows from
Vatican II in acknowledging rights to housing and education. 11 In grounding migration in
human rights and the right to pursue one’s own perfection, Paul VI broadens the basis for
the right to migration. Paul VI also brings in the themes of Vatican II into this discussion
through emphasizing the dignity of the immigrant, insisting on the right of that immigrant
to be treated not as a “tool of production,” but as a human being endowed with dignity
and able of entering into community with people in her new society. 12
In addition, Paul VI emphasizes the right not to migrate, which comes from
natural rights pertaining to the social nature of human beings. People have a right to be
assured of social conditions that will enable them to live with dignity in their own
community. However, if migration is necessary, families have the right to migrate
together, so as not to suffer family disunity. 13
Pastoralis Migratorum does put some limits on migration, using the common
good as a principle to limit migration. First of all, it uses the common good to ground the
right of a nation to control its borders. 14 “Public authorities unjustly deny the rights of
human persons if they block or impede emigration or immigration except where grave
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requirement of the common good, considered objectively, demand it.” 15 While the
primary purpose of this statement is to emphasize the obligation of countries to accept
immigrants, the latter half of the statement recognizes that immigration may be limited if
it harms the common good. This statement is left in the abstract, however; the document
does not define what those grave requirements may be.
Pastoralis Migratorum invokes the principle of the common good to limit
immigration again through exhorting professionals not to emigrate if they are needed by
their country:
Although they have the right to migrate, citizens should also keep in mind
that they have the right and the responsibility to contribute to the true progress of
their own community to the extent possible. Especially in regions of lower
economic development, where all resources are urgently needed, those who
succumb to the desire and temptation to migrate threaten the common good.
Technically developed regions should keep in mind the responsibility of
promoting the common good of less developed regions; they would do well to
prepare and repatriate professionals and young students after they have completed
their studies. 16
Here the letter is addressing the problem of “brain drain.” The common good of
individual countries depends on having an educated, professional class. Less developed
nations face difficulties when highly educated members leave for school or work and fail
to return. This statement is more specific than the one discussed above, but once again it
lacks precision, in that is unclear what constitutes the standard of “the extent possible” to
which people should be held.
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In another development of immigration ethics, this document updates the
anthropology used in the Catholic body of work on immigration, bringing it in line with
Vatican II’s understanding of the human person. Underscoring that persons possess both
bodies and souls, and that it is the Christian’s duty to promote the wellbeing of the whole
person, Pastoralis Migratorum promotes actions on concrete social issues, not just on
pastoral concerns. This point is underscored in Paul VI’s instruction to laity to work with
immigrants to resolve problem concerning housing, work, social security and to resolve
issues arising from differences in race, culture and language. 17
Lastly, Paul VI urges Episcopal Conferences to establish offices and initiatives for
the care of migrants. It charges the Sacred Congregation of Bishops to review and renew
the structure for immigrant ministry, which was later recorded in the Instruction The
Pastoral Care of People Who Migrate.
Ecclesia in America
Ecclesia in America is not an immigration text per se. However, it is an important
source for theological themes in Strangers No Longer, and it does touch briefly but
specifically on the topic of immigration. This apostolic exhortation of John Paul II was
written to the Church in the Americas, following the 1997 Special Assembly for America
of the Synod of Bishops convened in Rome. With regard to immigrants, John Paul II
urges churches in receiving nations to have an open and welcoming attitude toward
migrants, and foster this attitude among the general population. He also urges the Church
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in America to advocate for the right to migration and for the rights and dignity of
migrants, even in the case of illegal immigration.
These exhortations are written within the theological context of evangelization,
conversion and communion in Jesus Christ. The theme of the letter is “Encounter with
the Living Jesus Christ: The Way to Conversion, Communion and Solidarity in
America.” 18 John Paul II first recognizes the multitude of contexts where Christ’s
presence is explored today, including America’s Christian identity, popular piety, the
Eastern Catholic tradition, the growing respect for human rights, and globalization.
Threats to that presence are the drug trade, urbanization, external debt, and environmental
degradation. One of the central places that Christ is encountered is in face of the
neighbor, especially in our poorest and most needy neighbor. 19
Conversion, according to John Paul II, is a total, personal transformation that
prompts one to change one’s actions in light of the Gospel. 20 Conversion is fostered
through reading scripture, praying, participating in liturgy and learning the Christian
tradition. 21 Conversion to Christ also has a social dimension: “conversion urges
solidarity, because it makes us aware that whatever we do for others, especially for the
poorest, we do for Christ himself.” 22 Conversion is incomplete if it is not realized in
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concrete charitable actions that attend to the neighbor’s needs and foster the common
good and those social conditions that sustain human dignity. 23
Solidarity is “expressed in Christian love, which seeks the good of others,
especially of those most in need.” 24 For John Paul II, solidarity must be understood in
light of the preferential option for the poor. The option for the poor takes as its model
Jesus Christ, who “during his earthly time devoted himself with special compassion to all
those in spiritual and material need.” 25
While John Paul II incorporates the spiritually needy into the preferential option
for the poor, in Ecclesia in America he emphasizes solidarity with victims of social or
material poverty. This is apparent his introduction to Chapter V, The Path to Solidarity,
where he urges the Churches of the Americas to “[take] the Gospel as its starting-point[.]
[A] culture of solidarity needs to be promoted, capable of inspiring timely initiatives in
support of the poor and the outcast, especially refugees forced to leave their villages and
lands in order to flee violence.” 26 He continues this emphasis on the materially and
socially poor in the rest of his treatment on solidarity.
As another example, John Paul II lifts up the right to work and decries high
unemployment rates and poor working conditions. 27 He calls for the universalization of
solidarity, emphasizing the need to reduce the negative effects of globalization, especially
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“the domination of the powerful over the weak, especially in the economic sphere, and
the loss of the values of local cultures in favor of a misconstrued homogenization.” 28 In
this passage, John Paul II denounces economic domination of poor people and the
cultural domination of minority ethnic and racial groups, once again emphasizing the
social and economic dimension of the preferential option. In addition, he decries social
sins: corruption, foreign debt, drugs, the arms race and discrimination, highlighting their
effects on vulnerable populations. 29 He furthermore lifts up the problem of immigration
and calls on the Church to defend their right to migrate, to welcome them, provide for
their needs, and defend their rights, and protect their human dignity, even in cases of
illegal immigration. 30
Although John Paul II appeals often in Ecclesia in America to the common good,
he does not use it like Pastoralis Migratorum to limit immigration. Rather, he uses it to
call on nations to ensure the requirements of human dignity. 31 Furthermore, in keeping
with the letter’s emphasis on solidarity and the preferential option for the poor, he
focuses on ensuring human dignity for the poor.
The globalized economy must be analyzed in the light of the principles of social
justice, respecting the preferential option for the poor who must be allowed to
take their place in such an economy, and the requirements of the international
common good. For “the Church's social doctrine is a moral vision which aims to
encourage governments, institutions and private organizations to shape a future
consonant with the dignity of every person. 32
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While John Paul II uses the common good to make a different point than Pastoralis
Migratorum, this passage reflects the close correlation between human rights and the
common good found in Pacem in Terris.
Strangers No Longer
The U.S. and Mexican bishops’ letter on immigration, Strangers No Longer:
Together on the Journey of Hope, was published in 2003. This letter comes within the
context of a historical U.S. Catholic ministry to migrants. As far back as the 1920s, the
Catholic Church helped people migrate through the National Catholic Welfare
Conference’s Department of Immigration. The United States Catholic Conference
established a department of Migration and Refugee Services in 1965, and in 1998 this
department established four offices: the Office for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and
Refugees, the Office of Migration and Refugee Policy, the Office of Refugee Programs,
and the Office of the Executive Director. 33
Strangers No Longer was written in response to Pope John Paul II’s Ecclesia in
America, and in response to the suffering of immigrants and refugees in the United
States, especially the undocumented. Strangers No Longer takes up the prominent themes
of Ecclesia in America, challenging the Americas to unite in solidarity, communion and
conversion to Jesus Christ through doing justice to immigrants and refugees. Calling on
Ecclesia in America’s tripartite themes of conversion, communion and solidarity, the
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bishops emphasize the overarching importance of solidarity. In the beginning of the
declaration they say,
In the spirit of ecclesial solidarity begun in that synod and promoted in Ecclesia in
America, and aware of the migration reality our two nations live, we the bishops
of Mexico and the United States seek to awaken our peoples to the mysterious
presence of the crucified and risen Lord in the person of the migrant and to renew
in them the values of the Kingdom of God that he proclaimed. 34
In this statement, the bishops affirm a commitment to ecclesial solidarity and extend that
commitment to solidarity with immigrants. The bishops further reinforce the centrality of
solidarity when they say, “We reiterate our appreciation for and our encouragement of
manifestations of commitment to solidarity according to the vision inspired by Ecclesia
in America (EA).” 35
The vision of solidarity the bishops evoke is that of all peoples standing with the
poor and the immigrant, welcoming them with open arms and ensure that their human
rights are protected. 36 Connecting solidarity to social justice, the bishops announce,
We speak to the migrants who are forced to leave their lands to provide for their
families or to escape persecution. We stand in solidarity with you. We commit
ourselves to your pastoral care and to work toward changes in church and societal
structures that impede your exercising your dignity and living as children of
God. 37
Here, the bishops correlate solidarity with structural change, reminiscent of Ecclesia in
America’s treatment of social sin.

34

United States Catholic Conference of Bishops and Conferencia del Episcopado Mexicano,
Strangers No Longer: Together on a Journey of Hope, (United States Catholic Conference of Bishops
2003), par. 3, http://www.usccb.org/mrs/stranger.shtml#7 (accessed Feburary 3, 2004).
35

Ibid., par. 8.

36

Ibid.

37

Ibid., par. 9.

27
While the bishops do not explicitly declare solidarity with migrants as their
overarching moral framework, the theme is the implicit normal “control” throughout their
letter. To begin to illustrate the embeddedness of this theme, starting with the
introduction the bishops stress in almost every single paragraph the suffering and dignity
of migrants and/or emphasize the importance of ensuring their rights and meeting their
needs. Beginning in the second paragraph, the bishops denounce migrant experiences that
“are far from the vision of the Kingdom of God that Jesus proclaimed: many persons who
seek to migrate are suffering, and, in some cases, tragically dying; human rights are
abused; families are kept apart; and racist and xenophobic attitudes remain. 38 In the third
paragraph, the bishops announce their intent to “awaken our peoples to the mysterious
presence of the crucified and risen Lord in the person of the migrant…, 39 a statement that
stresses both the suffering and dignity of migrants.
Immediately following, the bishops discuss the human costs of migration.
We witness the vulnerability of our people involved in all sides of the migration
phenomenon, including families devastated by the loss of loved ones who have
undertaken the migration journey and children left alone when parents are
removed from them. We observe the struggles of landowners and enforcement
personnel who seek to preserve the common good without violating the dignity of
the migrant. And we share in the concern of religious and social service providers
who, without violating civil law, attempt to respond to the migrant knocking at
the door. 40
In this passage, the bishops begin with focus on the migrant. They then appear to begin
moving toward a discussion of the hardships that immigration poses to native-born
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residents in observing “the struggles of landowners and enforcement personnel.”
However, they focus not on the harmful effects of immigration on the residents of the
host country but on the wellbeing of immigrants, who are protected through the
landowners and enforcement personnel who “seek to preserve the common good without
violating the dignity of the migrant.” Even though the bishops provide a vague
recognition of difficulties that immigration might visit upon the host country, that
concern is quickly overridden by the returned focus to the immigrant, and the bishops fail
to mention any threats to other vulnerable populations resulting from immigration, which
is a grave oversight, as I argue later. Rather, the residents of the host country are
portrayed as people with resources at their disposal (landowners) or as agents of the
powerful state (enforcement personnel).
In the paragraph that follows, the bishops point to the need to change political and
ecclesial structures in order to repair the “injustice and violence against [migrants and
immigrants] and much suffering and despair among them because civil and church
structures are still inadequate to accommodate their basic needs.” 41 Once again, the focus
is on the immigrant, as it is in the following passage, in which they establish that the
main standard of assessment for Christian action is how the most vulnerable members of
society are treated.
We judge ourselves as a community of faith by the way we treat the most
vulnerable among us. The treatment of migrants challenges the consciences of
elected officials, policymakers, enforcement officers, residents of border
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communities, and providers of legal aid and social services, many of whom share
our Catholic faith. 42
In this passage, not only do they challenge U.S. residents to ensure the wellbeing
migrants (whom they equate with the most vulnerable members of society), they also
paint the residents of the receiving country as people with resources and agents of the
state, as they did earlier. In reinforcing the images of immigrants as the vulnerable and
residents of the host country as the powerful, the bishops reinforce the concept that in
questions of immigration ethics, solidarity means solidarity with migrants.
The bishops’ commitment to solidarity with migrants is apparent in the letter’s
theological reflection as well as in its introduction. This section starts with a scriptural
reflection that reveals an emphasis on treating strangers with justice and kindness. In this
section, the bishops highlight Abraham’s welcoming of three strangers who were
manifestations of God. They point to Joseph who was sold into slavery in a foreign land
but later saved his family from starvation. They recall that Jesus, Mary and Joseph were
themselves refugees in Egypt. 43 They emphasize Judaic laws mandating justice for the
stranger. 44 And the bishops find Christ in the face of migrants who are hungry and
imprisoned (Mt 25:40). 45
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This scriptural reflection is accompanied by a summary of Catholic social
teaching concerning migration. Reviewing key documents in the tradition, the bishops
identify five principles of Catholic social thought that relate directly to immigration:
I. Persons have the right to find opportunities in their homeland.
II. Persons have the right to migrate to support themselves and their families.
III. Sovereign nations have the right to control their borders.
IV. Refugees and asylum seekers should be afforded protection.
V. The human dignity and human rights of undocumented migrants should be
respected. 46
Through this list, the bishops present ethical principles that have been reached in the
various social documents regarding immigration. The bishops flesh out some of the
foundational theological principles underlying these principles in the accompanying
narrative. In it, they highlight the principles of subsistence (grounding the right to migrate
and to find opportunities in ones own land), human rights (based in the demands of
human dignity), and the common good (from which arises the right of sovereign nations
to control their borders). 47
Considering these principles in the aggregate, the primary ethical framework that
arises is solidarity with the immigrant. Four of the five principles (I, II, IV, and V)
articulate rights pertaining specifically to migrants. The third principle on the list is the
one principle that concerns itself with the rights of the receiving nation. It states that
nations have the right to control their borders. However, in its elaboration even this
principle emphasizes migrant wellbeing. The text reads:
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The Church recognizes the right of sovereign nations to control their territories
but rejects such control when it is exerted merely for the purpose of acquiring
additional wealth. More powerful economic nations, which have the ability to
protect and feed their residents, have a stronger obligation to accommodate
migration flows. 48
Even though this principle is ostensibly focused on the rights of a sovereign nation, the
bishops ultimately stress a nation’s obligation toward migrants, thus expressing solidarity
with migrants.
This emphasis on solidarity with the immigrant is carried through the letter’s
pastoral and policy responses. In this chapter, the bishops follow Ecclesia in America in
calling for conversion, communion and solidarity with immigrants, and they call
Christians to a conversion of mind and heart that will lead to communion between nativeborn people and immigrants. Such a communion is characterized by hospitality to and
welcoming of Christ in the person of the migrant. The growing communion between
native-born people and immigrants in turn leads to a growing solidarity with
immigrants. 49
The bishops point out that church communities demonstrate solidarity through
public policy responses as well as pastoral responses, mirroring Ecclesia in America’s
emphasis on social sin and the need for social justice. They begin their public policy
discussion by promoting solidarity across borders, urging the two countries to work
together to address the root causes of migration, such as low wages and unemployment in
Mexico and economic inequalities between the two nations, which have been exacerbated
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by factors such as NAFTA. 50 They urge Mexican policies that will create jobs with a
living wage, and they advocate international agreements to promote the economic
wellbeing of small businesspeople and individuals as well as big business. They also
advocate that immigration laws in both countries be reformed to reflect the reality of the
considerable social, economic and cultural integration between the two countries. 51
The bishops’ subsequent recommendations reveal a bias for a generous
immigration policy that favors immigrants. For example, they recommend that U.S.
immigration policy and resource allocation be changed so that families separated by
immigration can be united. The bishops suggest that the way to do so is through
increasing the number of visas for legal entry. They also advocate a broad legalization of
undocumented immigrants.
In addition to broad-based legalization, the bishops promote additional
employment-based visas. They are open to these work opportunities being facilitated
through both temporary visas and permanent resident cards, but they are clear that any
temporary work programs must be structured so as to avoid abuse of migrant workers.
The temporary work program envisioned in the letter includes the following elements: a
living wage, job portability, labor protections, mechanisms and resources for enforcing
worker’s rights, family unity, mobility within U.S. and between U.S. and homeland, a
path to permanent residency, and ability to accrue and use Social Security benefits while
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in the program. It also includes provision for labor market tests to ensure that U.S.
workers are not harmed.
The bishops’ final recommendation entails the creation of border enforcement
mechanisms and policies that will protect the human rights of immigrants. They advocate
policy changes to will reestablish immigrants’ due process rights, which were gutted in
the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. Lastly, they
encourage enforcement policies that will protect migrants’ right to asylum.
The bishops’ overarching moral framework – solidarity with the immigrant –
seemingly aligns with the preferential option for the poor, which mandates special
concern for the most vulnerable among us. However, as a framework for immigration
ethics, solidarity with the immigrant paradoxically contradicts the preferential option for
the poor, which mandates special concern for all vulnerable groups among us, without
favor. With such a heavy emphasis on immigrants, other vulnerable groups become
invisible, and the ethicist working out of this framework risks violating the principle of
the preferential option for the poor.
I do not argue with the bishops’ conclusion that immigrants are the most
vulnerable population. Nor do I disagree with the majority of the bishops’ policy
recommendations (discussed in Chapter Four). However, the bishops ignore the fact that
the United States contains other vulnerable populations, which John Paul II recognized in
Ecclesia in America in lifting up the concerns of communities of African descent, whom
he describes as victims of ongoing discrimination and marginalization and deserving of
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special attention. 52 The bishops also ignore the fact that undocumented Mexican
immigration negatively affects poor U.S. populations: low-skilled workers suffer
reductions in wages, and peers suffer declines in high school graduation rates. 53 In
ignoring these issues, the bishops allow injustices to poor communities in the United
States to remain unchallenged, and they disable true solidarity, which is intended for and
between all poor and marginalized people without preference.
Campaign for Immigration Reform: Justice for Immigrants
The lack of reciprocal solidarity becomes quite apparent in documents of the
Catholic campaign for immigration reform. The campaign, Justice for Immigrants: A
Journey of Hope, is the U.S. Bishops’ effort to educate and mobilize parishes in support
of immigrant-friendly public policies. The campaign maintains the ethical focus on
solidarity with immigrants and puts some “meat on the bones” of the policy
recommendations forwarded in their pastoral letter. It also buttresses the bishops’ claim
that the United States can afford to welcome current numbers of immigrants, through
providing social and economic data on the economic effects of immigration. 54 Less
positively, the campaign’s selective use of data reveals the weakness of putting solidarity
with immigrants at the heart of immigration ethics.
Theologically, the campaign is rooted in the principles and biblical reflection
summarized in Strangers No Longer. The campaign thus emphasizes solidarity with
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immigrants. In case there were any doubt that this is the ethical focus, the campaign’s
name, Justice for Immigrants, indicates clearly that it is.
The campaign’s policy recommendations reflect those found in Strangers No
Longer, although they bring more detail. Addressing family separation, for example, the
Justice for Immigrants’ Parish Resource Kit calls for more family-based visas and for a
reduction in the current backlog of cases waiting to be processed by the Bureau of U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services. They explicate the broad-based legalization called
for in Strangers No Longer as earned legalization, in which undocumented immigrants
may legalize their status if they can demonstrate that they have paid taxes and possess
good moral character. 55 The bishops clarify their just border enforcement
recommendation by specifying and applying three principles: (1) border enforcement
needs to target dangerous migrants such as smugglers, human traffickers and terrorists,
(2) border enforcement methods should be proportional to the situation, neither using
excessive force nor being carried out by non-immigration officials, and (3) humane
border enforcement mechanisms respect immigrants’ human rights. 56
Even while solidarity with immigrants remains firmly established as the chosen
foundation for immigration ethics, the bishops must show that current immigration
patterns do not unduly harm the United States and thus do not violate the principle of
national sovereignty, which serves to protect the common good. They do so through
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citing studies substantiating the position that immigrants provide a net positive economic
benefit to U.S. workers and taxpayers.
For example, the bishops point to one study showing that immigrants pay more in
taxes than they use in benefits. 57 They reference another study that estimates that
undocumented workers pay $20 billion into the Social Security system each year –
money those workers will never retrieve. 58 Challenging the claims that immigrant
workers take jobs from and depress the wages of native-born workers, the bishops quote
studies that show that immigrants create new jobs and fill jobs that are going unfilled by
native-born workers, 59 They also argue that undocumented immigrants do not depress
wages of native-born workers, citing the 2005 Economic Report of the President.
The Justice for Immigrants campaign creates a compelling case that the United
States benefits from immigration. However, the bishops’ focus on solidarity with
immigrants leads them to use data selectively, ignoring or minimizing evidence that
immigration has a deleterious effect on wages and employment of low-wage U.S.-born
U.S. workers. The Parish Resource Kit’s economic fact sheet, for example, ignores
evidence that immigration may have a negative impact on some U.S. workers, notably,
unskilled workers who are most vulnerable in the job market, citing studies that find that
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immigrant workers supplement, rather than displace, native workers. 60 However, it
ignores another study not cited by the campaign that found that a ten percent increase in
immigrant labor leads to a decline in employment among black men. 61
The economic fact sheet likewise cites findings that immigration has virtually no
effect on wages of low-skilled native-born workers, while ignoring opposing research. It
states that a 10 percent increase in immigrant labor lowers native-born wages by only 1
percent. 62 However, opposing research finds up to a 9 percent decrease in wages resulting
from immigration. 63 The Catholic bishops dismiss studies that show results that are
inconvenient for the bishops’ conclusions, and so they choose not to present them.
However, opposing studies were performed by credible scholars, they are part of a body
of work over time that has found that immigration depresses wages and raises
unemployment for unskilled U.S. born workers, and the economic community has not yet
reached consensus on fundamental assumptions regarding the substitutability between
immigrant and native-born workers. In the absence of such a consensus, a Catholic
ethicist committed to solidarity with all people is compelled to at least take the negative
studies into account.
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Not only do the bishops pick and choose which studies they will present, they
selectively present material from reports they cite, doing a disservice to the original work.
For example, while the cited 2005 Economic Report of the President observes that
research generally indicates a one percent decrease in overall U.S. wages, the same report
also notes that the wage impact is greater for unskilled workers than for workers as a
whole, and also that economic studies founded on different assumptions find a larger
impact. The president’s report explains:
Generally, estimates suggest that a 10 percent increase in the share of foreignborn workers reduces native wages by less than one percent. Recent studies that
look at wage effects by skill levels typically find larger negative effects on lessskilled than medium or high-skilled native workers. Adverse wage effects on
previous immigrants have been found to be on the order of 2 to 4 percent. It
should be noted that these studies typically identify the effect of immigration on
natives by comparing labor market outcomes of natives in response to differences
in immigration across regions and over time. Analysis done at the national level
relies primarily on variation in immigration over time and finds larger adverse
effects. 64
While this report discusses varied conclusions reached by different methods and
acknowledges that low skilled U.S. workers suffer declines in wages that exceed the one
percent figure forwarded by the bishops, the bishops selectively cite it to support the
claim that undocumented immigration has no significant impact on U.S. wages. The
economic fact sheet uses the president’s report to buttress its argument that the impact of
immigration on native workers is negligible, but the report itself provides a more nuanced
account of the effects, one that acknowledges a range of findings.
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Furthermore, where the bishops do recognize contradictory research, they
downplay its conclusions. In a sentence that is particularly shocking in light of the
preferential option for the poor, the bishops minimize the negative consequences of
undocumented immigration on wages of low-skilled U.S. workers by saying, “A recent
report concludes that low-skilled immigrant workers negatively impact only high school
dropouts, which represent only 9 percent of the population.” 65 This is a cavalier dismissal
of 27 million of the United States’ most vulnerable citizens (over four times the number
of undocumented immigrants), on the basis that they comprise only a small percentage of
the population. Such exclusion is unacceptable in light of the preferential option for the
poor, which insists on inclusion and justice for all marginalized groups. The bishops
renege on solidarity with vulnerable U.S. workers.
There is a lack of consensus concerning the economic effect of undocumented
immigration on U.S. workers, and even though a majority of economic studies find only a
small negative effect on low-skilled native-born U.S. workers, reputable scholars using
different assumptions have over time found a larger effect. In selectively choosing data
that supports their position, the bishops overlook some of this country’s most vulnerable
citizens: unskilled workers, who are disproportionately Black and Latino. (The economic
debate will be discussed at greater length in Chapter Four.) Workers earning $7.50 an
hour (which is above minimum wage) will earn $15,000 a year, or $3,000 less than the
poverty threshold for a family of four. 66 These workers do not have enough to feed and
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clothe their families and keep them in decent housing. Although immigration does not
cause poverty in the United States, it may exacerbate an already threatening situation for
some. It behooves the Catholic Church to take seriously evidence that immigration
negatively affects low-skilled U.S. born workers, so that the Church can stand for justice
for all people.
Summary
The bishops’ overarching emphasis on solidarity with immigrants is prophetic and
necessary in that it challenges a wealthy nation’s unwillingness to welcome immigrants.
Furthermore, it aligns with the scriptural emphasis on hospitality and the emphasis on
human rights in Catholic social thought. However, the bishops’ ethical focus on solidarity
with immigrants is problematic, because it leads to selective use of empirical and
economic data that leads them, ironically, to violate the preferential option for all poor
and marginalized people. The preferential option requires concern for all vulnerable
groups, and solidarity requires systemic solutions that further the wellbeing of these
groups. In the interest of solidarity with immigrants, the bishops hinder themselves from
attending to all of the pertinent dynamics in the arena of immigration, and they disable
themselves from developing recommendations for U.S. immigration policy that reflect
solidarity with all affected poor and marginalized groups.
In overlooking the needs of low-skilled U.S. born workers in their analysis and
recommendations, the bishops also breach the principle of the common good, which
requires that the wellbeing of all parties be considered, especially of the poor and
marginalized. This is a serious shortcoming, given that the common good is considered in
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Catholic social thought to be the very purpose of the law. While the bishops undertake to
show that current immigration patterns do not harm and they even promote the wellbeing
of United States citizens and society, I show in Chapter Four that the most vulnerable
U.S. workers are harmed by current immigration patterns. This fact needs to be addressed
in any immigration policy that seeks to be aligned with the common good.
In the next chapter, I argue that the common good should replace solidarity with
immigrants as the center of moral reasoning in immigration ethics. However, in order for
the common good to serve as the central principle, it needs to be more precisely
delineated than it currently is in Catholic social thought. I propose a treatment of the
common good based in a feminist retrieval of the common good performed by Suzanne
DeCrane.

CHAPTER TWO
DEFENDING AND DEFINING THE COMMON GOOD
In the last chapter, I demonstrated that the U.S. and Mexican bishops’ framework
for immigration ethics is solidarity with the immigrant. This framework is rooted in
documents of Catholic social teaching (hereafter CST) ranging from immigration
documents such as Exsul Familia and Pastoralis Migratorum to broader documents such
as Gaudium et Spes and Ecclesia in America. I also argued that the framework of
solidarity with the immigrant is insufficient for an evaluation of immigration issues
because it hinders a comprehensive moral analysis that takes into account all
marginalized populations. This framework erroneously biases the preferential option for
the poor toward only one vulnerable population, immigrants, and ignores other at risk
populations affected by immigration, such as the African American and Latino
communities.
In this chapter, I propose using the common good as the central moral framework
for immigration ethics, and I begin a process of specifying the common good so as to
capitalize on its benefits as an ethical approach. The common good holds several
advantages over solidarity with immigrants. As mentioned above, it ensures a balance of
concern for all affected parties, especially of poor and marginalized people and
communities. Doing so militates against partiality for one vulnerable group over another
and helps the analysis stay true to the preferential option for the poor. Concretely,
42
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with the common good at the center of immigration ethics, it is harder to gloss over
negative consequences of immigration for poor U.S. workers. Solutions based on the
common good will integrate proposals that benefit all vulnerable populations rather than
aiming solely at benefiting immigrants.
The common good is a more fitting framework for immigration ethics in addition
because immigration ethics today largely concerns law and public policy, and according
to CST the very purpose of law is to uphold the common good. 1 CST recognizes that
because people live in society, the many competing individual needs and interests must
be harmonized for the sake of all. 2 It is the State’s role to do so, guiding its efforts
according to justice and the common good.
The importance of law in U.S. immigration questions is apparent in the
multiplicity of immigration laws at local, state and national levels. Federal legislative
proposals in 2010, for example, included the Southern Border Security Act that intended
to hire, train and deploy more Border Patrol agents along Arizona’s border and the
DREAM Act, which sought legalization for children brought to the United States
illegally by their parents. 3 On the state level, in 2010 Arizona passed the most stringent
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anti-immigrant law in the nation, which mandates that police check the immigration
status of detainees and criminalizes the failure to carry immigration papers. 4 On the local
level, the town of Fremont, Nebraska voted to prohibit landlords from renting to
undocumented immigrants. 5 These pieces of legislation are but representative samples of
recent legislative activity around immigration. In 2009, 48 states enacted 222 laws and
131 resolutions concerning immigration. 6 And since 2006, almost 40 towns in 18 states
have attempted legislation similar to Fremont’s. 7
A further advantage of a common good approach is that it can be a vehicle for
moving beyond the polarizations of the current U.S. debate. Presently, pro-immigration
voices in the debate name only benefits of immigration for the U.S., while antiimmigration voices document only negative consequences. Both sides bear witness to
some truth, but the truth in its entirety is complex than either extreme would suggest.
This complexity, however, leads to confusion. The common good can provide citizens
with the ethical resources they need to chart a path through contradictory and confusing
economic and moral claims and help the United States move past simplistic and
antagonistic analyses and solutions toward those that embody solidarity with all affected
parties.

4

Archibold, "Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration."

5

CNN Wire Staff, "Nebraska Immigration Law Passes," CNN.com, June 22, 2010,
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-22/us/nebraska.immigration_1_immigration-policy-farmers-branchordinance?_s=PM:US (accessed January 2, 2011).
6
7

Archibold, "Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration."

Almost none of these proposals were enacted, due to concerns over legal costs stemming from
civil rights challenges. Diane Diamond, "Fighting Illegal Immigration at the Local Level,"
http://dianedimond.net/contact/ (accessed January 12, 2010).

45
Two additional advantages of a common good immigration ethic become apparent
through its application. When the common good is specified according to my proposal in
this dissertation, it leads to more comprehensive strategies for promoting human
wellbeing in the face of immigration – strategies that address threats to human flourishing
of all vulnerable populations, not only immigrants. Furthermore, in addressing a broader
range of issues for a broader range of people, a common good approach will lead to
greater solidarity between poor communities of differing legal status, race and ethnicity.
In order to fully realize the benefits of a common good framework, it is first
necessary to develop the common good beyond its current delineation in CST. The
common good is a key moral category in Catholic social thought, and yet its elaboration
in CST is so broad that it has been called not only “resistant to tight conceptual
definition” but also “embarrassingly fuzzy.” 8 This need not be so. Catholic social thought
provides a path for making the common good more specific. This path begins with
Gaudium et Spes’ succinct, if still vague, definition of the common good as “the sum of
those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members
relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment.” 9 This definition directs the
common good toward human flourishing. If the common good correlates to human
flourishing and human flourishing can be well defined, then the common good can
likewise be brought into clearer focus.
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I now turn to the task of specifying the common good. I investigate the definition
of the common good in Catholic social thought and propose a first step in making the
common good more tangible: providing a more exact definition of human flourishing
than currently supplied in CST. 10 A definition of human flourishing must be grounded in
an understanding of the human person. The anthropology I propose is based in Martha
Nussbaum’s human capabilities approach, first used in relationship to the common good
by Suzanne DeCrane in her feminist retrieval of Thomas Aquinas’ common good. 11 This
anthropology defines human beings in terms of a common set of physical, intellectual,
emotional, and moral capabilities. A person finds fulfillment, then, through realizing the
broad range of human capabilities with which she has been endowed.
The Roots and Elaboration of the Common Good in CST
The common good was first succinctly defined in Catholic social teaching in the
1961 encyclical Mater et Magistra. In this letter, Pope John XXIII distinguished that the
common good “embraces the sum total of those conditions of social living, whereby men
[sic] are enabled more fully and more readily to achieve their own perfection.” 12 This
definition was later updated in Vatican II’s Gaudium et Spes: “[The common good is] the
sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual
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members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment.” 13 This definition
highlights the relationship between the common good and the individual and indicates
that the aim of the common good is the wellbeing of human persons. In this declaration,
Gaudium et Spes asserts that people and groups must be afforded opportunities for selfrealization, and that these opportunities must be assured through social institutions and
dynamics. This statement does not promote any particular social arrangement, but it does
designate the standard through which human society should be judged: the wellbeing of
its population.
This definition leaves open the question: in what does human fulfillment exist? To
answer this question, one must posit a shared set of human characteristics, an
understanding of who we are as human beings, in other words, an anthropology. I explore
CST’s anthropology and understanding of the common good below. While CST
illuminates some aspects of human nature and provides some guidance on the content of
the common good, I find both its anthropology and its exposition of the common good
incomplete. In order to further develop CST’s thought in these moral categories, I first
return the roots of these categories, found in Thomas Aquinas. These roots will ultimately
form the basis of their further development.
Thomistic Roots of CST’s Understanding of the Human Person and the Common Good
Thomas Aquinas is the central foundation for CST on the common good, and his
reflections on human nature coupled with his theological methodology of natural law
thinking have formed the basis for CST’s anthropology. Aquinas’ anthropology and
13
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account of human flourishing begin with his general theory of goodness. In the Summa
Theologica, Aquinas adopts the Aristotelian premise that all beings tend toward an end, a
telos, which they understand to be a good. Because Aquinas equates goodness with
perfection, 14 and God alone is perfect and completely good, 15 the final end that all
creation seeks is God, or union with God. 16
Beings not only seek the ultimate good, they also seek the proximate good of selfperfection. Because goodness is equated with perfection, the good of creation is
maximized when beings seek their own actualization or perfection. 17 This good is not at
odds with the pursuit of God but rather forms part of that pursuit; the quest for selfperfection is not the ultimate end of any thing’s existence but is ultimately directed
toward God. 18
Beings pursue their own perfection through following their natural inclinations in
accordance with the type of being they are. 19 Consequently, all of creation seeks its own
perfection simply through existing in its proper form and function. For Aquinas, the ideal
form to which a being aspires can be induced through observation and reflection on its
nature. He reaches the following conclusions about natural human inclinations through
such observation and reasoning, known as natural law reasoning. First, human beings
share an inclination toward survival with all substances and creatures. Secondly, human
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beings share other inclinations with all animals, including procreation and the education
of offspring. The third group of inclinations is common only to rational beings. These
inclinations include seeking the truth about God and living in society. 20 As rational
beings, human beings attain God through own intellect and will, rather than through mere
existence or instinct. 21 They do so through exercising right judgment and actions,
specifically through knowing and loving God. 22
Although Aquinas recognizes the capacity of human beings to err in their moral
judgment and practice, he is optimistic of human beings’ capability to understand what is
required of them and to act on it. Unlike Luther and Calvin, for whom reason was
completely clouded and flesh completely fallen, Aquinas maintains that human beings
can understand what God’s will is and act in accordance with it – through the
development of virtues, or habits, that incline one’s intellect and will properly to God.
As rational, embodied beings ordained to God, human beings have both rational
and physical elements. Human flourishing includes these different components. As
rational beings, people seek God through knowing and loving God. As physical beings
they seek to fully realize their material wellbeing. Aquinas does not advocate that each
individual seek her own material good indiscriminately. Rather, she must seek it in
proper relation to the good of one’s soul; true human flourishing requires proper ordering
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of goods. Because the rational faculty is of a higher order than the other faculties, one’s
bodily good is subordinate to the good of one’s spirit. 23
Another element of Aquinas’ anthropology is human beings’ inherently social
nature. According to Aquinas, people live in society for three reasons. First, they depend
on each other to meet their material needs. Secondly, they depend on a web of
relationships for their own development, both intellectual and moral. Lastly, human
beings need each other in order to fulfill their vocations as human beings formed for love.
The human person has an “inner urge to the communications of knowledge and love
which require relationship with other persons.” 24
Because the human being is a social being, “the highest natural good of the
individual consists in participation in a just community.” 25 Because people were created
to live in society, an individual’s good consists in part in the good of the whole. 26 One’s
individual wellbeing is enhanced when social conditions support one’s mental, moral and
physical growth and development.
The good of the whole does not stand in opposition to the good of the individual,
because Aquinas understands the common good as supporting individual wellbeing. The
relationship between person and society is mutually informing: the individual person is
oriented toward the good of the whole, but the common good is directed toward the good
of the individual. Because a person is a being with a transcendent destiny, a person’s
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good is not subsumed by the good of the whole, nor does the good of the whole supersede
the good of the individual. 27
Any seeming social conflicts between individuals’ accessing conditions that
advance their flourishing are harmonized through justice, justice being a virtue that
directs ones will toward giving another person his due through a “constant and perpetual
will.” 28 General, or legal, justice directs the actions of an individual toward the common
good 29 and governs the other virtues through orienting them toward the good of the
whole. In addition to general justice, Aquinas recognizes two parts of justice that govern
different transactions. Commutative justice directs a person toward what is due another in
individual transactions. Distributive justice governs the distribution of common goods to
individuals.
Human Flourishing and the Common Good in Catholic Social Thought
Theological anthropology in CST is rooted in Aquinas. Catholic social thought
recognizes that human beings are made to know and love God and affirms their
transcendental destiny. 30 It affirms the importance of the body. 31 And it acknowledges
humankind’s inherently social nature and the centrality of the common good to one’s
individual good. 32
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CST also emphasizes the proper ordering of goods and the social nature of true
human flourishing.
One of the greatest injustices in the contemporary world consists precisely in this:
that the ones who possess much are relatively few and those who possess almost
nothing are many. … [T]he few who possess much … do not really succeed in
‘being’ because, through a reversal of the hierarchy of values, they are hindered
by the cult of ‘having’; and there are others – the many who have little or nothing
– who do not succeed in realizing their basic human vocation because they are
deprived of essential good. The evil does not consist in ‘having’ as such, but in
possessing without regard for the quality and the ordered hierarchy of the goods
one has. Quality and hierarchy arise from the subordination of goods and their
availability to man’s ‘being’ and his true vocation. 33
In this passage, John Paul II gives modern voice to the subordination of material to
spiritual goods. The desire for superfluous material goods must be subordinated to love of
neighbor, which is lived out through ensuring that the basic needs of the most vulnerable
members of society who do not have access to “essential good.” Love for God is lived
through concrete actions that support the ability of the most vulnerable people to live
dignified lives. The above passage also emphasizes the social nature of true human
flourishing, which John Paul II describes as “integral human development.” 34 The
flourishing of an individual does not occur in a vacuum but happens in relationship to
others, in society. Authentic human development requires access to basic material and
social goods for all people, and it requires the subordination of superogatory physical
wants to the basic material needs of others.
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While Catholic social thought retains its Thomistic roots, recent Catholic social
teaching integrates a particularly modern anthropology, describing human beings as
bearers of rights pertaining to their intellectual, spiritual, social and physical nature. 35 For
example, as physical beings all people have an equal right to the means necessary for
live, such as to adequate food, shelter, and medical care. As intellectual and social beings
they have the right to share in the benefits of culture (for example through attaining an
education commensurate with others), to speak and assemble freely in public, to
participate in political governance, and to contribute to the common good. As beings with
a spiritual vocation, intellect and free will they have the right to seek and worship God as
they see fit. Persons also have the right to control their own bodies, to work, to earn a
living wage, and to work under safe and reasonable working conditions. When these
rights go unfulfilled in a person’s native land, a person has the right to emigrate. 36
Catholic social thought recognizes that human beings are bearers not only of
rights but also of responsibilities. For example, each person has the responsibility to seek
God and to worship God according to their conscience. She also has the responsibility to
honor the rights of others. And she has the responsibility to contribute to the common
good. 37
This understanding of humans as bearers of rights and responsibilities is
particularly pertinent to CST’s treatment of the common good, because the common good
is correlated with the protection and promotion of human rights. In fact, the Vatican II
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Council names the universal realization of human rights and their attendant
responsibilities as one of the chief indicators of the common good. 38 Strangers No
Longer reflects this emphasis, stating that any act that violates basic human rights fails
the common good. 39
The emphasis on human rights points to another development in the tradition of
the common good found in CST – an emphasis on the well being of the least among us.
Human flourishing must be assured for all people, especially the most vulnerable
populations. Many passages in Gaudium et Spes emphasize the need to attend to the
wellbeing of the poor and marginalized. It names the elderly, refugees, and the poor as
groups of people who are deserve special attention. 40 It emphasizes the need to foster
justice for oppressed people, listing sins against human dignity such as slavery,
disgraceful working conditions, and subhuman living conditions. 41 And it notes that the
equality of human dignity requires justice and the eradication of discrimination against
women. 42
John Paul II considers the option for the poor an organizing principle of charity.
“The option or love of preference for the poor … is an option, or a special form of
primacy in the exercise of Christian charity….” 43 A Christian is directed toward loving
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all neighbors, but especially the poor. The option for the poor is not simply an exercise in
personal affection toward poor people, however, although it includes an affective
dimension. Nor is it a simple exercise of providing aid. Rather, the option for the poor
involves working for social and structural change. The changes required are not only
local but also national and even international. They include not only changes in personal
consumption patterns but also changes in established political structures. 44 The
conditions sought are those that provide all people with basic means for life and human
dignity. This includes ensuring access for all to means of subsistence as well as to
conditions that foster the social, cultural and spiritual dimensions of the human being. 45
Human flourishing is enabled when one maintains an option for the poor. It is also
enabled through the establishment of justice, which in Catholic social thought is more a
set of institutional arrangements rather than a virtue. CST borrows Aquinas’ commutative
and distributive forms of justice, but it forwards the importance of “social justice,” which
describes the relationships governing the “comprehensive context, the overall social
order, in which the agents involved in the other two forms of justice carry on their
activities.” 46 The term social justice was introduced in Quadregesimo Anno, which
equated it with the common good. “The public institutions of the nations should be such
as to make all human society conform to the requirements of the common good, that is,
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the norm of social justice.” 47 In this encyclical, which devotes itself to the economic
order, Pope Pius XI indicates that social justice is directed toward equitable social and
economic arrangements, including the requirement that growth in the economy or
improvements in the social infrastructure benefit all people and not just a select few. 48
Another way in which CST expands on Aquinas is in its scope. The concept of the
common good was developed initially at a time when precursors to the state were
forming, and the common good served to justify and limit positive law within a
jurisdiction. It thus became correlated with the common good of a nation. 49 However, in
the contemporary context of globalization and universal human rights, Pope John XXIII
firmly established the importance of promoting the universal common good. 50 One must
be concerned not only with the flourishing of members of one’s own nation-state, but
with that of all people everywhere.
To summarize CST on the common good, the common good is directed toward
promoting the flourishing of all persons and groups, and it is characterized by social
justice and a special concern for the wellbeing of poor and oppressed groups. CST’s
definition of human flourishing is informed by Aquinas’ anthropology, even as it also has
distinctly modern elements. Human beings are rational and physical beings who are
inherently oriented toward God and self-actualization. Because human beings are bearers
47
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of dignity, rights and responsibilities, human flourishing requires protection and
promotion of those rights and fulfillment of corresponding responsibilities. As social
beings, one’s own flourishing depends on the common good. One pursues ones full
humanity through pursuing God, working for justice, and knowing and loving God and
neighbor, especially those neighbors whose basic rights and needs are threatened.
The common good and theological anthropology elaborated in Catholic social
thought hold some key insights for immigration ethics. First, the common good is
directed toward human flourishing, and human flourishing is defined through human
rights. As such, an analysis framed by the common good asks how current immigration
trends affect people’s wellbeing. It asks, are immigrants more or less able to realize the
fulfillment of their human vocation through migration? Furthermore, the common good is
directed toward the wellbeing of all people, not just immigrants. A common good
analysis hence also asks: How are members of the host country affected by immigration –
is their wellbeing hampered or increased?
In addition, the common good is characterized preferential option for the poor. A
common good analysis consequently focuses its concern for wellbeing on poor and
marginalized communities. Because of the preferential option for the poor’s focus on atrisk communities, the primary question becomes: How are poor people – both immigrants
and citizens of the receiving country – affected by immigration? Are they more or less
able to realize their rights and vocations as human beings? Lastly, because the common
good requires just social institutions, the question shifts focus once again: instead
inquiring into the effects of immigration on the population, a common good analysis
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analyzes the effects of immigration laws, policies and practices that affect immigrants
and citizens.
Bringing all elements into focus, a common good analysis of undocumented
immigration from Mexico, at its core, asks not only how the universal wellbeing of
people is affected, but how undocumented Mexican immigrants, Mexicans, and poor U.S.
citizens are affected by current immigration trends – both the migration of Mexicans and
the U.S. policies that are currently in place. The answers to these questions will
determine whether or not the current combination of immigration and policies promotes
the common good, and what responses are called for.
Need for Further Specification of the Common Good in CST
The common good in Catholic thought is a valuable resource for thinking about
individual and social wellbeing. However, it would be beneficial to more concretely
delineate it in order to ensure its correct application in complex situations in which
competing claims must be adjudicated. The common good would benefit from greater
demarcation in two areas in particular: the relationship between the national and universal
common good and theological anthropology.
I first address the relationship between the national and universal common good,
as the latter question is the focus of the rest of the chapter. As discussed above, the
principle of the common good was first developed within a political context of emerging
precursors to the State, and as the State became the dominant form of public authority,
the common good was envisioned as pertaining to the State. 51 In light of globalization,
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John XXIII declared the universality of the common good and insisted on the
subordination of the state to the universal common good. He called for the creation of a
global political entity whose purpose would be to safeguard the universal common good.
Forty-five years after the release of Pacem in Terris, however, there is still no
democratically controlled global organization with the authority to compel policies
promoting the universal common good. The nation state therefore continues to be “the
most important (actual or potential) agent for promoting the common good, regionally
and even globally.” 52 The State is thus charged with promoting the common good at the
national, regional and universal levels. There has been little discussion of the relationship
between the common good at these varying levels. I offer three principles for a more
precise understanding of that relationship.
The first principle is that the universal common good forms part of a nation’s
good. This is true because just as an individual’s wellbeing depends on the health of
society, the health of a society is affected by the health of the community of nations. For
example, political instability in the Middle East carries security risks for the United
States. The condition of the Brazilian rain forest affects the entire world’s environment.
And low wages in Asia negatively affect Mexico’s ability to provide living wages to its
workers or even keep industry in Mexico.
The second principle is that the universal common good promotes the good of
each individual nation. This is because the common good of a nation or state forms parts
of the universal common good; it is an area “in which the common good of the whole
52
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civilized society achieves greater density.” 53 The global common good must ultimately
be realized through local realities. Thus, the global common good is not served when the
common good of any one country is jeopardized. The universal common good is directed
toward the flourishing of each and every member of each and every society, and their
flourishing in turn depends on the health of their respective societies.
Third, the national and global common goods are harmonized through justice and
an option for the poor. Because the common good is equated with justice, a nation cannot
pursue its own interests without regard to the impact of its actions on other societies.
Because of the option for the poor, a nation cannot pursue its own interests without
considering the impact on poor people in their own and other countries. An option for the
poor requires that justice be sought especially for poor and marginalized people, and it
requires that social and economic conditions be measured by how well the poorest among
us are served by them.
In applying these principles to the immigration issue being studied in this
dissertation, the first point of notice is that the national common good differs from
national interest. A nationally interested framework is concerned only with the wellbeing
of the one population. A common good analysis, however, incorporates into the national
common good a concern for the universal whole. This concern reflects the primacy of the
human being over the State, the interrelatedness of human societies, and the moral
obligation of any people to promote the wellbeing of all peoples, not just those belonging
to her own country or community. In light of the common good, therefore, U.S.
53

Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, 55.

61
immigration policies should be guided not by national interest but by the universal
common good. Where there are seeming conflicts between the good of immigrants and
the good of U.S. citizens, U.S. policy should attempt to meet, to its highest ability, the
needs of the at-risk populations involved –in this case Mexicans and poor U.S. workers –
regardless of whether they are immigrants or citizens. Solutions to conflicts between the
two should be guided by solidarity and a preferential option for the poor.
Understanding now the relationship between the national and global common
good, I turn to the other area whose greater delineation would greatly facilitate accurate
usage of the common good as a moral principle: theological anthropology. Aquinas
provides a foundation for CST’s anthropology, which recognizes the spiritual vocation
and dignity of the human being. CST furthermore recognizes human beings as bearers of
human rights, which moves the common good toward greater specificity: the common
good must protect and promote human rights. However, rights language suffers from
abstraction. Rights are intangible things that people have, rather than descriptions of what
people are or do when they are flourishing. While rights are based in an implicit universal
description of human beings, the epistemological method for reaching that description
remains undefined and undefended. Furthermore, human rights as currently delineated
refer to an incomplete anthropology, ignoring certain human characteristics such as those
relating to ones emotional life.
The Common Good and Human Functioning Capabilities
An important step toward making the common good more concrete is to specify a
clearer description of the human being – to complement CST’s description of the human
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person with an account of what people do rather than in terms of the abstract rights they
have. Even though such a description must be specific, it must also be universal, i.e. true
for all people, even across cultural differences. Furthermore, it must promote human
flourishing for all people. This latter point, while seemingly obvious, is important to set
forth, because past theological anthropologies, including Aquinas,’ have been oppressive
to women. 54
Suzanne DeCrane provides a model for such an anthropology, through bringing
together Aquinas’ insights about the spiritual nature of the human person with an
amended set of Martha Nussbaum’s human functioning capabilities. 55 The human
functioning capabilities are capacities shared by all persons that must be minimally
available to each and every person in order to for them to “function in a fully human
way.” 56 Nussbaum’s human capabilities are comprehensive set of minimally described
abilities and potentialities related to a person’s rational, physical, moral, emotional and
psychological capacities. 57 In DeCrane’s work, the human capabilities expand to include
insights from Aquinas and CST on the human person, including the spiritual dimension.
DeCrane argues in her retrieval of Aquinas on the common good that
incorporating human functioning capabilities into the common good is not contrary to
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Aquinas’ methodology, but rather is defensible based on it. She demonstrates that
Aquinas’ natural law methodology, even while making deductions about human nature
based on metaphysical claims, uses “the capacities of intellect and reason (and the
disciplines associated with them) to come to greater clarity regarding the truth of the
human person and the human good.” 58 In other words, human nature and the human good
can be understood through empirical observation about human experience.
The human capabilities approach differs from Aquinas’ use of natural law
reasoning in that it incorporates cross-cultural dialogue in reaching conclusions. 59 This
method does not conflict, however, with natural law’s inductive process, but rather is a
more sophisticated form of it. Like John XXIII who aligned the conception of the
common good with a global political context, Nussbaum has aligned inductive natural
law reasoning with the global cultural context. Instead of positing deductions reached by
one individual or even one society, she incorporates into the reasoning approach the
recognition that cultural background influences one’s understanding of the truth.
Incorporating multiple perspectives, she corrects for cultural bias and is able to present a
more accurate picture of human nature than otherwise.
For DeCrane, the list of human functioning capabilities represents the best grasp
that the human family has on the truth about human beings. While DeCrane does not hold
with Aquinas’ ahistorical, realist view of human nature as absolute and unchanging, she
is careful to distinguish her perspective from the postmodern view that rejects the

58

DeCrane, Aquinas, Feminism and the Common Good, 114.

59

Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 76.

64
possibility of any truth claims about human nature, on the basis that such relativistic
claims disable moral critique. 60 She posits the set of human capabilities as a middle path
between the two extremes, 61 as “some few constituent elements that are universally
dependable as truth statements about what it means to be human and to enjoy the
circumstances that foster a relatively authentic (good) human life.” 62
While DeCrane presents the human functioning capabilities as truth about human
nature, she advocates humility about the list, following Aquinas in recognizing the
fallibility of human reason. She warns that any conclusions about human nature have a
degree of conditionality to them and warns of the necessity to guard against the
“tendency to arrogance” in anthropological assumptions. 63 This being said, the human
functioning capabilities approach minimizes human error through dialogue across
difference. The capabilities approach relies on the collective wisdom of people from
different cultures and religions – women in particular – who have suffered from
marginalization and other forms of oppression. Wisdom is found in the collective voices
of oppressed people, a point found in the preferential option for the poor, as discussed
below.
Human Functioning Capabilities and CST
Nussbaum’s list of human functioning capabilities includes physical, emotional,
and mental capabilities, individual and relational capabilities, and moral capacities. It
60
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goes beyond the capabilities needed for mere survival and includes all faculties that long
to be expressed by thinking, reasoning, feeling, and social human beings. In Nussbaum’s
account, while proper social conditions must exist so that a person can freely choose to
develop each capability if so desired, the capabilities do not represent a list of
requirements that every person must develop fully, but rather a list of capabilities that
every person must have access to developing if they so wish. A Catholic view of the
human functioning capabilities is grounded, however, in a Roman Catholic anthropology
and therefore views the capabilities as human characteristics that need to be expressed in
order for a person to flourish.
DeCrane proposes using all of the human capabilities on Nussbaum’s list, and
adds to it. The first human functioning capability that DeCrane borrows from Nussbaum
is life. 64 This capability includes ability to live a normal life-span and the ability to live a
human life that is worth living. 65 The second capability is bodily health. This capability
includes the ability to obtain proper nourishment, to have good reproductive health, and
to obtain adequate shelter. 66 The third capability is exercising bodily integrity, which
refers to a person’s ability to make choices about movement from place to place, to set
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physical boundaries, to be free from external bodily assault, and to make their own
choices in regards to sexuality and reproduction. 67
The fourth human functioning capability concerns the senses, imagination and
thought. This capability refers to the human ability to use one’s senses and to use one’s
reason in its creative and analytical aspects and in its search for ultimate meaning. This
capability requires cultivation through education and freedom of expression and religious
exercise. 68
The fifth capability concerns the emotional life. It includes the ability to feel
emotions. Nussbaum lists justified anger or grief as examples, as well as gratitude; joy
would be another such example. It also includes the ability to form emotional attachments
with people and things outside of oneself and the ability to love. Nussbaum notes that this
capability requires proper conditions and treatment, because conditions leading to
excessive anxiety or fear such as abuse or neglect can lead to emotional stunting. 69
The sixth capability is practical reason. One exercises practical reasoning in
taking concepts and applying them practically to given situations. Nussbaum names one
of the most fundamental expressions of this capability as that of forming a conception of
the good and determining how one will pursue it. Nussbaum specifically notes that this
capability requires protection of the freedom of conscience. 70
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The seventh human functioning capability is affiliation with others, which
encompasses the ability to form friendships, to interact in different social situations, to
demonstrate concern for others, to be compassionate and empathetic. It also includes a
capacity for justice. Nussbaum’s account mentions that this capability requires selfrespect, which requires the social conditions that foster it. It also requires protections
against discrimination and the ability to work in humane conditions that foster mutually
respectful work relationships. 71
The eighth capability concerns the ability to relate to members of other
species with concern, be they animals, plants or other parts of the natural world.
This capability includes the ability to care for the environment. 72 The ninth
capability is play, which includes the ability to laugh, play and take pleasure in
leisure activities. 73 The tenth is the ability to control one’s environment. This
includes the ability to control ones political environment through the political
participation. It also includes the ability to control ones material environment
through owning property – as a practical and not just formal opportunity. 74
Feminist theologian Sowle Cahill and others have criticized Nussbaum’s work as
reflecting too liberal a bias. 75 Nussbaum’s response is that the list is open to revision.
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While some critics advocate the abolishment of a set list of capabilities, Sowle Cahill
argues, as mentioned above, that the post-modern cultural relativism that refuses to name
any universal human characteristics disables moral critique and provides no defense
against oppression. 76 Rather than rejecting the list she suggests amending it,
complementing Nussbaum’s list with two additional capabilities: kinship and religion. 77
DeCrane borrows these to additional capabilities from Sowle Cahill. She relates
kinship to the ability to bear and raise children within the context of “stable, affiliative
relationships of support.” 78 This capability resonates with the centrality of family found
in Catholic social thought, while avoiding narrow definitions of family. The capability of
religion she names as the ability to “acknowledge, appreciate, and respond to the
transcendent.” 79 This capability resonates with the Thomistic understanding that all
human beings are oriented toward God, even while it is a more universal expression of it
that can be expressed differently by people of differing religious backgrounds. DeCrane
adds one additional capability that accords with CST, work – or the ability to do
meaningful work and to be compensated adequately and appropriately for it. 80 This
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capability correlates to the understanding of work in Catholic social thought as a means
through which people participate in God’s creative work in the world. 81
This amended set of human functioning capabilities forms a framework for
understanding in what human flourishing consists. This anthropology aligns with natural
law methodology in that it reaches conclusions through reasoning based on experience. It
coheres with Catholic social thought’s understanding of human beings as embodied and
spiritual beings in that it identifies capabilities that encompass both aspects. Furthermore,
it recognizes that human beings flourish through pursuing their transcendent destiny in a
way that honors their embodied existence. And recognizes that they thrive when they are
enabled to develop themselves spiritually, emotionally, mentally and physically.
The human capabilities approach considers all capabilities essential to living a
fully human life. This approach honors the embodied aspects of the human experience as
an integral element of human flourishing. This respect for embodied elements of human
flourishing is consistent with recent Catholic social teaching, which emphasizes honoring
human dignity through ensuring human rights. The capabilities approach stresses the
importance of creating the social conditions that enable people to exercise all of their
human functioning capabilities. The Catholic tradition adds valuable insight into the
internal orientation of a person needed to create the conditions in which all people will
have this opportunity: namely, one needs to correctly order one’s values, subordinating
one’s superfluous material desires when necessary for ensuring the basic needs of others.
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The human functioning capabilities give content to the common good, because
through them human flourishing is defined. The common good, in promoting human
flourishing, promotes the human functioning capabilities of each and every member of
society. While human fulfillment and the common good are open-ended, the option for
the poor indicates that of greater importance than the upper limit of human capabilities
are the lower limits that constitute basic human functioning. Human dignity must be
assured. The option for the poor requires one to evaluate situations based on their impact
on those people whose basic capabilities are most often at risk.
Summary and Next Steps
The overarching framework for U.S. immigration ethics should be the common
good rather than solidarity with immigrants. This is first of all because the common good
is the purpose of law, and law is central to today’s immigration ethics. Secondly, the
common good forces a balanced social analysis that takes into account especially the
situation of all vulnerable populations that affected by immigration, immigrants and U.S.
born people alike. Thirdly, the common good can provide a framework out of the
confusion of competing claims in the public sphere about the impact of immigration on
U.S. society. Fourthly, the common good as a moral norm leads to more comprehensive
strategies for addressing threats to human capabilities resulting from immigration and the
public policies surrounding it. And lastly, it promotes a greater level of solidarity
between vulnerable groups.
The common good in Catholic social thought is defined as the sum of social
conditions that promote human wellbeing. This definition of human flourishing is rooted
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in the Thomistic tradition, in which human flourishing is correlated with progress toward
those ends and actions that are aligned with natural human inclinations. The anthropology
found in Catholic social thought follows Aquinas in viewing human beings as
transcendent beings who are destined for union with God and as both physical and
rational beings. However, it also includes a particular modern understanding of the
human being as bearer of rights and corresponding responsibilities. CST follows Aquinas
in correlating the common good with justice, but it explicates it through a modern
understanding of justice called “social justice” and it furthermore includes an option for
the poor, and emphasizes the universality of the common good.
While this description of the common good provides general direction, it can be
improved through providing a clearer delineation of the relationship between the national
and universal common good, which I did, and through more clearly explicating a
theological anthropology from which to define human flourishing. In this chapter, I
advocated using a definition of human flourishing forwarded by Catholic feminist
theologian Suzanne DeCrane, which is based on Martha Nussbaum’s human functioning
capabilities approach. This definition of human flourishing makes the common good
more concrete than in current Catholic social thought, because it describes abilities
pertaining to human beings rather than abstract rights. Using this definition, the common
good comes to be understood as promoting the human functioning capabilities of each
person. Coupled with the option for the poor, the presence of the common good can be
evaluated through examining the extent to which human functioning capabilities are
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being assured for the most vulnerable populations. When human capabilities are enabled
for the poor and marginalized, the common good is being served.
Because the human functioning capabilities provide a way of evaluating the
presence of the common good, a common good methodology would benefit from a
system for measuring the presence of human functioning capabilities. In the next chapter,
I develop such a system. I first demonstrate an example in Catholic tradition of
quantifying Catholic social principles, namely the work of John Ryan on the living wage.
I then develop a Common Good Index that can be used to measure the presence of human
functioning capabilities and therefore the common good.

CHAPTER THREE
A COMMON GOOD INDEX
In Chapter Two, I argued that the appropriate moral framework for evaluating
immigration issues today is the common good, and I explored Thomas Aquinas’ and
CST’s understanding of the common good. CST’s definition of the common good starts
with Aquinas’ teleological understanding of creation – that God wills the perfection of all
of creation, and so wills the perfection of each person in their intellectual, physical and
moral capacities. CST also maintains Aquinas’ understanding of the relationship between
the common good and the individual person – that the common good is ultimately
expressed through the good of individual persons. CST develops the common good
beyond Aquinas through universalizing its scope, incorporating a modern anthropology
that stresses human rights and integrating a preferential option for the poor.
I proposed utilizing CST’s definition of the common good but informing that
definition with an understanding of the human person based in Nussbaum’s human
functioning capabilities. Because the common good is directed toward human flourishing,
and the human functioning capabilities describe human flourishing, the human
functioning capabilities can be used to evaluate the extent to which a society is realizing
the common good by examining whether, for whom, and at what level human capabilities
are functioning.
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Through correlating the common good with human functioning capabilities, the
common good becomes more clearly defined than it is presently in CST. In this chapter, I
propose bringing this moral lens into even greater focus through quantifying it. Since the
common good is evaluated through human functioning capabilities, it is made even
clearer through quantifying the extent to which basic human functioning capabilities are
being realized in society.
I begin this chapter by demonstrating that there is precedence in Catholic social
thought for the quantification of Catholic social principles. This precedent is found in
John A. Ryan’s work on a living wage. Ryan, an early twentieth century U.S. theologian,
turned the Catholic social principle of subsistence into a concrete proposal for public
policy, proposing a national minimum wage that would ensure basic conditions for
human dignity.
The common good, being a more complex phenomenon, requires a more complex
quantification. In this chapter, I create a tool called the Common Good Index (CGI),
which is an index composed of twelve sociological indicators that measures the common
good through measuring the presence of human functioning capabilities. The CGI makes
possible a level of common good analysis that was heretofore impossible, and as such is
an important contribution to the development of the common good.
I make the proposal for the CGI within the context of a flourishing number of
indicator projects in the United States and world-wide. Before laying out the Common
Good Index, I briefly review the indicator movement and then briefly examine the
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particular model I use for the index, the Index of Social Health. 1 I then delineate the
model for the Common Good Index, present the criteria for the twelve indicators chosen,
and discuss the choice of each indicator in turn.
Quantifying Catholic Social Principles: John A. Ryan
Catholic social thought offers principles for social, political and cultural policy
and action, applying these principles to particular contexts. The U.S. bishops’ positions
on immigration are one such example. In addition to application of principles, however,
there is precedent in the Catholic tradition for bringing an objective measure to these
principles. Monsignor John A. Ryan’s work on the living wage is a primary example of
such a precedent.
Ryan was a Catholic theologian in the early twentieth century whose expertise in
the fields of theology and economics made him uniquely suited for the “creative
application and adaptation of the [universal Catholic] teaching that was his special
genius.” 2 Ryan combined his interests in theology, the social sciences, and public policy
to apply Catholic economic principles to the United States context. He was a public
scholar who wrote books and articles for an academic audience and also published
prolifically for non-academic audiences. Ryan’s greatest contribution lay in taking a
largely theoretical and European framework that characterized Catholic reflection on
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economic principles and making it very concrete as it applied to the United States
context. 3 This application is apparent in his work with the living wage.
Ryan wrote his first book, A Living Wage, at a time in which several U.S. states
had minimum wage laws that covered women and children, there were no laws covering
men, and the very constitutionality of creating a living wage law for men was questioned.
In it, he defended and quantified the right to a living wage. At the same time, Ryan was
active in organizations advocating for living wage laws and was a recognized leader in
the area of minimum wage laws. His level of involvement was such that he wrote the
Minnesota minimum wage bill that was subsequently modified and passed by the
Minnesota legislature. 4
Ryan’s A Living Wage entered into the public debate on the philosophical
grounding of minimum wage laws. 5 Ryan took the position that a right to a living wage
stemmed from the natural rights to subsistence and a decent livelihood. This stance
resulted from his engagement with Catholic social thought: Ryan was greatly influenced
by Pope Leo XIII, whose encyclical Rerum Novarum was published a mere fifteen years
before Ryan published his book, A Living Wage. While Ryan’s viewpoints were
controversial in the public sphere (the influential Catholic priest and radio host Charles E.
Coughlin disparagingly nicknamed him the “Right Reverend New Dealer” for Ryan’s
3
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defense of Roosevelt’s New Deal policies), 6 his theology was grounded firmly in the
Catholic social tradition established by Leo XIII. 7
Ryan’s Use of Natural Law
Maintaining continuity with Leo’s intellectual and social orientations, Ryan
grounded his work intellectually in the neo-Thomist natural law tradition. 8 In Rerum
Novarum Leo XIII grounded the rights to private property and a living wage in a natural
law argument linking those rights to God’s natural order. The right to private property
stems from common use of land as ordained by God, the right to sustenance and the
primacy of the family as the basic social unit preceding political forms of social
organization. 9 The right to a living wage is likewise in the right to sustenance. “Let the
working man and the employer make free agreements, and in particular let them agree
freely as to the wages; nevertheless, there underlies a dictate of natural justice more
imperious and ancient than any bargain between man and man, namely, that wages ought
not to be insufficient to support a frugal and well-behaved wage-earner.” 10 In appealing
to natural rights, Leo XIII here disregards the liberal approach to freedoms that espouses
the absoluteness of freedom divorced from moral judgments.
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In A Living Wage, Ryan turns to Leo XIII to argue that a living wage is based in
the natural rights to subsistence and common use of the land. 11 We hear echoes Aquinas
as well in Ryan’s insistence that, “Men’s [sic] natural rights … are based on the duty of
pursuing self-perfection.” 12 Starting from Aquinas’ teleological foundation, Ryan begins
his argument by asserting a person’s natural rights to realize their spiritual, physical and
social wellbeing, within limits set by the moral law and the rights of others. 13 A living
wage, therefore, must enable a person to meet not only their basic physical needs, but
their basic social and spiritual needs as well.
In order to pursue self-perfection, one must have the material means to do so. The
material goods necessary must provide not only for physical survival, but for the
development of other human faculties. To flourish as a human being, one needs
opportunities to exercise one’s reason, emotions, body, spirit and will according to the
demands of human personality.
[I]f a man [sic] is to live a becoming life he must have the means, not merely to
secure himself against death by starvation and exposure, but to maintain himself
in a reasonable degree of comfort. He is to live as a man, not as an animal. He
must have food, clothing and shelter. He must have opportunity to develop within
reasonable limits all his faculties, physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual. The
rational ground of this right is the same as that of the right to subsistence. It is the
dignity and essential needs of the person. Those means and opportunities that
have just been described as a decent livelihood are the minimum conditions of
right and reasonable living, since without them man cannot attain to that exercise
of his faculties and that development of his personality that makes his life worthy
of a human being. When he is compelled to live on less than this minimum he is
treated as somewhat less than a man. 14
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In short, the duty of self-perfection translates into a right to a decent livelihood. A
living wage is necessary because the economic system is such that working people can
secure a decent livelihood only through wages. The right to a decent livelihood translates
into a right to receive a living wage. “As long as the present organization of industry
exists, the obligation of not hindering the laborer from enjoying his right to a decent
livelihood will be commuted into the obligation of paying him a Living Wage.” 15
Ryan’s Quantification of the Right to a Living Wage
Ryan takes the natural law methodology a step further than Leo XIII by
determining an actual dollar amount of a living wage in the U.S. context. Ryan argues
that a living wage must cover not only individual expenses but family expenses as well.
A person must be provided with the means to support his [sic] family, because it is
through family that two central human needs – a conjugal relationship and selfpreservation (through procreation) – are met. Ryan establishes that a living wage should
be based on the average amount of money needed to secure decent living conditions for a
family. “Rights are to be interpreted according to the average conditions of human life,
and these suppose the laborer to become the head of a family.” 16 A family wage should
be provided to all workers regardless of their civil status.
Ryan then presents a concrete estimate of how much money it would cost to meet
the human needs of an average family, or to maintain an average family in “reasonable
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comfort.” 17 He does not attempt to satisfy the demands of complete justice but rather
undertakes to describe the minimum resources needed for families to satisfy the demands
of human dignity. 18 These needs go above mere survival, encompassing the spectrum of
human needs: emotional, physical, and spiritual.
Ryan determines reasonable living conditions for an average family through
reflecting on the demands of human dignity and referring to social custom. He uses social
custom, because he understands that there is a social component of human needs – the
demands of human dignity include not only survival but also social acceptance and selfrespect. Therefore, a “decent livelihood, or a Living Wage, must conform in a reasonable
degree to the conventional standard of life that prevails in any community or group. For
in order to live becomingly, men must possess not only those goods that are objectively
necessary, but in some measure those that they think are necessary.” 19 Clothes, for
example, have a social as well as utilitarian function. It is recognized that many people
will in fact go hungry in order to avoid being out of fashion. Minimum conditions may
change over time, as the overall standard of living of a society shifts.
Since human needs are social in nature, Ryan uses convention to justify his list of
basic needs. He finds a high degree of consensus between economists, political scientists
and labor unionists on what concretely constitute basic needs. However, he does not
accept convention blindly but rather augments it with natural law reasoning about human
nature. When finding disagreement between the cited sources concerning whether or not
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to provide for illness, retirement or disability, Ryan argues that families must be assured
the conditions for a decent life even when the bread-winner cannot work due to illness,
old age or disability, because of the demands of human nature and dignity.
According to Ryan, the “minimum amount of goods and opportunities that will
suffice for decent living and the rearing of a family” 20 consist first of all of food, clothing
and shelter. Families must have access to food that will enable them to maintain a normal
level of health, and to shelter that provides a reasonable amount of health and comfort.
Ryan specifies that an average family of five should have at least five rooms in the home,
including three bedrooms, in order to meet this requirement. In terms of clothing, Ryan
proposes that a living wage must be able to afford each family member at least one
formal outfit. 21 Secondly, they must be afforded the economic means for the family to
live decently in the event of accidents, disability, and old age. 22 And they must also be
paid a sufficient sum to be able to satisfy their mental and spiritual needs, for example
through attending primary education, enjoying some recreation, buying some books,
joining civic and labor organizations and fulfilling ones religious obligations. 23
These needs are then calculated into a budget. The line-items in the budget
include food, clothing, rent, fuel and light, insurance, organizations, religion, street-car
fare, paper, books, etc., amusements, drinks, tobacco, sickness, dentist, oculist, glasses,
etc., furnishings, laundry, cleaning supplies, and miscellaneous items. Using a
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comprehensive study that summarized numerous efforts to quantify the average cost of
living, Ryan estimated that in 1919 the cost of living for an average family fell between
$1,400 and $1,500 in the United States, and that the hourly wage for a head of family was
50 cents.
Through his effort to specify in detail what the general principle of a living wage
meant in his time and place, Ryan created a model for concretizing Catholic moral
principles. Furthermore, through making the right to subsistence concrete, Ryan made
Catholic social thought more influential on the living wage debate of the day. The lines of
justice became clear: anything less than 50 cents an hour was unacceptable and fell
beneath the floor of minimal justice and human dignity. With this sort of specificity,
Ryan was able to not only offer visionary statements but to advocate for concrete policy
recommendations, to the benefit of working people.
Proposal for Quantifying the Common Good
Recognizing that there is precedent in Catholic social ethics for quantifying
Catholic social principles, I propose in this dissertation to quantify the common good.
Such enumeration is more complex than a determination of a living wage, because the
common good is a considerably more complicated principle. It is multi-faceted. It is
open-ended and ever-expanding in nature. And it is deals with the relationships between
people as well as individual states of being.
This quantification is made possible when human flourishing is understood
through human functioning capabilities. Since the common good is directed toward each
and every person’s flourishing, and human flourishing can be specified through the
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human functioning capabilities, one can evaluate the extent to which a society is realizing
the common good through evaluating the level of human functioning capabilities among
its population. What is needed, therefore, to assess the state the common good are
measures of the human capabilities: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses,
imagination and thought, emotional wellbeing, practical reason, affiliation, relatedness to
other species and the environment, play, control over one’s environment, kinship,
religion and work.
The measures taken must be concerned with the state of flourishing among the
most vulnerable populations. The preferential option for the poor mandates the basic
states of human flourishing for the marginalized be ensured over higher states of
flourishing for others. Only when basic states of wellbeing are guaranteed can the
common good be realized. In the area of bodily health, for example, one would pass on
measuring the upper limits of health for the healthiest in society and instead examine the
extent to which women, minorities and other vulnerable populations have access to basic
health care services.
In measuring the human functioning capabilities, the CGI provides a concrete
baseline measure of the common good. In so doing, it serves four valuable functions.
One, the CGI is a measure against which to judge the state of the common good at a
given point in time. Two, it establishes a concrete goal toward which societies should
strive. Three, it provides a tool for assessing whether society is moving toward or away
from the common good; when used in for this purpose, Common Good Index scores are
compared over time. And four, it is used to evaluate whether a particular policy proposal
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or change promotes or degrades the common good. When used for evaluating potential
policy changes, anticipated changes to the Index are calculated and compared to the
current Index score. In the case of immigration, there has been so much research
discussing the economic and social impact of immigration on the United States that it is
possible to compare the actual Common Good Index score to a hypothetical score in the
theoretical absence of recent immigration.
The Common Good Index makes possible a level of common good analysis that
was heretofore impossible. Rather than teasing out conclusions from the broad
philosophical underpinnings of the common good and a general sense of social dynamics,
real numbers and facts will direct a common good analysis. The numbers will bring a
higher level of clarity and surety to a common good analysis, enabling the common good
to be used with far more exactitude.
While the common good cannot be exactly quantified due to the complexity of the
common good and the fullness of the human functioning capabilities, it can be
sufficiently quantified through indicators of human functioning capabilities. What does it
mean to indicate rather than measure the common good? An indicator is a measure that
points to the existence of something. It suggests the state of its health or provides a sign
of how healthy it is. It does not capture the whole, full richness of that thing’s entirety,
but it does capture pieces of it or provide information on an important symptom of its
health.
An index, or set of indicators taken together, provides a snapshot of the health of
a complex phenomenon. For example, economic health is measured by indicators such as
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the Gross National Product, inflation, job starts and stock prices. Environmental health is
indicated by water quality, air quality and cancer rates, among others. Quality of life can
be measured by access to health care, homeownership rate, and children in poverty. 24 An
index can provide a picture of something that is otherwise too complex to get a fix on.
The Common Good Index consists of a set of twelve sociological indicators that measure
the extent to which human functioning capabilities are being realized in society. I develop
the Index below.
First, however, I wish to put the Common Good Index into a broader social
context of the proliferation of composite indexes. I do so because in order to take the CGI
into a public conversation, it will be necessary to distinguish it from other indicator
projects, and as such one needs to be familiar with the other efforts. Furthermore, I use
another index (the Index of Social Health, discussed below) as the technical model for
developing the CGI. Additionally, the limitations and directions for future improvement
of the CGI can be best understood in terms of those of composite indexes in general.
Context for a Common Good Index: Other Indicator Projects
The dominant measure of aggregate social welfare since the 1950’s has been
national income, usually expressed as the Gross Domestic Product or the Gross National
Product. 25 However, this measure has been widely criticized as inadequate, on the basis
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that it does not necessarily reflect the how well people are doing. 26 As an example, the
United States’ GDP increased dramatically between 1970 and 2007, yet during that same
time period, a national indicator project in the United States, the Index of Social Health
(ISH), showed stagnation in the welfare of the population. 27
Alternate methods for measuring social health have gained increasing popularity
since the 1966 publication of a U.S. report called Toward a Social Report that called for
the creation of a social welfare index. 28 Although the United States did not follow
through on the project, that report generated interest in other countries. Today, most
European nations and many developing nations have institutionalized social welfare
indices. 29
Internationally, hundreds of demographic and social indicators are compiled by
organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the World Health
Organization. Similar to the U.S.’s Toward a Social Report, in 1975 the United Nations
published a report that challenged the dominance and inadequacy of using national
income data to reflect development and established a statistical reporting system to
capture human development through measuring things that people can do (such as read)
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rather than only have (such as money). 30 Today, the United Nations maintains numerous
statistical products and databases covering dozens of social and demographic indicators
that it collects from its nearly 200 member countries. The World Bank maintains a
database with 331 indicators for 209 countries. 31 The World Health Organization
maintains information on approximately 100 health indicators for almost 200 countries. 32
Examining the United States in particular, although the U.S. has no official Index
of social welfare, as mentioned above, there is a national indicator project called the
Index of Social Health that measures the national welfare of the United States population.
In addition, a plethora a quality of life indexes have developed at the local level.
America’s Social Health lists approximately 100 state, local and regional-level
community indicator projects. 33 These indicator projects all seek to measure how well
people are doing through measuring social data that reflect human wellbeing.
Some indicator projects simply list the varying indicators alongside each other.
Others aggregate the indicators to create one synthetic measure. On the international level
one composite index stands out, the Human Development Index (HDI). This index was
created in the late 1980s, and similar to other indicator projects it was developed in
response to dissatisfaction over the ability of national income statistics to measure human

30

Dudley Seers, "A System of Social and Demographic Statistics: A Review Note," The Economic
Journal 86, no. 343 (1976): 595.
31

Indicators, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2010), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator.

32

Indicator Definitions and Metadata, (World Health Organization, 2010),
http://www.who.int/whosis/indicators/en/.
33

Miringoff and Opdycke, America's Social Health: Putting Social Issues Back on the Public
Agenda, 63-66.

88
development. 34 As a composite index, the HDI standardizes and combines several
measures to create one final rating. The index consists of three equally-weighted factors:
life expectancy, education (which compiles literacy and school enrollment data), and the
Gross Domestic Product. 35 The index scores for any individual country are calculated in
comparison to the countries with the highest development, rather than to an individual
country’s best score. 36 Therefore, it provides relative ranking, rather than an absolute
ranking of wellbeing.
The Common Good Index is proposed within this context of international to local
interest in capturing information on human wellbeing. I seek to create the Common Good
Index as a composite index, and as such I look to composite indexes (such as the HDI) as
a model. Composite indexes vary in the number and kind of indicators chosen and in the
standardization method, but what they have in common is that they contain a series of
indicator data that are standardized and added up to arrive at a single number. I create the
CGI as a composite index because the composite number enables one to numerically
answer the question with one number: how has x factor affected the common good? In
the case of this dissertation, I ask the question: how have recent U.S. immigration trends
affected the common good?
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Critiques of Composite Indexes
Before defending a particular model for the Common Good Index, I first want to
note that all indexes have their limitations. I cover here the major criticisms of composite
indexes in general and of the HDI (as the most broadly used index), and the Index of
Social Health (as the main model for the CGI). One of the main critiques of composite
indexes is that they lack of coherent theory for their choice of indicators. For example,
many quality of life indicators do not present a theory of what quality of life consists of
and why. The indicators chosen thus stand undefended in terms of what they represent. 37
The Common Good Index, unlike these indexes, is firmly grounded in theory - the theory
of the common good as explicated in previous chapters – and so it avoids this criticism.
Another critique concerns lack of data: data for all indicators are not available for
all countries for all years. The United Nations uses linear interpolation to determine data
for missing years. 38 In the Common Good index, I use the data for closest next year
available, although I recommend that in the future linear interpolation be used. The
Human Development Index minimizes the problem of data collection through measuring
very few variables. The Common Good Index, as we will see, faces more difficulties due
to its breadth. Data limitations are endemic to the data-collection community
internationally, however, and efforts are constantly being made to address it. 39 As
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international efforts improve, so will the ability of the Common Good Index to accurately
and precisely measure the common good.
Another key issue raised is redundancy among constituent indicators. 40 An index
may contain indicators that “overlap” or fail to point to a discrete quality. A good
example of this is poverty. Poverty is recognized to be a key indicator for many other
conditions: education level, crime, health, etc. If included in an index with these other
elements, it (or the other indicators) would be considered redundant. In the Common
Good Index, I welcome redundancy. I do this because it would be impossible to represent
the full range of human functioning capabilities without any redundancy. Practicality
overrules the statistical concern for perfection in this case.
Thirdly, indexes have been critiqued for their weighting methodologies. The HDI,
for example, combined three equally weighted numbers. The suggestion has been made
that income, however, should be weighted more heavily than GDP and education due to
its ability to affect many more capabilities. 41 Another weighting issue concerns implicit
weights. 42 Some indicators have greater variance than others, and therefore will carry
more weight in an equally weighted index. For example, there may be a greater variance
in literacy than in unemployment across nations. The Common Good Index follows the
example of the HDI and the Index of Social Health in that it weights its indicators evenly.
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It does so on the theoretical basis forwarded by Martha Nussbaum that all the human
capabilities are equally important, as noted in the previous chapter.
Lastly, the Index of Social Health in particular is criticized for having an
inadequate standardization process, scaling numbers to simple best and worst figures,
rather than using a standard deviation methodology. 43 However, the same critic
recognized the benefit of the simplicity and understandability of their method, 44 and even
though the Index scores would change with a different methodology, the relative value of
scores across countries would be hardly affected. 45 The CGI follows the ISH’s
standardization process.
Constructing the Common Good Index
The Common Good Index (CGI) created here is an index that measures the end of
the common good (human flourishing) through measuring human functioning
capabilities. While the CGI has some similarities with the HDI, it is actually modeled
after Vassar University’s Index of Social Health [of the United States], even it differs
from the Index of Social Health in important respects, as is discussed below.
I choose the Index of Social Health (ISH) as the model for the CGI in part it
contains the number and kind of indicators that lend themselves to the breadth and scope
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of human functioning capabilities. The HDI, as described above, consists of only three
indicators: education, life expectancy and GDP. The ISH, on the other hand, consists of
sixteen indicators that cover a range of human goods. Furthermore, the Index of Social
Health is self-contained, whereas the HDI is qualified by three other indexes: the
Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index, the Gender Equality Index, and the
Multidimensional Poverty Index. 46 As such, the overall structure is too onerous for the
scope of this project. Lastly, the Index of Social Health has been evaluated as being an
excellent public policy tool at all levels of aggregation. 47 The Common Good Index, like
the Index of Social Health, is intended for practical use in evaluating public policy.
Another reason for choosing the ISH as a model is that its indicator criteria are
very clear, and many of them are useful and therefore adopted for the construction of the
CGI. The CGI indicators are discussed below. Furthermore, it offers helpful examples of
indicators, a number of which are likewise used in the CGI, when they are appropriate
given the CGI purpose and indicator criteria. Lastly, the ISH’s numerical calculation of
the Index score, copied in the CGI, is simple and replicable and yields meaningful results,
as discussed below.
The ISH is comprised of sixteen social indicators covering five age groups:
children, youth, adults, the elderly, and all ages. The CGI contains a dozen indicators of
human wellbeing that also measure wellbeing at different age levels. While both indexes
measure human wellbeing, they differ in an important respect: the Common Good Index
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relies on a Catholic anthropology to determine the content of that wellbeing, in contrast
to the Index of Social Health, which provides a cross-section of indicators relevant to
human wellbeing that are determined not by an underlying anthropology but rather are
determined by social consensus. 48 The Common Good Index, on the other hand, tracks
human wellbeing according to the anthropology elaborated in Chapter Two. Specifically
speaking, the Common Good Index measures the presence of human functioning
capabilities in a population.
CGI Indicator Criteria
The Common Good Index consists of a set of indicators that measure the presence
of human functioning capabilities in society. The construction of the CGI begins with
choosing criteria for the indicators. The first criterion is that the indicators measure
human functioning capabilities. This standard speaks to the foundational definition of the
CGI, which is to measure those capabilities. The second criterion is related to the first: it
requires that the indicators shed light on important aspects of human capabilities. This
norm recognizes that no one indicator captures the fullness of any given capability. It
dictates that indicators chosen are significant and relevant to the capability being
measured.
The third criterion is that the indicators are measured reliably and consistently
over time by government or recognized private research organizations. 49 The Common
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Good Index follows this criterion because it is necessary for statistical accuracy,
coherence and consistency.
Fourth, the CGI requires that indicators have international resonance and can be
directly compared to statistics kept by other industrialized nations. 50 When a policy
question at hand has international implications, for instance in immigration questions, the
Common Good Index must be evaluated at the level of all parties involved. In evaluating
recent immigration trends, for example, a common good analysis must include
consideration of the common good of both United States and Mexican citizens. The
Common Good Index must thus include data for the United States and Mexico.
This criterion ensures that the common good can be measured at a global level, which is
necessary given the universal nature of the common good,
Fifth, the indicators chosen must be able to be broken down to examine impact on
key subgroups in the nation, for example by race, class, gender or age. 51 This criterion is
important in order to truly understand which particular groups are suffering. Aggregate
numbers can hide inequalities, which are unhidden by a deeper analysis of subgroups.
This criterion is particularly important to the CGI because of the preferential option for
the poor within the common good. The common good must be able to be analyzed at a
local level in order to account for the wellbeing of marginalized persons. It is important,
furthermore, because the Catholic social principle of subsidiarity requires that issues be
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addressed at the most local level possible. A common good index that operates only at a
national or global level will disable local level analysis and therefore action.
A sixth criterion judges indicators on how they affect vulnerable populations,
requiring that CGI indicators have either a neutral or positive effect on those
communities. This standard recognizes that what is measured matters, influencing, for
example, what poverty formulation one would use (to be discussed at greater length in
the next chapter). Just as John Ryan described the minimum financial resources necessary
to maintain a family with dignity, the CGI requires indicators that demarcate the
minimum levels of human capability necessary to satisfy the demands of human dignity.
This criterion exists as a check to ensure that that the Common Good Index does not
betray the preferential option for the poor and thereby betray its mission in furthering the
common good.
Seventh, while the number of indicators chosen must be broad enough to indicate
all human functioning capabilities, the list of indicators must be short enough to be used
practically and widely. The brevity of the list belies the richness of the information
provided, however: most indicators reflect multiple capabilities, and thus most human
capabilities are covered by two or more indicators. For example, the human functioning
capability of work is indicated by rates of unemployment and high school drop-out rates.
In sum, the criteria for the Common Good Index are:
1. They measure human functioning capabilities.
2. They shed light on important aspects of the human functioning capabilities
they indicate.
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3. They are measured reliably and consistently over time by government or
recognized private research organizations.
4. They have international resonance and are able to be compared to statistics
kept by other nations.
5. They capture how the most vulnerable members of society are affected. This
means that the data must be able to be broken down by key subgroups, such as
class, race, gender, age or sexual orientation.
6. Their use causes neutral or positive impact on poor and vulnerable
populations.
7. The number of total indicators is manageable, so as to make the Index a
practical tool that is not unduly cumbersome to use.
With these criteria in mind, I turn to developing the list of common good indicators.
Overview to Methodology for Choosing CGI Indicators
In this section, I examine each human functioning capability and determine what
indicator(s) would adequately represent it. In developing the total list, I take into
consideration overlap in indication, i.e. which indicators measure more than one
capability. In short, I seek a comprehensive and balanced yet relatively short list of
indicators of the broad range of human functioning capabilities.
To develop a given indicator, I start with two areas of investigation. The first
point of investigation is: what would be one or more physical, concrete manifestations of
that capability? This question generates ideas for indicators that directly measure the
capability itself. However, an indicator that directly correlates to a capability is not
always available, and even if it is, it may not illuminate social conditions contributing to
that capability’s realization, which limits its usefulness in pointing to directions for
change. I therefore also ask: what social conditions either hinder or promote the
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realization of that capability? Social conditions can indicate a human capability because
of the close relationship between social conditions and the realization of human
capabilities. One’s health, for example, is compromised by lack of economic access to
medical care. Where possible, I choose indicators that reflect social conditions, because
they also point to directions for social improvement. Potential indicators are evaluated
through the above listed criteria.
I organize the rest of this section according to the human functioning capabilities,
since the capabilities are the subject of the Index. To review, there are thirteen human
functioning capabilities: life, physical health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and
thought, emotions, practical reasoning, affiliation, other species and nature, play and
recreation, control over environment, relationship to the transcendent, raising children in
a stable, supportive environment, and work. I proceed one by one to determine indicators
for each, and then present a composite that recognizes where there is overlap and how
well the indicators chosen measure human capabilities for people of different age groups.
Life Indicators
The capability of life concerns being able to live a life of normal length and to
live a life that is not “so reduced as to be not worth living.” 52 The capability of life is
expressed at its most basic level through the length of one’s life. Three indicators that
directly measure length of life are infant mortality, child mortality and life expectancy In
the interest of limiting the number of indicators, I choose infant mortality (which is one
of the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals for 2015). While mortality
52
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directly indicates this capability, it does not point to the social causes contributing to
realization (or lack thereof) of this capability. Therefore, it is preferable to include
another indicator, one that will illuminate causal social conditions. One of the major
contributing factors to the length of one’s life is one’s health, and a key social indicator
of health in developed nations is access to health insurance. Health indicators are
examined more closely below.
Physical Health Indicators
Health indicators vary widely depending on a country’s level of development. The
UN Millennium Development Goals include reducing maternal mortality by threequarters and achieve universal access to reproductive health. Healthy People 2010, a
project of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, names the following as
the ten leading health indicators: physical activity, overweight and obesity, tobacco use,
substance abuse, responsible sexual behavior, mental health, injury and violence,
environmental quality, immunization, and access to health care. 53
Again, the indicators I choose in this project must be measured internationally, by
both developed and developing nations. However, due to project limitations, when there
are great differences between the types of indicators that should be used for developing
countries versus developed countries, I choose indicators that will reflect conditions in
developed countries, in order to shed light on the immigration issue here at home. In the
Healthy Families indicators list, some indicators on the list (substance abuse, mental
53

"Healthy People 2010," Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion - U.S. Department
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health, violence and environmental quality) pertain to other human functioning
capabilities, and I develop indicators for them during discussion of those capabilities. 54
They serve as secondary indicators for physical health. One indicator stands out among
the remaining: access to health care, because access to health care strongly influences
whether or not a person seeks medical attention and therefore significantly impacts one’s
health, no matter what health problem one is facing. People who have no health
insurance, bluntly put, are more likely to die than people with insurance. 55 For this
reason, lack of health insurance is the primary indicator for this capability in the common
good index.
Bodily Integrity Indicators
The next human capability, bodily integrity, includes the abilities to move about
freely and safely, to control access to one’s body and to have choice in matters of
sexuality and sexual reproduction. Key indicators of safety and control over access to
one’s body are homicide and child maltreatment. A third indicator that points to
limitations in safety and movement is poverty. A family living in a dangerous
neighborhood that cannot afford to move to a safer one may have the liberty to secure
their safety in theory, but not in practice. An abused woman without a job that pays a
living wage may have the freedom to move out of an abusive situation in theory, but not
in practice.
54

Substance abuse and mental health correspond to the emotions, violence pertains to bodily
integrity, and environmental quality relates to other species and nature.
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Senses, Imagination and Thought Indicators
The capability of senses, imagination and thought can be indicated by various
educational measurements. Martha Nussbaum names literacy as one of the expressions of
this capability. Literacy is still a huge issue in some countries – especially the eight
countries in which two-thirds of all illiterate adults reside. 56 The three regions with
extremely low literacy rates are the Arab states, South and West Asia, and Sub-Saharan
Africa. 57
While literacy is foundational, literacy itself is not a high enough indicator for
intellectual capability. Literacy as a standard does not capture the level of mental abilities
required to negotiate the complexities of the technologized and globalized context of
today’s world. A high school degree, while it may not give someone access to the high
level of intellectual capability required for today’s professional, well-paying jobs, at least
gives one basic intellectual skills for negotiating the world of work and entering into
higher intellectual explorations. In today’s work world, while the better paying jobs
require a higher level of thinking, high school graduates have the skills to pursue short
term professional certificates, which gives them access to move up the economic ladder. I
choose high school drop-out rates as the indicator to measure basic intellectual capacities.
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Emotions Indicators
The human capability of emotions refers to the ability to have a healthy emotional
life, including the ability to love and form emotional bonds with others, and to feel a
range of emotions, including justified anger. Two indicators of the lack of emotional
wellbeing are suicide and child maltreatment. 58 In terms of suicide, over ninety percent of
all people who commit suicides suffered from depression or other mental disorders,
and/or substance abuse problems. 59
Child maltreatment unfortunately cannot be used as an indicator because the
reporting for child maltreatment – both in terms of coverage and comparability – is so
poor as to prohibit its use. However, I mention this indicator for future reference when
more data is collected, because of its importance. Child maltreatment is relevant in two
ways as an indicator – both in pointing to the lack of emotional capability in the person
committing the maltreatment and in pointing to a likely stunting of emotional ability in
the maltreated, since children who are victims or witnesses to abuse are likely to have
problems forming healthy emotional attachments with others. 60
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Practical Reason Indicators
The capability of practical reason refers to the ability to form one’s conception of
the good and to critically reflect on the planning of one’s life. This ability is not directly
indicated by any current data collection, but it may be indirectly indicated by education
level, since it is fostered by the teaching of critical thinking skills in schools. High school
completion rates (or its opposite, drop-out rates) may be used as an indicator for this
capability. Nussbaum points out that this capability depends on freedom of conscience
and is hindered by the lack of such freedoms. Although freedom of conscience can be
indicated through the presence of laws protecting freedom of conscience, there are no
numerical indicators that represent the effectiveness or extent of such laws.
Affiliation Indicators
The human functioning capability of affiliation reflects the ability to maintain
interpersonal relationships and to demonstrate concern for others on an interpersonal and
social level. This includes the capacity for compassion, friendship and justice. Three
obvious indicators for this unfortunately cannot be used, however, due to data limitations.
Child maltreatment has been showed to negatively affect a child’s peer relationships and
social competence and could be used as an indicator, except for the data collection
problems mentioned above. 61
Two other indicators, although they seemed like obvious choices, proved to be
unworkable for the Common Good Index. Hate crimes, for example, reveal a break in
affiliation toward others based on differences in race or ethnicity, religion, gender or
61
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sexual orientation or disability. However, there are several problems with using hate
crimes as an indicator. It is not broadly used outside of the United States, and the
reporting of hate crimes year by year includes total numbers but does not allow for a hate
crime rate to be established and compared across years. 62 Therefore, I do not include it
here. Martha Nussbaum notes that affiliation requires equality in social and economic
opportunities. The Gini coefficient is a common indicator of social and economic
equality, measuring income equality in society. The Gini coefficient cannot be used in the
Common Good Index, however, because it cannot be applied to subgroups by race or
gender. Futhermore, an ideal Gini score would imply that the lowest skilled laborers
receive the same income as the highest skilled workers, a proposition for which there is
no social consensus.
Regardless of these limitations, this capability can be indicated through other
means, through other indicators of equality of opportunity: when a resource-rich a society
such as the United States allows 46 million residents to lack access to health care 63 or
allow 39 million people to live in poverty, or half of all students at urban public schools
to drop out, 64 it demonstrates a deficiency in this capability. Thus, the indicators of
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poverty, health care uninsurance and high school graduation rates serve as indicators for
affiliation.
Other Species and Nature Indicators
The realization of the next capability, relating to other species and nature,
determines our ability to ensure a healthy future for the environment, life species and
indeed of the planet. One of the key areas of measurement for this capability is the
environment. The field of the environment is broad, and environmental indexes include
numerous indicators for diverse concerns such as land, water, air and biodiversity. 65
While one indicator alone cannot provide guidance when discussing the impact of certain
events or policies on the environment, I choose one indicator for the Common Good
Index: carbon dioxide emissions.66 Carbon dioxide emissions play a significant role in
global warming and the resulting destabilization of the environment and has been a key
environmental indicator for many years. A recent research study has shown that CO2
emissions must be halved by 2050 in order to stabilize global climate. 67
Control over Environment Indicators
The next human functioning capability is control over one’s environment. This
capability has two aspects: political and material. Political control over one’s
65
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environment refers to the ability to influence the social and political policies that affect
one’s life. This capability is exercised through participation in political and civil
processes, including but not limited to electoral processes. It is protected by the right to
assembly, free speech, and by voting rights. I choose to indicate this capability through
voter turnout rates. While voter registration rates indicate basic access to voting, voter
turnout rates point to barriers to voting other than the formal right to vote. 68
Material control over one’s environment, the second aspect of this capability,
refers to one’s ability to acquire and hold property, including land and other material
goods. This is potentially indicated by property ownership. Homeownership in particular
not only indicates control over one’s environment but the capabilities of senses,
imagination and thought, affiliation and bodily health as well, since it has been found that
“housing boosts the educational performance of children, induces higher participation in
civic and volunteering activity, improves health care outcomes, lowers crime rates and
lessens welfare dependency.” 69
The formal right to own property for both men and women is recognized under
international law. Many countries, however, still permit discriminatory policies, and
many other countries, while recognizing the formal right, allow “the persistence of
discriminatory laws, policies, patriarchal customs, traditions and attitudes [to block]
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women from enjoying their rights.” 70 While homeownership or housing affordability
would seem to be an ideal indicator for this index, statistics on housing affordability are
not measured in enough countries to use this indicator for the Common Good Index. 71
This indicator cannot, therefore, be used for the Common Good Index.
Another indicator may be used, poverty. Certainly one of the main barriers to
ownership is economic, even when the formal right to own property exists. However, a
family’s general economic status greatly influences its ability to own property, and thus
this capability can be indicated by family income, and especially poverty, since an
impoverished person lacks the means to buy even necessities, much less a home.
Work Indicators
The human functioning capability of work requires the ability to work and to be
adequately remunerated for it. This capability is also indicated through unemployment
rates. The capability of work is also indicated by high school completion rates. This is
because educational level strongly influences one’s ability to earn a living wage. High
school drop-outs in the United States earn less than $19,000 a year, placing most families
with uneducated workers in poverty. Furthermore, poverty and family wages indicate the
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capability of work, since it provides a window into whether or not people are receiving a
living wage.
Raising Children in a Stable, Supportive Environment Indicators
The capability of raising children in a stable, supportive environment might be
indicated by the divorce rate, since divorce reflects instability in child raising, exacts a
high psychological toll on all members of the family and generally places women and
children at an economic disadvantage. 72 However, there is a problem with using divorce
as an indicator of this capability. While divorce may cause instability, it may actually
increase a parent’s ability to raise their children in a supportive environment, for example
if there is conflict or abuse in the home. This leads to a problem in determining an ideal
divorce rate. In an ideal world where all marriages reflect life-giving partnerships
between spouses, the divorce rate would be zero. However, in a world where a continued
relationship is damaging to the parties involved, especially when involving spousal or
child abuse, a zero percent divorce rate would represent a failure to ensure basic
wellbeing. A better indicator of this capability is the teenage birth rate. Teenagers who
have babies are at a tremendous disadvantage in terms of being able to provide
economically provide for their children, to provide the nurturing and guidance that come
with maturity, and to provide a stable home with two parents. 73
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Relatedness to the Transcendent Indicators
A common religion indicator is membership in a formal religious organization
(e.g. the Catholic Church). However, in an age where an increasing number of people
define themselves as “spiritual but not religious,” it is not easy to make the case that a
drop in membership in organized religion means a decrease in relatedness to the
transcendent. Relatedness to the transcendent can be measured, however, by frequency of
prayer or to what extent a person considers God important in their life. For reasons of
access to data I choose the indicator of what percentage of the population considers God
very important.
Play Indicators
The one capability that lacks an indicator is play. The capacity for play is
developed in childhood through ongoing engagement in play activities. Play could
possibly be indicated by statistics on organized play activities or time in physical
recreation in schools. However, extensive research resulted in some published reports but
no systematic, regularly kept statistics on hours of physical education or recreation
periods in schools. 74 Furthermore, while official statistics are maintained on the number
of hours adults spend on sports and recreation, 75 there is no consensus on what the ideal
number of hours should be, disabling this as an indicator.
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Summary of Indicators
To summarize, there are twelve common good indicators representing thirteen
human functioning capabilities. Most capabilities are indicated by more than one
indicator, however. Table 1 shows the list of human functioning capabilities with their
attendant indicators, showing how many indicators each capability has.
Table 1. Human Functioning Capabilities with Attendant Indicators

1

Human Functioning Capabilities
Life

2

Health

3

Bodily Integrity

4
5
6
7

Senses, imagination and thought
Emotions
Practical reasoning
Affiliation

8
9
10

Other species and nature
Play and recreation
Control over environment

11
12

Relationship to the transcendent
Raising children in a stable,
supportive environment
Work

13

Infant mortality
Uninsurance
Poverty
Uninsurance
Poverty
Carbon dioxide emissions
Homicide
Poverty
High school drop-out
Suicide
High school drop-out
Poverty
Uninsurance
Carbon dioxide emissions
Voter turnout
Poverty
God very important
Teen pregnancy
Unemployment
High School drop-out
Poverty

As is apparent in Table 1, each human functioning capability has at least one
indicator, and in many instances has several. The indicators themselves overlap, however
– many indicators indicate more than one capability. Table 2 provides an unduplicated
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list of indicators, correlated to the capabilities they represent. As is evident in this table,
each indicator represents at least one human functioning capability, with most indicators
pointing to the health of several capabilities.
Table 2. Common Good Indicators

1

Indicator
Infant mortality

2

Uninsurance

3

Homicide

4

Family Income

5

Poverty

6

High school drop-out

7

Suicide

8
9
10
11

Carbon dioxide emissions
Voter turnout
Unemployment
Teenage birth rate

12

God very important

Human Functioning Capabilities
Life
Health
Life
Health
Affiliation
Bodily integrity
Life
Health
Affiliation
Life
Health
Bodily integrity
Control over environment
Work
Affiliation
Life
Health
Bodily integrity
Control over environment
Work
Affiliation
Senses, imagination and thought
Practical reason
Work
Affiliation
Emotions
Life
Other species and environment
Control over environment
Work
Raising children in a stable, supportive
environment
Relatedness to the transcendent
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Like the Index of Social Health, the Common Good Index is concerned with
taking into account the wellbeing of all age groups – children, youth, adults and elderly.
Some indicators, such as infant mortality or high school drop-out rates, indicate human
capabilities for only one age group. Others indicate capabilities for two or three age
groups; for example, unemployment indicates the capability of work for both youth and
adults. Still others, such as food insecurity or poverty, indicate capabilities across all age
groups. Table 3 shows the age groups for which data are pulled for each indicator. The
age groups correspond to the affected groups as well, although it must be recognized that
due to human interrelationality, all age groups are in the end affected by all problems. For
example, while infant mortality indicates wellbeing for children, a child’s death
obviously and negatively affects a parent’s wellbeing as well.
Table 3. Indicators: Correspondence to Age Groups
Indicator
1 Infant mortality
2 Uninsured
3 Family income
4 Homicide
5 Poverty
6 High school drop-outs
7 Suicide
8 Carbon dioxide emissions
9 Voter turnout
10 Unemployment
11 Teenage birth rate
12 God very important
Total # indicators

Children
√
√
√
√
√

Youth

Adults

Elderly

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√

√
√
√

√

√

5

8

√
√
√
√

√
√

√
8

√
5
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Calculating the Common Good Index Scores
The Common Good Index is set on a range of one to 100, with one 100
representing a Model Year. In the Index of Social Health, the Model Year does not reflect
an actual calendar year’s performance, but rather reflects a summation of each indicator’s
highest yearly (standardized) score since 1970. 76 The Model Year may include, for
example, a 1989 score for one indicator and a 2005 score for another. For the application
of the CGI in Chapter Four, I based the maximum value for any given indicator on the
same year of the indicator value, because it was outside the scope of this work to
determine scores for the past thirty years. However, I recommend for the future using a
time series comparison, as in the Index of Social Health, for a fuller development of the
Index.
To reach the total CGI score, first each indicator value is standardized into a
number between one and ten, and then added. The sum is then described as a percentage
of the total score possible and multiplied by 100, to reach a number between one and 100.
The Common Good Index score, like the Index of Social Health score, is expressed by
the following equation:

I =

1 (MAi – Xi)
∑ 10 (MAi – MIi)_
x 100
n x 10

where I = Index score
Xi = social indicator value for that year
MAi = maximum value of Xi during Model Year
MIi = minimum value of Xi during Model Year
76
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n = number of indicators. 77
As an example, if the highest high school drop-out rate is 23%, then 23% is scored at 0,
because that is the worst performance. The lowest high school drop-out rate, 11%, is
scored at 10, for best performance. A current year performance of 17%, which falls onehalf of the way between the two numbers, would be scored at 5.0. To determine the
overall Index score, that indicator’s score is added to the other fifteen indicator scores
and divided by 160 (16 indicators x 10 maximum points per score = 160), to reach a
percentage of the total possible points. That percentage is then multiplied by 100 to reach
a total Common Good Index score between 1 and 100.
The scale is relative to historical reality: when indicator scores reach new
maximums, these new numbers inform a new Model Year score, creating a higher
standard for comparison. Conversely, new lows create a lower standard for comparison.
Relative scales have been criticized as being difficult to compare across years because of
the “moving goalposts.” 78 However, the benefits of such a system outweigh the costs. As
a relative scale, the CGI is compared against an achievable goal, one that has been
already been realized in a given country. Furthermore, a relative scale enables a
“meaningful basis of comparison” between nations and provides a pragmatic yardstick
for progress or decline. 79 An Index that measures progress toward or away from previous
77
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societal “bests” provides a social reading that challenges the global community to bring
less developed nations to higher standards of living and challenges developed nations to
repeat and outdo what they has already shown themselves capable of. 80
Summary
The Common Good Index consists of twelve indicators that collectively measure
the thirteen human functioning capabilities defined in Chapter Three. These indicators fit
into seven criteria that maximize data availability and consistency, highlight important
aspects of the human functioning capabilities, keep the index to a manageable size, and
orient them toward the wellbeing of vulnerable populations in light of the preferential
option for the poor. The Index score is a summation of standardized indicator scores that
reflects to what extent the common good is being realized in society.
There is a precedent in Catholic tradition for the quantification of Catholic social
principles in John Ryan’s quantification of the right to subsistence in the form of a
proposal for a living wage, a proposal that included an actual set dollar amount. The
Common Good Index constructed here follows Ryan’s example, quantifying the Catholic
principle of the Common Good. In the next chapter, I apply the CGI to the issue of
undocumented Mexican immigration to the United States, in order to evaluate its effects
on the common good at all levels and develop an appropriate response to it.
80

On a technical note, I investigated using a fixed scale for the Common Good Index but found it
problematic because a fixed approach implicitly weights some indicators more heavily than others. To
explain: the vast majority of indicators are scaled between one and one hundred. So teenage pregnancy is
presented as number of births per 1,000 teenagers, the suicide rate is presented as the number of deaths per
100,000 people, and the voter turnout rate is expressed as a percentage of voters. In 2006, the teenage
pregnancy rate was 10.1, the suicide rate 12.3 and the electoral participation rate 43.6. Because they are all
scaled so differently from the start, to standardize them to a scale of 1-100 weights them randomly. In
scaling them to actual historical possibilities instead, the scores become more evenly weighted. A relative
scale provides a fairer representation of equality between indicators.

CHAPTER FOUR
APPLYING THE SPECIFIED COMMON GOOD APPROACH
TO THE U.S. IMMIGRATION ISSUE
The Common Good Index measures the common good through measuring human
functioning capabilities. In the last chapter I presented the methodology underlying the
CGI and the rationale for the indicators chosen. In this chapter, I use the CGI to evaluate
the impact on the common good of recent undocumented Mexican immigration trends
and effects of relevant U.S. social policies. It is important to note that this evaluation not
only assesses the effects of unauthorized Mexican migration itself, but also the effects of
social policies affecting immigration and immigrants.
I begin this chapter by presenting and analyzing the CGI scores (see Appendices
A through C for complete list of scores). I calculate the CGI scores at three levels:
international (which includes both the United States and Mexico), national (for the U.S.
and Mexico separately) and community (including African Americans, Latinos and
undocumented Mexican immigrants). The international level represents the universal
level, but in this analysis the International CGI Score encompasses data for the United
States and Mexico only, because they are the two nations directly affected by my
research question.
The international level of analysis takes precedence over more local units of
analysis. Because of the universality of the common good, it is at this level that social
115
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situations and our responses to them are ultimately judged. 1 However, more local levels
of analysis are also important in order to bring to light and respond to threats to a
particular population’s human capabilities, which may be lost in a more general analysis.
A tri-level analysis (international, national and community) enables one to develop a
comprehensive response to threats to the human functioning capabilities of all affected
groups. When threats are recognized at all three levels, strategies can be employed that
will maximize the common good to a greater extent than if the common good is
examined at the universal level alone. Furthermore, an ethical response that takes all
three levels into account will more readily avoid a violation of the preferential option for
the poor.
The preferential option for the poor focuses one’s attention on vulnerable
populations. In this study, it directs attention to the CGI scores of undocumented
Mexicans and Mexican residents, and also of the Black and Latino U.S. populations.
Blacks and Latinos are much poorer on average than the overall United States population,
face disabling disparities in opportunities for education, work, health, and safety, and are
more likely to be negatively affected by immigration. 2 When the threats to these
communities are understood, they can be mitigated through focused efforts.
1
2

See Pope John XXIII, "Pacem in Terris."

The African-American population, for example, has infant mortality rates that rival those of
some developing nations. Their infant mortality rate is 13.5 deaths per 1,000 live births, similar to infant
mortality rates for Sri Lanka (15), Albania (14) and El Salvador (15). United States: Infant Mortality Rate
(Deaths per 1,000 Live Births) by Race/Ethnicity, Linked Files, 2004-2006, (Kaiser Family Foundation
Statehealthfacts.org), http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?ind=48&rgn=1&cat=2. Mortality
Rate, Infant (per 1,000 births), (The World Bank, 2010),
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN?order=wbapi_data_value_2009+wbapi_data_value+
wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc (accessed January 30, 2011).
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The CGI scores display the relative abilities of these different populations to
achieve their basic human functioning capabilities. I discuss these scores at length below,
but to briefly present the results, they show that a much higher percent of U.S. residents
meet their basic human capabilities than Mexican residents, but they also show that
African Americans and Latinos meet their basic capabilities at a rate that is significantly
lower than the U.S. average: their scores fall halfway between the overall U.S. rate and
Mexico’s rate. Undocumented Mexican immigrants’ rate of attainment of basic
capabilities is somewhat higher than Mexico’s, but falls far below the rate even of the
overall U.S. Black and Latino populations.
After presenting the data for the Common Good Index at these different levels, I
present recent findings regarding how recent undocumented Mexican immigration has
affected the Index’s indicators. Using available sociological and economic research, I
estimate how the CGI scores would differ if the 6.7 million undocumented Mexican
immigrants had not moved to the United States. Comparing this estimate to the real
numbers allows for a judgment about whether recent undocumented Mexican
immigration trends have increased or decreased the common good.
What is revealed through the CGI is that overall, undocumented Mexican
immigration to the United States since 1980 has caused a small decline in the
international common good. Furthermore, at the national level undocumented Mexican
immigration has improved basic human capabilities for Mexican residents, but it has
affected a slight decline in the ability of U.S. residents to achieve their basic capabilities.

118
At the community level, undocumented Mexican immigration has resulted in noteworthy
improvements in human functioning for undocumented Mexican immigrants, and it
yields highly significant generational improvements for the offspring of undocumented
Mexicans. However, it has negatively affected the ability of low-income U.S. citizens to
meet their basic capabilities. The negative effect on the average low-skilled U.S. worker
is smaller than the positive effect on the average Mexican and undocumented Mexican
immigrant, but because the U.S. population is so much larger than Mexico’s population
and the undocumented Mexican immigrant population combined, the overall effect on the
international common good is negative.
As the final step in this chapter, in light of this data I develop some suggestions
for an appropriate Christian response to undocumented Mexican immigration. This effort
involves weighing improvements against declines in human functioning capabilities
through the lens of solidarity with the poor – all the poor, and not only undocumented
Mexicans. Among the recommendations forwarded, I argue that policies should be
pursued that enable current rates of Mexican immigration to happen legally and that help
to legalize currently undocumented Mexicans, but also that policies to improve the wages
and working conditions of all workers should also be advocated by the Catholic Church
as part of its immigration agenda.
International, National, and Community Common Good Index Scores
Before exploring the CGI scores, I first present a technical note to facilitate
accurate understanding. I name the CGI indicators differently from the actual sociological
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indicators used, in order to avoid the following confusion: with most indicators, a higher
score is worse; you want to minimize, for example, the suicide rate. CGI indicators,
however, measure attainment of human capability on a scale of one to 100, with 100
being the best score possible. To name the CGI indicator “Suicide” may mislead someone
into interpreting a high score as a high suicide rate, which is the opposite of the intention.
I have named the CGI Indicator in this case Emotional Wellbeing. 3 Table 4 contains the
names of the CGI indicators of human capabilities, with their corresponding
measurements.
International and National CGI(P) Scores
The International CGI(P) score is 75.8 on a scale of one to one hundred. (See CGI(P)
Scores, Table 5). 4 In order to understand what that means, first remember that a CGI
score reflects the extent to which people are or are not getting their basic needs met.
Second, recall that the scale is relative, measured against international best and worst
performance. Therefore, a score of 75.8 means that the U.S. and Mexico are collectively
in the seventy-fifth percentile internationally in terms of ensuring minimum levels of
human capabilities for their residents. The United States’ score is 80.9, which means that

3

I do not name the indicators by to the names of corresponding human capabilities, because of
many indicators correspond to multiple capabilities.
4

Scores reflect 2006 figures. I use 2006 numbers rather than more recent numbers for two reasons.
First, it is the year for which the most number of indicators is available. Data for more recent years is
spotty, due to the length of time that it takes governmental bodies to report data. Secondly, later in this
chapter I will compare these scores to hypothetical scores in an imagined absence of unauthorized
immigration. The literature grounding that analysis uses data through the middle of the decade, but not
through the end of the decade. Therefore, use of 2006 data allows for a better comparison. In some cases, I
approximate 2006 data with data from 2005 or 2007, due to lack of 2006 data. See Appendix for CGI
calculations and citations.
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Table 4. CGI(P) Indicators and Corresponding Measurements 5

Name of CGI(P)
Indicator
Electoral Participation

Measurement Used

Education

Voter Turnout
High School
Drop-out

Safety from Violence

Homicide

Household Income

Household Income

Infant Life

Infant Mortality

Emotional Wellbeing

Suicide

Age of Mother

Teenage Births

Health Insurance

Uninsurance

the United States is in the eightieth percentile internationally. It comes as no surprise that
Mexico’s CGI(P) score is significantly lower than that of the United States. Mexico’s
score of 61.4 shows the dramatically lower level of capabilities among Mexican residents
than U.S. residents.
In order to understand the vast difference between these two countries CGI
scores, I examine the differences in scores for each indicator (see Table 6). What we see

5

CGI(P) stands for the Partial Common Good Index; it is a subset of the CGI. Four of the twelve
CGI indicators cannot be included in the calculations in this project due to the lack of information on that
indicator for one or more of the various sub-groups. Discarding these indicators, I calculate what I call
Partial Common Good Scores (CGI(P) Scores). The indicators that are used to calculate the CGI(P) scores
are listed in Table 4.
Although the Partial Common Good Index depicts an incomplete picture of human functioning
capabilities, it still includes the majority of the human capabilities toward which the common good is
directed. Despite its limitations, the Partial Common Good Index provides information on the condition of
enough of the human functioning capabilities to give a fair reading of the effect of recent immigration
trends on the common good. It thus remains a valuable tool.
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Table 5. CGI(P) Scores: International and National

International
(U.S. &
Mexico
Combined)

Mexico

United
States

Electoral
Participation

46.3

57.1

42.4

Education

78.0

33.7

93.5

Safety
Household
Income

90.2

84.6

92.2

66.7

20.9

82.8

Infant Life
Emotional
Wellbeing

94.7

89.6

96.5

75.5

87.7

71.1

Age of Mother

79.8

67.3

84.1

Health Insurance

75.3

50.2

84.2

CGI(P) Scores

75.8

64.1

80.9

is that Mexico lags behind the United States in eight out of the eleven indicators: infant
mortality, uninsurance, homicide, poverty, household income, high school drop-outs,
electoral participation, and teen birthrate. Particularly alarming are disparities in income
and poverty. The poverty rate for Mexico is almost four times that of the United States:
almost half of all Mexicans (47.0%) are impoverished, versus 12.3% of U.S. residents. 6
The median family income is only thirty percent that of the United States, even in spite of

6

This striking difference alone explains the high immigration rates from Mexico. Mexico figures
from Mapas de Pobreza y Rezago Social 2005, (CONEVAL (Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la
Política de Desarrollo Social), 2007), http://www.coneval.gob.mx/mapas/. United States figures from
Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2007,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008), 57, http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf
(accessed January 18, 2011).
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Table 6. Human Functioning Indicators: National 7

Mexico
Electoral
Participation 8
High School
Drop-Out 9

United
States

58.0

43.6

66.7

11.0

11.0

6.2

$14,280

$48,201

16.2

6.7

4.3

12.3

Teenage Births 14

82.3

10.1

Uninsurance 15

49.8

41.9

Homicide 10
Household
Income 11
Infant
Mortality12
Suicide 13

the fact that Mexico’s median family size (3.9) is almost twice that of the United States
(2.3). 16

7

See Appendix for a complete list of sources.

8

Percentage of voting-age population who voted in 2006 national elections.

9

United States figures reflects status drop-outs, or the percentage of people aged 18 – 25 who did
not graduate from high school and are not currently enrolled. Mexico’s figure reflects population aged 2564 with less than an upper secondary school education.
10

Rate per 100,000 people.

11

All numbers in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), with U.S. dollars as the standard.

12

Per 1,000 live births.

13

Rate per 100,000 people.

14

Births per 1,000 women.

15

Percentage of population without personal or public health insurance.

16

Mexico’s figures from Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH) 2006,
(Mexico, D.F.: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, 2007),
http://ceidas.org/documentos/Centro_Doc/Resultados_ENIGH_2006.pdf (accessed December 18, 2010).
U.S. figures based on U.S. Census Consumer Expenditure Interview Survey, from HIES - Household
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Although poverty is not included in the CGI(P) index, I discuss it briefly here due
to its importance as an indicator. The difference in wages between the two countries
seems stark, and yet the question is begged, “What can you buy with it?” The numbers
reflected in the above table are in Purchasing Power Parity numbers, with U.S. dollars as
the standard. This means that the dollars listed for Mexico can buy the same things as
they would in the United States. The average Mexican family income is $14,280, which
is $7,650 lower than the U.S. poverty line for a family of four of $22,050. 17 The U.S.
poverty line itself is widely criticized as being too low, with advocates supporting a
figure of poverty times two as a more accurate indication of whether a family earns the
necessary income to pay for basic expenses. 18 These facts lead to the conclusion that the
average Mexican family lacks sufficient income to pay for their basic expenses.
Mexico’s poverty rate, as measured by Mexican standards, is also much higher
than the United States’ poverty rate: 47 percent, versus 12 percent. Regarding poverty
statistics, a frequently asked question is how comparable the poverty measurements are.
Income and Expenditure Statistics, (International Labor Organization Department of Statistics, 2010),
http://laborsta.ilo.org/ (accessed September 12, 2010).
17

The 2009 HHS Poverty Guidelines, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 2010), http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/09poverty.shtml.
18

Gregory Acs and Pamela Loprest, "Who Are Low-Income Working Families?," (2005).
Another study found that a family needs 1.5 to 3.5 times the poverty income to pay for their basic needs.
Kinsey Alden Dinan, Budgeting for Basic Needs, (New York: National Center for Children in Poverty,
Malman Center for Public Health, Columbia University, 2009),
http://www.nccp.org/publications/pdf/text_858.pdf (accessed November 11, 2009). The U.S. poverty
measurement was determined in 1965, when one-third of family budgets were spent on food. The U.S.
poverty measure still equals an adequate food expenditure (based on consumer expenditure surveys),
multiplied by three. However, food now constitutes only one-quarter of the average family budget, while
child care and health care now constitute a larger share of the family budget. Efforts to change the poverty
measurement have been happening since a government sponsored research study was commissioned in
1995. Measuring Poverty: A New Approach, ed. Constance F. Citro and Robert T. Michael (Washington,
D.C.: National Academy Press, 1995).
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Mexico has a three-level definition of poverty: food-based poverty, capacity-based
poverty and assets-based poverty. 19 Mexico’s 47 percent poverty rate reflects assetsbased poverty, which is defined as the income below which a family cannot afford food,
health, housing, transportation and education costs, even if 100 percent of their income is
used exclusively on those goods and services. 20 This figure does seem to have a similar
approximate value to the U.S. poverty figure. 21
Poverty is one of the most important indicators, as poverty compromises one’s
ability to realize one’s most basic capabilities. Although this number is not included in
the CGI(P) calculation, household income serves as a proxy in the calculation. The data
also demonstrate the well-documented correlation between poverty and education levels:
Mexicans are much less likely to be educated than United States residents: Mexicans are
six times less likely to complete high school: 66.7% of Mexicans failed to complete high
school, versus 11.0% of U.S. residents. 22 Mexicans are thus far less likely to have their
basic intellectual capabilities realized.

19

La Medicion de la Pobreza y su Multidimensionalidad, (Mexico, D.F.: Consejo Nacional de
Evaluacion de la Politica de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL), 2006), 7, http://www.coneval.gob.mx/.
20

Expenses are calculated according to consumer expenditure surveys. Ibid.

21

In response to criticism that the U.S. poverty line is too low, the U.S. Census Bureau has created
three different alternative poverty calculations, all of which are based in a true expense- and income-based
methodology. These alternative calculations take in-kind governmental assistance into account, so they do
not reflect how many families earn enough to sustain themselves without government help. However, they
do reflect how many families are meeting their basic needs through a combination of income and
governmental assistance. These alternative poverty measurements result in even lower poverty rates than
the traditional formula. Joe Dalaker, Alternative Poverty Estimates in the United States: 2003,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2005), http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-227.pdf.
22

Mexican figure reflects the percentage of Mexican residents aged 25-64 who did not complete
upper secondary school. Country Statistical Profiles 2010: Mexico, (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2010), http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx. U.S. figure reflects “status drop-outs,”
or number of U.S. residents aged 18 – 24 who did not complete or are not enrolled in high school. High
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Other indicators also demonstrate inequality in capabilities between Mexican and
U.S. residents: Mexico has significantly two to three times higher, infant mortality, teen
pregnancy, homicide and uninsurance rates. Infants in Mexico are more than twice as
likely to die as infants in the U.S. (16.2 infants per 1,000 live births, versus 6.7). 23
Contributing to higher rates of infant mortality, poverty and high-school drop-outs, teens
in Mexico are twice as likely to bear children as teens in the United States, with 82.1
births per 1,000 young women versus 41.9 in the U.S. 24 And people in Mexico are almost
twice as likely to die from homicide (11.0 homicides per 100,000 people, versus 6.2 in
the U.S.). 25 Adding to the threat to basic health and life is lack of health insurance:
almost half of the Mexican population is uninsured, over three times the U.S. rate
(49.8%, versus 15.8% for the U.S.). 26

School Dropouts by Race and Hispanic Origin: 1980 to 2007, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau),
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/education.html
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0262.pdf. The OECD Country Statistical
Profiles 2010 reports that the number of U.S. residents who failed to complete high school is 12.1, which is
slightly higher than the U.S. census bureau number. However, I use the U.S. Census Bureau statistics,
because it is then possible to compare the overall U.S. numbers to those of Latinos and African Americans.
23

"OECD Health Data 2009 - Selected Data: Health status (Mortality)," in OECD.Stat Extracts
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)),
http://www.oecd.org/statsportal/0,3352,en_2825_293564_1_1_1_1_1,00.html.
24

U.S. figure from U.S. Teenage Pregnancies, Births and Abortions: National and State Trends
and Trends by Race and Ethnicity, (Guttmacher Institute, 2010), 7,
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/USTPtrends.pdf. Mexico figure from Adolescent Birth Rate, per 1,000
Women, (United Nations, 2010), http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx (accessed December 20, 2010).
25

Mexican figures from Tenth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of
Criminal Justice Systems, Covering the Period 2005 - 2006, (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime),
4, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/CTS10%20homicide.pdf (accessed July 3, 2010).
U.S. figures from Deaths: Final Data for 2006 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Disease Control, 2009), 5,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57_14.pdf (accessed January 30, 2011).
26

Mexican statistics from Secretaria de Salud de Mexico, Indicadores Basicos de Salud, 20002004, (Mexico, D.F.: Organización Panaméricana de la Salud: Oficina Regional de la Organización
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It is interesting that while Mexico’s overall CGI(P) score is close to 20 points
lower than the United States, Mexico still shows better performance in two indicators
measured in the Partial Common Good Index, namely suicide and electoral participation.
In Mexico the voter participation rate is 58 percent, versus 43.6 percent for the United
States. 27 And Mexico’s suicide rate is almost three times lower than that of the United
States (3.4 suicides per 100,000 people, versus 10.1). 28 Mexico’s relatively low suicide
rate is interesting in light of the fact that Mexicans suffer many more deprivations than
United States residents. A cross-cultural study of emotional health would have to be done
to demonstrate the reasons for this anomalous finding.
While these facts are not insignificant, they still do not change the fact that
Mexico’s overall CGI(P) score is markedly lower than that of the United States. This
forms part of the basis of why Mexicans migrate to the United States: to seek a better
life. 29 However, the picture changes somewhat when comparing social conditions in
Mexico with social conditions in the United States in the African American and Latino
Mundial de la Salud), http://sinais.salud.gob.mx/indicadores/ (accessed January 30, 2011). U.S. Statistics
from DeNavas-Walt et al., Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2007, 22.
27

Mexico figure from Eleccion de Presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, (Mexico, D.F.:
Instituto Federal Electoral, 2010),
http://www.ife.org.mx/documentos/OE/participacion2006/reportes/circ.html (accessed January 30, 2011).
U.S. figure from Table A-1: Reporting Voting and Registration by Race, Hispanic Origin, Sex and Age
Groups: November 1964 to 2008, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau),
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/historical/index.html.
28
29

"OECD Health Data 2009 - Selected Data: Health status (Mortality)."

Various migration theories account for a multiplicity of reasons why people migrate. Economic
push factors (e.g. poverty or political instability) form one important set of reasons. Other reasons include
the “pull” factor of jobs in the host country, such as labor demand or social capital that facilitates ease of
migration, e.g. relationships with other migrants already residing in the host country. For a good overview
of migration theories, see Massey et al., Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of
Economic Integration, 9-23.
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communities, and in comparing the capabilities of undocumented Mexican immigrants
with their Mexican counterparts.
African American and Latino Common Good Index Scores: 2006
While the United States’ population as a whole far surpasses Mexico in basic
attainment of human functioning capabilities, this wellbeing is not equally shared by all
groups. The indicator scores for minorities in the United States fall quite short of the
overall U.S. scores. This is true for the African American and Latino communities, and it
is certainly true of the undocumented Mexican immigrant community, whose scores I
will discuss in more detail in the next subsection (see Table 7). The African American
Community CGI(P) score is 72.9, eight points below the national average. The Latino
Community CGI(P) score is even lower, at 70.2. Both scores fall about half way between
Mexico’s and the United States’ National Common Good Index scores. The score for
undocumented Mexican immigrants is even lower than for Latinos and African
Americans, at 63.4.
Examining individual CGI(P) scores, it is troubling that in almost all indicators
African Americans and U.S. Latinos lag behind U.S. whites (see Table 8). African
Americans rank worse than the U.S. national average in every indicator but one. Needless
to say, these statistics reflect great disparities within the nation. The Black infant
mortality rate (13.5) stands over twice the national U.S. rates (6.7). 30 Even more

30

Unemployed Persons by Marital Status, Race, Hispanic or Latino Ethnicity, Age and Sex,
(Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Labor Statistics, 2007),
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/lf/aa2006/pdf/cpsaat24.pdf (accessed January 14, 2011).
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alarming, Black homicides stand at four times the national rate (23.6 deaths per 100,000,
versus 6.2). Blacks are 29% more likely to be uninsured, 31 18% more likely to drop out
of high school, 32 9% less likely to vote, 33 and 52% more likely to give birth as a
teenager. 34
Table 7. CGI(P) Scores
International
(U.S. &
Mexico
Combined)
Electoral
Participation

Undoc.
Mexican
Immigra
nts

Mexico

United
States

African
America
ns

46.3

57.1

42.4

37.3

17.7

0.0

Education

78.0

33.7

93.5

91.4

77.2

61.4

Safety
Household
Income

90.2

84.6

92.2

70.1

89.9

90.4

66.7

20.9

82.8

53.1

63.7

60.5

Infant Life
Emotional
Wellbeing
Age of
Mother
Health
Insurance
CGI(P)
Score*

94.7

89.6

96.5

91.5

97.4

97.9

75.5

87.7

71.1

85.4

82.9

86.6

79.8

67.3

84.1

75.1

67.0

60.4

75.3

50.2

84.2

79.5

65.9

50.0

75.8

61.4

80.9

72.9

70.2

63.4

Latinos

31

DeNavas-Walt et al., Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States:
2007, 22. You can use 2009 data no w - -it is easily available online.
32

High School Dropouts by Race and Hispanic Origin: 1980 to 2007.

33

Table A-1: Reporting Voting and Registration by Race, Hispanic Origin, Sex and Age Groups:
November 1964 to 2008.
34

Teenagers—Births and Birth Rates by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1990 to 2007,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010),
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0084.pdf (accessed May 25, 2010).
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Table 8. Human Functioning Indicators: National and Minority Populations 35

Mexico
Electoral
participation 36
High School
Drop-Out 37

United
States

African
Americans

Latinos

Undocumented
Immigrants

58.0

43.6

38.6

19.3

0.0

66.7

11.0

13.0

26.2

40.9

11.0

6.2

23.6

8.0

7.6

$14,280

$48,201

$31,969

$37,781

$36,000

16.2

6.7

13.5

5.5

4.9

4.3

10.1

5.1

6.0

4.7

Teenage Births 42

82.3

41.9

63.7

83.0

99.0

Uninsurance 43

49.8

15.8

20.5

34.1

50.0

Homicide 38
Household
Income 39
Infant
Mortality40
Suicide 41

It is furthermore troubling that some African American indicators are lower not
only than the U.S. as a whole but than Mexico as well. The African American community
fares considerably worse, for example, than both the Mexico and U.S. averages in

35

See Appendix for sources.

36

Percentage of voting-age population who voted in 2006 national elections.

37

United States figures reflects status drop-outs, or the percentage of people aged 18 – 25 who did
not graduate from high school and are not currently enrolled. Mexico’s figure reflects population aged 2564 with less than an upper secondary school education.
38

Rate per 100,000 people.

39

All numbers in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), with U.S. dollars as the standard.

40

Per 1,000 live births.

41

Rate per 100,000 people.

42

Births per 1,000 women.

43

Percentage of population without personal or public health insurance.
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homicide rates. African Americans are almost four times as likely as the U.S. average to
die of homicide, with 23.6 homicides per 100,000 people, versus 6.2. 44 And they are
twice as likely to die from homicide as Mexicans, who suffer 11.0 homicides per 100,000
people. In addition, Blacks suffer a poor infant mortality rate in comparison to Mexico:
infant mortality among African Americans is 13.5 deaths per 1,000 live births, which is
close to Mexico’s 16.2. 45
The African American community performs better than the U.S. overall in one
indicator: suicide. The suicide rate in the African American community is 5.1 deaths per
100,000 people, versus 13.9 for the overall U.S. population. Blacks fare better than
Mexicans in this regard as well: the Mexican suicide rate is 6.0. 46
Overall, Blacks fare worse than the average U.S. resident but better than
Mexicans. The Latino CGI(P) scores show a similar dynamic. In comparison to the
national average U.S. Latinos are two or more times as likely to be uninsured, 47 give birth
as a teenager 48 or drop out of high school. 49 They are 1.7 times as likely to be
impoverished, 50 1.3 times as likely be unemployed and 1.29 times as likely to be a victim

44

Deaths: Final Data for 2006

45

United States: Infant Mortality Rate (Deaths per 1,000 Live Births) by Race/Ethnicity, Linked
Files, 2004-2006.
46

"WISQARS Injury Mortality Reports, 1999 - 2006," (United States Center for Disease Control:
National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 2009),
http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate10_sy.html.
47

Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2007, 22.

48

Teenagers—Births and Birth Rates by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1990 to 2007.

49

High School Dropouts by Race and Hispanic Origin: 1980 to 2007.

50

Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2007, 57.
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of a homicide than the U.S. average. 51 Their median family income is only three-quarters
of the U.S. average. 52 While these numbers are worse than the overall U.S. scores, they
are better than Mexico’s scores: U.S. Latino poverty, high school drop-out and homicide
rates are all approximately 40% lower than Mexico’s, and their income is two and half
times that of Mexico.
One area in which U.S. Latinos fare worse than both the U.S. and Mexico is
electoral participation. Only 19.3 percent of Latinos voted in the 2006 election, versus 56
percent for the U.S. overall and 73 percent for Mexico. 53 Another area in which U.S.
Latinos score worse than Mexico is mental wellbeing: 6 suicides per 100,000 persons.
This score is worse than Mexico’s (4.3), but better than that of the United States (13.9).
One area in which Latinos fare better than the U.S. average is infant mortality. The infant
mortality rate is 5.5, eighteen percent lower than the United States’ 6.7, and two-thirds
lower than Mexico’s rate of 16.2. 54
The vast majority of the indicator scores for the Latino and African American
communities in the U.S. are lower than the overall U.S. scores, reflecting unequal
opportunities for the different communities and the challenges these communities have in
meeting their basic needs. However, the well being of both groups, as indicated by the
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http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0681.pdf (accessed November 25, 2010).
53

Table A-1: Reporting Voting and Registration by Race, Hispanic Origin, Sex and Age Groups:
November 1964 to 2008.
54

U.S. data from Deaths: Final Data for 2006 Mexican data from Country Statistical Profiles
2010: Mexico.

132
CGI(P) scores, exceeds that of Mexico. This is significant to the immigration debate in
that it suggests that Mexicans are the group most at risk, which therefore suggests that it
is in the interest of the universal common good to enable Mexicans to migrate to the
United States in order to improve their abilities to meet their basic needs. This
supposition can be tested by examining the impact of undocumented Mexican migration
on the Common Good Index score. A specified common good approach requires,
however, a more comprehensive look at how capabilities of many groups are affected by
immigration, which I provide below.
Relative Capability Levels and the Preferential Option for the Poor
With an overall CGI(P) score of 70.2, Latinos suffer impediments to their basic
human capabilities at a much lower rate than the average U.S. citizens (80.9). African
Americans suffer similarly low levels of capability, although the disparities are not quite
as pronounced (72.9). These differences are important to note, because they suggest that
Black and Latino populations are deserving of solidarity and should be included in the
preferential option for the poor.
However, both groups have higher capabilities than Mexicans. What does this
mean in light of the preferential option for the poor? Does it mean that only Mexicans are
deserving of solidarity, because they are the most needy? Certainly, the preferential
option for the poor calls for special concern for the most vulnerable populations. As such,
the Mexican population as a whole merits this concern. However, the option for the poor
requires special concern for all vulnerable populations. The African American and Latino
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communities CGI(P) scores show that those communities are at risk communities. There
is a subsection even of those populations that is very economically and socially
marginalized: unskilled workers, who are disproportionately Black and Latino, and who
are the citizens most affected by immigration. 55 In 2009, high school dropouts in the
United States earned an average of $23,608 annually, versus $53,248 for college
graduates with Bachelors degrees. This income still far exceeds Mexico’s. And yet, the
average income needed in the U.S. to supply basic necessities for one parent and one
child is $32,241 a year. 56 True, the United States has many social programs, including
food and shelter programs, which supplement low incomes to supply basic necessities.
However, many poor people are not poor enough to qualify for those programs. For
example, in order to qualify for food stamps, a family must earn less than 130% of
poverty guidelines, which for a family of two equals $18,948. Families earning over that
amount but less than $32,241 annually cannot receive that subsidy, and yet do not earn
enough to cover their basic costs.
With this picture in mind, it becomes clearer to recognize that the defense of poor
and marginalized people must extend to all who suffer from such vulnerable
circumstances, regardless of their country of origin. It is insufficient to promote solidarity
only with the people whose capabilities are most compromised; rather, solidarity must be
55
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extended to all people who suffer from the inability to meet their basic capabilities.
Solutions must be informed by a mutual solidarity.
Effects of Recent Immigration Trends on the Common Good
The issues of mutual solidarity and the vulnerability of low-income people in the
U.S. arise when considering the effects of immigration on the common good. In this
section I analyze what kind of effect immigration has had on the common good through
examining the impact of recent immigration trends have had on the Common Good Index
at all three levels: international, national and community. Much research has been
performed on how immigration has affected a variety of social indicators, including most
of the indicators composing the Common Good Index. I use this research to compare
actual indicator scores to theoretical scores in the counterfactual absence of immigration.
A correct response is based in part on what happens at the universal level. If the
international Common Good Index score improves as a result of recent undocumented
Mexican immigrant flows and U.S. response to it, then this immigration and the U.S.
response to it have benefited the common good. If it declines as a result of recent
undocumented Mexican immigration, then the common good has been harmed. A correct
response also depends on trends at the national and community levels, however. Only
through understanding local dynamics can an effective strategy to improve human
functioning capabilities be devised.
I wish to underscore here that I am evaluating not only recent undocumented
immigration from Mexico, but also the U.S. response to it. Many factors go into creating
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a given situation, and all parties bear some responsibility for the results – the United
States, Mexico, immigrants and U.S. citizens. Yes, undocumented Mexican immigrants’
actions affect the quality of life of those around them, but governmental policies greatly
affect the abilities of individuals and their families to achieve basic levels of human
functioning. CST recognizes the primacy of the human person and the natural right to
obtain conditions to live with dignity, even if it means migrating. It is important to avoid
“blaming the victim” and instead view the situation holistically. Is poverty the fault of the
individual, the employer that pays a non-living wage, or the government who fails to
create or enforce living wage laws? Solidarity requires a social analysis that investigates
systemic causes of problems, so that systemic solutions may be sought to benefit the
many persons involved. A common good analysis requires analysis of social sin, which is
what I undertake in this work.
Furthermore, the social analysis and recommendations I forward below pertain to
United States’ (rather than Mexican) policies, as do the solutions I forward. Just as the
parable of the Good Samaritan challenges its listeners to be good neighbors to the
stranger, U.S. citizens must ask themselves how to be good neighbors to immigrants. 57
The correct ethical orientation toward immigrants is one of neighbor, and the implication
for social ethics is that U.S. citizens must focus on what the United States can do to
promote the wellbeing of immigrants, rather than focusing on what others should do
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William R. O'Neill and William C. Spohn, "Rights of Passage: The Ethics of Immigration and
Refugee Policy," Theological Studies 59, no. 1 (1998).
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differently. Hence, I focus my investigation on what the United States can do to promote
human functioning capabilities.
In this section, I first review the effect of undocumented Mexican immigration on
the International CGI(P) and then delve more closely into the internal dynamics,
investigating the changes to the CGI(P) scores at the national and community levels. To
briefly present the results, recent immigration trends have caused some decline in the
international CGI score (a difference of zero to 0.2 points, on the 100 point CGI scale). 58
(See Table 9.) The relatively small scale of the decline to the universal common good
suggests that the ethical evaluation must rely more heavily on what happens to the
common good at lower levels – national and community.
To review the changes at the national and community levels: Mexico’s CGI score
definitely improves as a result of immigration, by 0.5 points, and undocumented
immigrants improve their CGI score by 2 points. The human capabilities of United States
citizens declines, however, as a result of recent immigration trends. Recent
undocumented Mexican immigration in light of U.S. policies has caused a 0.2- and 0.5point reduction in the CGI score for U.S. citizens overall, and up to a 0.2- or 0.3-point
reduction for African Americans and Latinos, respectively. 59 These findings, and what
they mean, are discussed below, beginning with undocumented Mexican immigrants.
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One factor that complicates the conclusions is the lack of consensus among economists
regarding the effect of immigration on U.S. wages. I thus present the CGI(P) scores as ranges, in order
incorporate the differing economic conclusions into my analysis.
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I use the term U.S. citizen as shorthand to refer to all U.S. residents except undocumented
Mexican immigrants. The CGI score for this group of people was determined by subtracting undocumented
immigrants from the equation. This group thus includes not only U.S. citizens, but immigrants – including
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Table 9. Changes to International CGI(P) Scores Resulting from Immigration
Current State:
International
CGI(P) Score, with
Immigration

International
CGI(P) Score, in
Absence of
Immigration

Electoral Participation

46.3

47.3

Education

78.0

78.2

Safety

90.2

90.1

Household Income

66.7

64.9-66.6

Infant Life

94.7

94.6

Emotional Wellbeing

75.5

75.5

Age of Mother

79.8

80.4

Health Insurance

75.3

75.3

CGI(P) Scores*

75.8

75.8 – 76.0

Immigration’s Effects on Undocumented Mexican Immigrants
Even though undocumented Mexican immigration’s effect on the international
common good is unclear, changes to the common good at lower levels are less
ambiguous. In comparing between the scenarios “with immigration” and “without
immigration,” the data yields at least one expected result: that through migrating
Mexicans are able to increase their wellbeing, even in spite of their undocumented status
in the U.S. (see Table 10). The CGI(P) score for undocumented Mexican immigrants

undocumented immigrants from other countries. While I recognize the philosophical limitations of
referring to this broad group as citizens, it would be unreasonably cumbersome to constantly describe this
complex grouping of people.
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(63.4) is 2 points higher than the CGI(P) score for Mexico (61.4), indicating that
Mexicans achieve their basic capabilities at a higher rate through immigration.
The overall improvement is less dramatic than I expected. I had hypothesized that the
CGI(P) scores of undocumented Mexican immigrants would be closer to those of the
African American and Latino communities. In seeking an explanation for why in the
data, I find that immigration has a mixed effect for immigrants. Four indicators improve
for immigrants over their counterparts in Mexico (Income, Safety from Violence, Infant
Life, and Education), yet two remain fairly constant (Emotional Wellbeing and Health
Insurance) and two decline greatly (Age of Mother and Electoral Participation). The most
dramatic increase in capabilities for undocumented Mexican immigrants is in household
income, whose CGI(P) score rises from 20.9 to 60.5. Significantly, the average income of
an undocumented Mexican family in the United States is 2.6 times that of Mexican
residing in Mexico: $36,000 versus $14,280. 60 This rise in income takes undocumented
immigrants out of poverty.
Education levels also increase dramatically for undocumented Mexicans over
their Mexican peers. The high school drop-out rate in Mexico is 66.7 percent, but it is
only 40.9 percent for undocumented migrants in the United States. This number in part
reflects the fact that undocumented Mexican immigrants are more highly educated than
their Mexican counterparts. However, it also reflects increasing education among young
undocumented Mexicans: when only undocumented youth are considered, the drop-out
60

As noted above, the Mexican figure is in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), which is standardized
to the U.S. and reflects U.S. purchasing power.
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Table 10. Effects of Immigration on Mexican/Immigrant CGI(P) Scores
In Theoretical
Absence of
Immigration

Mexico’s CGI(P)

Current State: With Immigration
Undocumented
Immigrants’
CGI(P)

Mexico’s
CGI(P)

Electoral Participation

57.1

0.0

57.1

Education

33.7

61.4

33.7

Safety from Violence

84.6

90.4

84.6

Household Income

16.8

60.5

20.9

Infant Life

89.6

97.9

89.6

Emotional Wellbeing

88.0

86.6

87.7

Age of Mother

67.3

60.4

67.3

Health Insurance

50.2

50.0

50.2

CGI(P)

60.9

63.4

61.4

rate dives to 33 percent, 7 points lower than the official 40.9 figure, and 10 ten points
lower than Mexico. 61 The number is even lower for students who arrived at a younger
age. 62 Furthermore, educational attainment rises generationally: second-generation Latino
youth drop out at a rate of only 8.5 percent and third- and higher-generation youth drop
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Figure for foreign-born Latino youth between the ages of 18 and 24. Between Two Worlds: How
Young Latinos Come of Age in America, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2009), 48-49,
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/117.pdf (accessed November 5, 2010).
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Ibid. Also, see this 1990 national study showing the correlation between age of immigration on
high school drop-out rates: Charles Hirschman and Jennifer C. Lee, "Race and Ethnic Inequality in
Educational Attainment in the United States," in Ethnicity and Causal Mechanisms, ed. Michael Rutter and
Martha Tienda (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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out at a rate of 11.6 percent, only one-third the first-generation rate. 63 This indicator,
while reflecting significant change to educational levels for immigrants, masks how large
the educational effect is.
Another capability that improves greatly for undocumented Mexicans is life,
which is reflected in a lower infant mortality rate for Mexican immigrants (4.9 deaths per
1,000 live births, which is less than one-third that of Mexico’s (16.2). 64 The infant
mortality rate among Mexican immigrant women is also lower than that of white women
(who have a higher socio-economic status) in the U.S., prompting scholars to investigate
the reason for the anomaly. While they have not found it, they have at least demonstrated
that the remarkably low mortality rate does not stem from selective migration. In other
words, the causes can be found in the conditions of the immigrant women’s lives in the
United States. 65
63

A comparison of generational differences in 2009 high school drop-out rates is found in
Between Two Worlds: How Young Latinos Come of Age in America. Those numbers, which are generated
by Pew from Census reports on drop-out rates for 16-24 year olds, are quite different from Census reports.
In order to maintain consistency with other drop-out rates used in this dissertation, rather than using those
numbers directly, I apply the Pew differential to Census generated 2006 status drop-out rates for 18-24 year
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Safety from violence also improves for those who migrate; the homicide rate
among undocumented Mexican immigrants is 7.6, versus Mexico’s 11.0. 66 Unfortunately,
this indicator does not capture another important characteristic of the capability of bodily
integrity: physical safety on the job. Latinos die on the job at a 23 percent higher rate than
whites and a 14 percent higher rate than African Americans. 67 Nonetheless, homicide, as
an indicator of safety from violence, presents valuable information about the additional
capacity undocumented immigrants have gained in this important aspect of bodily
integrity.
While these four indicators improve greatly, yet another remains essentially
unchanged for undocumented Mexicans over Mexican residents: the health insurance
rate. Fifty percent of undocumented Mexicans lack health insurance. 68 The high rate of
uninsurance of undocumented Mexican immigrants is over three times the U.S. average
because they are concentrated in temporary and low-wage positions whose uninsurance
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Singh shows that foreign-born Latinos are 0.95 times as likely to die from homicide as nativeborn Latinos. While admittedly there will be differences between different origin-groups, Mexicans
comprise 70% of the foreign-born population, so this statistic serves as an approximation. Gopal K. Singh
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rate exceeds the average, and because they are ineligible for public health insurance
programs. 69
Furthermore, three other indicators decline. The suicide rate for undocumented
Mexican immigrants is about ten percent worse than for Mexican residents (4.3 versus
4.7). 70 The teenage birth rate is twenty percent worse: an estimated 99 births per 1,000
among first generation Latino immigrants, much higher than Mexico’s rate of 82.1. 71
And electoral participation drops to zero, because undocumented immigrants do not have
voting rights in the United States and cannot therefore exercise their right to political
participation. One of the grave problems facing undocumented immigrants is that there is
no way for most of them to become legalized and gain the right to vote. 72 This lack of a
pathway to citizenship perpetuates the violation of the human capability of political
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control over one’s environment and leaves them in a political limbo. 73 Legislation has
been put forward in recent years to enable undocumented immigrants to “earn”
legalization through living here a certain number of years, contributing to the tax base,
and avoiding criminal activity. 74 Such legislation would certainly rectify the violation of
capability in this area. This and other recommendations are presented below.
In sum, the higher CGI(P) for undocumented Mexican immigrants over their
Mexican counterparts owes to improvements in family income and in the drop-out, infant
mortality and homicide rates. The vast improvements in these areas are muted by
weakened voting, suicide and teenage birth rates. The net effect is positive, however, and
this positive effect becomes even stronger if generational improvement is examined. The
Common Good Index figures reflect one immediate point in time, so it captures the
immediate effects of immigration. Immigrants move, however, in order to benefit not
only themselves but their children and grandchildren. Research on second- and thirdgeneration Latino immigrants demonstrates that subsequent generations fare significantly
better than the immigrant generation as they integrate into U.S. society, and that they
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catch up and even surpass the U.S. average. 75 Over time, immigrant families improve
their CGI(P) scores dramatically, with successive generations born to undocumented
Mexican families reaching almost ten points higher than Mexico (70.2 score for U.S.
born Latinos, versus 61.4 score for Mexico).
Immigration’s Effects on Mexican Residents
The Partial Common Good Index shows that undocumented Mexican immigrants
have benefited overall from their decision to migrate. Mexican residents have benefited
as well, as demonstrated in a rise of Mexico’s CGI(P) score from 60.9 to 61.4. The
improvement in this score is due almost entirely to income.
There are two ways that Mexico’s income rises as a result of migration. The first
is through remittance income, or income sent to Mexican residents by immigrants abroad.
Remittance income accounts for 7.3 percent of Mexico’s income. 76 In fact, Mexico
receives more money in remittances than it does in foreign investment income. 77
Mexican income would therefore decline by 7.3 percent overall in the absence of
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immigration. The decline in income to migrant-sending families would be much more
severe. Remittances to Mexico have reduced food-based poverty by 50 percent and
capabilities-based poverty by 30 percent. 78 In their absence the ability of very poor
families to afford food and health care services would be severely compromised.
The second factor that causes in a rise in income for Mexican residents due to
immigration is the reduction in workforce. Immigration caused a 10 percent reduction in
the Mexico workforce between 1970 and 2000, and research shows that this outmigration of labor resulted in an 8 percent rise in Mexican wages. 79 Between this factor
and remittances, Mexico’s income would drop by 15% in the absence of immigration, an
alarmingly high number for an already impoverished population.
Another area of improvement for Mexicans resulting from immigration is in
infant mortality. Infants in migrant-sending households are 3 percent less likely to die
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than in non-migrant households. 80 This improvement in infant health is due to increased
income from remittances and to improved health behaviors. 81
In spite of the overall positive benefits accruing to Mexican residents as a result of
immigration, immigration has had mixed effects on Mexico, just as it has had uneven
effects on immigrants. Although Mexico benefits economically and health-wise, the
disruption in family relationships due to immigration causes emotional strife that
seriously affects the suicide rate. Members of migrant-sending households are 1.67 times
as likely as non-migrant households to commit suicide due to immigration’s disruptive
effect on families. 82
Family disruption is also used to explain immigration’s ambiguous effects on
Mexican youth in Mexico as well. On one hand, research across many countries has
shown that immigration results in educational improvements. 83 One Mexican-based study
finds that a significant increase in literacy and the number of years of schooling for
young children belonging to migrant households, especially where the mother has a very
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low educational level. 84 However, research is inconclusive whether or not immigration
lowers or raises educational outcomes for high school students in migrant-sending
families in Mexico. Some studies have found that immigration results in lower school
attendance rates for Mexican teenagers from migrant-sending households. 85 However,
other studies have found exactly the opposite: that migration reduced the high school
drop-out rate. A Mexican study found that children in migrant-sending households are 10
percent less likely to drop out of school than children from non-migrant-sending
households. 86 A Salvadoran study similarly found that remittances helped reduce high
school drop out rates. 87 Because the evidence is inconclusive, I have not attributed any
change to high school drop-out rates in the CGI(P) scores.
An indicator that shows no improvement for Mexican migrants or their families in
Mexico is that of health insurance coverage. Undocumented immigrants have an
uninsurance rate of 50 percent, which is approximately the same as Mexico’s. This low
rate is due to low employer coverage, coupled with ineligibility for receiving Medicaid. 88
The Common Good Index also fails to capture improvements to access to health care for
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Mexicans resulting from remittances. One study found that after controlling for size,
location and demographics of the receiving household, that remittances were responsible
for a 44% increase in the share of household income being spent on health care. 89
Remittance-receiving households are able to obtain more health care because of
remittance income. This fact is not captured in the indicator of uninsurance.
In addition to its failure to express the full extent of improvements to immigrants’
lives, the Index also masks generational improvement in access to health insurance for
undocumented Mexican migrants. Children born in the United States to Mexican
immigrants are U.S. citizens and are therefore eligible for Medicaid, unlike their parents.
This indicator will rise, therefore, for second-generation immigrants.
Immigration’s Effects on U.S. Residents
This analysis gives evidence to the common understanding that undocumented
Mexican immigrants improve their opportunities by immigrating, even while it
recognizes that they face many challenges in their new country. But a common good
analysis examines the wellbeing of all groups, doing so with an eye toward the
preferential option for the poor. In this section, I examine the effects of undocumented
Mexican immigration in light of U.S. policies on United States citizens, especially poor
U.S. citizens.
According to the Partial Common Good Index, undocumented Mexican
immigration has caused a decline in capabilities of U.S. residents overall, as reflected in
89
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the difference between the CGI(P) scores with and without undocumented Mexican
immigration. The score with such immigration is 80.9, which is 0.6 to 0.9 points lower
than the score in the hypothetical absence of such immigration (81.5-81.8, see Table 11).
To what is this decline due? In part, it results from the subtraction of a very vulnerable
population: undocumented Mexican immigrants. Once undocumented Mexicans are
subtracted from the U.S. population, the CGI(P) score for the United States becomes
81.3, which is 0.2 to 0.5 points lower than the range of scores without immigration (see
Table 11). The data show that immigration has slightly depressed human functioning
capabilities for U.S. citizens. 90
Immigration has been shown to negatively affect U.S. citizens in three areas:
wages, unemployment and education. Two of these, wages and education, correspond to
indicators in the CGI(P): household income and high school drop-outs. The third,
unemployment, was removed from the CGI(P) due to an inability to measure that
indicator for undocumented immigrants.
Regarding education, there is evidence that recent immigration from Mexico has
lowered the educational attainment level of other students around them. Research has
broadly shown that student outcomes are influenced by peers. Desegregation programs,
for instance, have improved the reading scores and graduation rates of African American
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Table 11. Changes to U.S. CGI(P) Scores Resulting from Immigration

In Theoretical
Absence of
Immigration
U.S. Population
Overall

Current State: With Immigration
U.S. Population
Overall

U.S. Citizens

Electoral Participation

43.5

42.4

43.5

Education

95.2

93.5

94.3

Safety

92.2

92.2

92.2

83.3-85.7

82.8

83.3

Infant Life

96.5

96.5

96.5

Emotional Wellbeing

70.8

71.1

70.8

Age of Mother

85.4

84.1

84.7

85

84.2

85

81.5 – 81.8

80.9

81.3

Household Income

Health Insurance
CGI(P)

participants. 91 Studies about the influence of lower scoring students on higher scoring
students have likewise shown a peer effect, especially intra-racially. 92 One U.S.-based
study calculated the impact of immigration on the educational outcomes of native-born
students. This study showed that the immigration influx of the 1980s decreased the
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African American graduation rates by approximately 1 percent, and that it increased
native-born Latino drop-out rates by 3.5 to 4 percent. 93
Before turning to the most highly debated effect of undocumented Mexican
immigration (wages), I want first to note that although there has been concern for public
safety raised in the public debate, research has found that violence among Latino
immigrants is roughly the same as populations with comparable socio-economic
backgrounds. 94 Furthermore, research has investigated peer effects on teen pregnancy and
has found significant effects, but those effects are limited to one’s immediate circle of
friends, not one’s peer group at large. 95 This indicator remains unchanged by
immigration, therefore, because of segregation between immigrants and native-born
teenagers.
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The other indicator besides education that undocumented Mexican immigration
has affected is income. The evidence is mixed on the extent to which undocumented
immigrants have affected native wages. Most studies show that there is negligible impact
on either native wages or unemployment, and yet some studies demonstrate notable
impact on both. Rather than a consensus in the literature, two divergent perspectives have
emerged. 96 I examine the evidence on both sides.
Two types of studies have traditionally been performed to determine the impact of
immigrant inflows on the native-born workforce. These studies have not focused
specifically on undocumented Mexican immigration but on the influx of low-skilled
workers due to immigration. However, because the predominance of Mexicans among
low-skilled unauthorized immigrant workers, these studies are directly applicable to the
question of how undocumented Mexican immigration has affected U.S. wages. 97 The first
of these two types, empirical studies, examine existing sociological and economic data
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and draw conclusions from it. These “cross-sectional” studies examine immigration’s
labor effects on local markets. The second type, econometric studies, focus on national
level wage effects, deriving conclusions from theoretical mathematical models. The
empirical studies have found only very slight negative wage effects, although they have
found that the wage effects are greater on low skilled U.S. laborers. Econometric studies,
on the other hand, have found a more significant wage effect, for reasons explained
below.
A considerable body of empirical studies dating back almost 30 years shows that
immigration labor supply shocks reduce wages by very small amounts. Reviews of the
economic literature on this topic in the 1980s and early 1990s show that most empirical
analysis has concluded that a ten percent increase in immigrant population (as was
experienced in the 1980s through the mid 1990s) reduces wages of competing nativeborn workers by 1 percent or less, although recent immigrants experience a greater
decline (2 to 4 percent). 98 One of the most influential early empirical studies examined
wages in Miami in the years after the Mariel boatlift, an important study due to the fact
that the immigration wave was due to effects exogenous to the economy. 99 This wave of
immigration brought a large number of relatively poor and uneducated Cubans to Miami,
increasing Miami’s labor pool by 7 percent. Card found, surprisingly, that this labor
98

James P. Smith and Barry Edmonston, The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and
Fiscal Effects of Immigration (Washington, DC: National Research Council - Panel on the Demographic
and Economic Impacts of Immigration, 1997), 219.Also, see Rachel M. Friedberg and Jennifer Hunt, "The
Impact of Immigrants on Host Country Wages, Employment, and Growth," Journal of Economic
Perspectives 9, no. 2 (1995).
99

David Card, "The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Economy," Industrial and Labor
Relations Review 43, no. 2 (1990).

154
shock had very small effect on the wages of previous Cuban immigrants, and none at all
on non-Cuban workers. 100
Other more recent empirical studies have demonstrated similar results. 101 Card,
for example, in 2001 found that a 10 percent increase in immigrant labor results in a 1.5
percent decline in wages for competing low-skilled workers. 102 Orrenius and Zavodny in
2003 found that a ten percent increase in immigrant labor results in an even smaller
negative effect, between 0.05 and 0.25 percent. 103 I thus use the 0.5 percent number to
calculate family income for in the absence of immigration.
Econometric studies, however, traditionally result in findings that are quite a bit
larger than those identified in empirical studies. For the past twenty years prominent
economist George Borjas has built a case that immigration significantly harms U.S.
workers, especially competing (unskilled) workers. 104 He found that immigration of the
1980s and 1990s resulted in an 8.9 percent decrease in wages for unskilled U.S. workers
100
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and a 3.2 percent decrease in wages across the population as whole. 105 Borjas finds in a
later study that the influx of low-skilled workers through migration has resulted in a 2.5
percent decline in wages for low-skilled African American worker. 106 I use Borjas’
conclusions to calculate the “worst case scenario” extreme of the family income
indicator, as it has been affected by immigration.
What accounts for the differences in conclusions? Borjas et al. argue argued that
there are three problems with empirical studies: one, that high-immigration cities attract
immigrants because of their robust economy, two, that they ignore out-migration of
native workers to other cities in response to labor supply shocks, and three, that intercity
trade nationally diffuses the effects of a labor supply shock, causing an overall decline
that may not be noticeable locally. 107 Empirical studies have addressed two of these three
criticisms. Card’s Mariel study undermines the first, demonstrating that even in the
absence of a particularly robust economy, immigration does not necessarily have a large
negative effect. Card also studied native out-migration and found no evidence that native
workers were leaving because of immigrant influxes. 108 However, there is evidence that
native workers may migrate out of their immediate locale to other parts of the same
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metropolitan area, which may account for some of the softening of immigration wage
effects. 109
What is an ethicist to do in light of this contradictory information? An orientation
of solidarity with the poor directs one at least to take into account those analyses that
demonstrate harm to vulnerable populations. In terms of the Common Good Index, I
therefore include the extremes of the findings in the CGI(P), presenting the “without
immigration” family income indicator as a numerical range. Using Orrenius and
Zavodny’s and Borjas’ estimates, I estimate the decline in wages among low skilled U.S.
workers to be between 0.5 percent and 8.9 percent, and the national effect to range from
0.5 and 3.2 percent. I estimate the effect on Blacks to be 1.0 to 2.5 percent, and the effect
on Latino workers to be 1.5 to 3 percent. 110
The research surveyed here considers the impact of immigration on U.S. workers
before the current economic recession. One might assume that immigration in this current
economic climate would cause much larger wage depression and unemployment than in
better economic times. However, three considerations weigh against this conclusion. The
first consideration is that immigrants, as consumers and entrepreneurs, create jobs in
addition to taking jobs. It is erroneous to view immigrants as people who simply take jobs
away from U.S. citizens. They contribute to job creation.

109

Mark D. Partridge et al., "Recent Immigration: The Diversity of Economic Outcomes in
Metropolitan America," Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research 11, no. 3 (2009).
110

In terms of the “worst-case effect,” I assume a similar effect for the Latino community as the
African American community, although slightly higher due to findings that the group whose wages are
most affected by immigration are previous immigrants, who are predominantly Latino.

157
Secondly, immigration is a self-regulating activity that decreases in economically
difficult times, as evidenced in recent trends. In 2006, 10.1 out of every 1,000 Mexican
residents emigrated, but in 2008, that number had dropped to 6.2. This decline in
immigration eases the negative effects of immigration in difficult economic times for the
host country. 111
Third, there is evidence that Latino immigrants have recently suffered similar job
losses to native-born Latinos and Blacks. From the fourth quarter 2007 to the fourth
quarter 2008 the unemployment rate for Latino immigrants rose from 5.1 percent to 8.0
percent, a rise of 2.9 percentage points. The unemployment rate for native-born Latinos
and Blacks rose by 2.8 percent and 2.9 percent, respectively – from 6.7 to 9.5 percent for
native-born Latinos and from 8.6 to 11.5 percent for African Americans. The
unemployment rate for the nation overall rose by 2 percentage points, from 4.6 to 6.6
percent. 112 This data suggests that in this economic downturn employers are not keeping
immigrants on the payroll at the expense of native-born workers. Rather, immigrants
have been integrated into the economy and are similarly affected by economic shifts. 113
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To summarize the effects of immigration on U.S. residents: recent undocumented
immigration from Mexico has caused a decrease in human capabilities for U.S. residents.
This decline results from negative wage and educational effects, although there is no
consensus on the extent of the wage effect. The combined effect is a 0.1 to 0.5 point
decline in the CGI(P) for the United States, a 0.1 to 0.2 point decline for African
Americans, and a 0.1 to 0.3 point decline for Latinos.
A Common Good Response
The Partial Common Good Index has mathematically indicated undocumented
Mexican immigration’s effects on the wages of native-born U.S. residents and brought to
light the negative peer effect that immigration has on high school graduation rates. In
addition, it has confirmed the general consensus that immigration improves the lives of
immigrants, even while it has drawn attention to its detrimental aspects. The CGI(P) has
rendered the conclusion that the universal common good declines slightly in the presence
of these recent immigration trends. How does a Catholic ethicist respond to these
findings?
While numerical changes to the CGI(P) are small, the numbers reflect significant
changes to the individuals affected by immigration – especially to poor individuals. Data
reveal that average wages more than double for undocumented Mexicans over what they
earned in Mexico, bringing them above the poverty line, and their children’s educational
levels increase dramatically. On the other hand, by some estimates the poorest nativeborn U.S. workers wages decline almost 10 percent as a result of immigration, and their
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children tend to complete fewer years of school due to peer effects of lower-performing
Mexican immigrant children (whose scores while much improved over their parents, still
trail the educational scores of their U.S. born peers). Immigration brings about real
changes in people’s ability to meet their basic human needs for health, thought, safety
and other concerns. Therefore, a response is required.
According to the International CGI(P), the harm to U.S. citizens caused by
undocumented Mexican immigration slightly outweighs the good to Mexicans
(undocumented Mexican immigrants and Mexican residents combined). This result seems
to suggest that immigration should be reduced or eliminated. However, Mexicans – who
are the most vulnerable people in this situation – would be greatly harmed if immigration
were ended, a fact that militates against such a solution. Mexico’s poverty rate is four
times that of the United States, and the median family income is less than one-third that
of the United States – even in spite of the fact that their families are almost twice as big
as U.S. families. Undocumented immigrants increase their income by a factor of 2.5
when they immigrate here, enabling them and their families back home to eat, seek
medical attention, and pay for basic necessities. In moving they achieve great gains in
education, health, and safety. To tell them to go back to Mexico would be to condemn
them to deep poverty and suffering. This is surely not in keeping with the will of God, the
“permanent defender of life, especially the life of the poor, whom Yahweh delivers from
oppression.” 114
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The preferential option for the poor requires special consideration for vulnerable
populations, and solidarity requires critical thinking and action in union with and in the
interests of those populations. Solidarity with the poor requires in this case solidarity with
undocumented Mexican immigrants. This stance negates an easy acceptance of a
restrictionist position. Even so, such a position might be warranted – if the harm were
vastly greater than the good done, and the country had insufficient resources for
addressing the harms. However, that is not the situation here; in this case, the overall
change to the CGI(P) is small, and the United States’ relatively higher CGI(P) score
suggests that the United States has the capacity to implement social policies or programs
that will enable continued immigration while improving conditions for poor U.S.
workers.
Nevertheless, undocumented Mexican immigrants are not the only group
deserving of solidarity: low wage workers in the United States, who are
disproportionately Black and Latino, are also vulnerable to violations of their human
capabilities. They work at poverty wages. They are disproportionately uninsured. 115 They
are more vulnerable to violence in their neighborhoods. They are poorly educated. And
they are harmed by immigration: their wages decline by as much as 9 percent. While the
harms to the average low wage worker’s capabilities are less pronounced than the
benefits to the average undocumented Mexican immigrant, this does not mean that their
problems should be ignored in light of Mexicans’ greater need. Low wage native workers
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struggle to meet their basic human functioning. Even though the level of harm is not
dramatic, it must still be taken into account because of the demands of solidarity and the
preferential option for the poor.
So we arrive at a seeming conflict. The reduction in the CGI(P) demonstrates a
decline in the common good, and some of the United States’ most vulnerable citizens are
harmed by immigration. That situation must be rectified. And yet, it should not be
resolved through reducing or eliminating immigration. The principle of solidarity points
to a way out of this dilemma. Solidarity brings forth a different imagination; it generates
the impetus to create solutions that will benefit all groups involved. Solidarity advocates
that policies be pursued to enable continued immigration, and that policies be
simultaneously pursued to improve wages and education for poor U.S. citizens. 116
Solutions through Solidarity
The path to a Christian solution lies in solidarity with and between all of these
populations, with exact solutions being hammered out in encounters with leaders of all
affected populations. Solidarity involves recognition of mutual interests and involves a
search for solutions that will meet those interests for all involved. Certainly the Black,
Latino and undocumented Mexican immigrant communities can recognize low wages, for
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example, as a common problem and work together to find solutions to it. In the spirit of
solidarity, disparate groups can hammer out solutions that benefit all parties involved,
rather than forwarding solutions that pit one relatively powerless group in society against
another, or that leave one group out.
Pastor and Marcelli note wisely that mutuality at times involves some “horsetrading” and some compromises. 117 They suggest, for example, that African American
leaders could support non-restrictionist immigration policies in exchange for Latino
support on maintaining African American employment in the public sector. 118 They note
that Blacks may fear that legalization of undocumented immigrants will result in African
Americans being pushed out of well-paying public sector jobs. If this is the case,
immigrant rights groups could more easily win Black support for one of their issues,
legalization, through agreeing to not pursue equitable representation in employment in
the public sector. Although such a solution may be realistic, it would be unacceptable in
light of the Catholic insistence on justice. One thing that Pastor and Marcelli have right,
however, is that in order to gain support for legalization, the immigrant rights community
must be willing to listen to the needs of other communities and support them in their
needs.
From the perspective of solidarity, there are points of mutuality that do not require
selling one community short on the demands of justice. Solidarity goes beyond
117
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negotiated settlements, seeking common concerns and common ground for solutions.
Solidarity requires a critical thinking that recognizes how the issues of one group affect
another.
While all solutions should ultimately be determined by representatives of the
affected communities, this specified common good analysis does lead to certain policy
suggestions. One public policy proposal that has been forwarded as “pro-immigrant” is
legalization of undocumented immigrants. Indeed, legalization would provide the
conditions for much higher achievement of human capabilities among those immigrants
who are currently undocumented. A study of immigrants who were legalized through the
1986 Immigration Reform Control Act shows that between 1990 and 2006, 28 percent
more IRCA immigrants had received their high school diplomas, only half as many lived
in poverty, and double the number owned their own homes. 119 This solution should be
endorsed as a way of improving their human functioning, and it should include provisions
for future undocumented immigrants to earn legalization though paying taxes, being lawabiding citizens, and paying a fine. 120
I am suggesting here a legalization of all undocumented immigrants, not just
undocumented Mexicans. While this study has focused specifically on the effects of
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undocumented Mexican immigration, I include other undocumented immigrants in this
and my other proposals because other undocumented immigrants face similar challenges
in realizing their basic capabilities and their suffering – and need to increase their ability
to realize their basic human capabilities – must also be addressed. Furthermore, the
demographics suggest that a CGI analysis that included non-Mexican undocumented
immigrants would not yield dramatically different trends than those identified in this
study.
Although the inclusion all undocumented immigrants in the CGI would magnify
the negative effect on unskilled U.S. workers, this change would not be so great as to
warrant a different kind of ethical response. Their numbers are fewer, first of all –
Mexicans comprise a majority (59 percent) of all undocumented immigrants. Secondly,
non-Mexican undocumented immigrants have higher education levels than
undocumented Mexicans, comprising only 5 percent of all undocumented immigrants
without high school degrees. 121 Their relatively higher educational level thus makes nonMexican undocumented immigrants less substitutable for U.S. born high school dropouts,
which diminishes their effect on the wages of U.S. born unskilled workers relative to that
of undocumented Mexican workers. Third, because a relatively high percentage of nonMexican undocumented immigrants have college degrees (30 percent, versus only 4
percent of undocumented Mexicans), their legalization would mitigate even further their
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effect on unskilled U.S. workers, as newly legal college graduate immigrants seek higherskilled work. 122
Legalization for undocumented immigrants should be endorsed for another reason
as well: it would secure better wages not only for immigrants but also for U.S. residents
over all. 123 Wages decline due to undocumented immigration not only because
immigrants add workers to the labor pool. They also shrink because undocumented
immigrants are allowed to stay undocumented. Employers can pay unauthorized workers
less and treat them worse than other workers because they know that these immigrants
are afraid to speak up. 124 Although undocumented immigrants still have labor rights in
this country, those rights go largely unclaimed because of fear of losing one’s job or even
being deported. However, once immigrants become legal, their wages rise. 125 Just as
undocumented immigrants’ willingness to accept less money depresses wages for
everyone, a new insistence on higher wages will effectively raise wages across the
industries in which they work. Reframed through the eyes of solidarity, it becomes clear
that legalization is “pro-worker” issue. This solution meets the criteria of the common
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good, because it would increase human capabilities for immigrants and other poor U.S.
workers.
Most of the bishops’ proposals in Strangers No Longer (which seek to maintain
family unity, legalize workers, enforce U.S. borders humanely, and ensure due process
rights and asylum rights) should remain as recommendations within a common good
analysis, because they would forward human capabilities for undocumented immigrants.
Other proposals could also be included that focus on the human capabilities of
immigrants. One such proposal is the Protect Our Workers from Exploitation and
Retaliation (POWER) Act, which would protect whistle-blowing immigrants from
retaliation. 126 This legislation would make it more difficult for employers to use
workplace raids as a way of preventing immigrant workers from defending their
workplace rights.
One of the bishops’ proposals, however, should be removed: the formation of a
guest worker program. This is because temporary immigrants hold precarious social
positions that are not dissimilar to when they are undocumented. Fearing involuntary
removal, guest workers, like undocumented immigrants, are disabled from insisting on
fair working conditions. This results in depression of wages. Temporary workers earn an
estimated 12 percent less than their legal immigrant counterparts. 127 While a guest
worker might sound like an ideal political compromise between restrictionists (who want
126

Protect Our Workers from Exploitation and Retaliation (POWER), 111th Congress, SB 3207,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:s.03207: (accessed January 20, 2011).
127

Peter B. Brownell, "Wage Differences between Temporary and Permanent Immigrants,"
International Migration Review 44, no. 3 (2010).

167
to prevent legalization) and liberals (who want legalization), qualitatively it will advance
the same dysfunction in wages as undocumented immigration.
Beyond modifying the bishops’ current proposals to improve conditions for
undocumented immigrants, a specified common good analysis directs solidarity toward
not only immigrants but also poor U.S. residents, and it therefore leads to additional
policy recommendations aimed at improving human functioning for poor immigrants and
U.S. citizens. In particular, a common good approach advocates public policies to address
areas in which immigration causes a decline in U.S. capabilities. This means first of all
that the Church should promote policies to protect wages and working conditions of U.S.
workers. Advocacy around wages and working conditions are not new in the Church.
John Ryan’s work on the minimum wage is one example of it. However, what is new is
that these issues should be seen as an immigration issue. They should be linked so that
the Church can help build the solidarity necessary between communities that will enable
all workers’ rights to be protected.
Undocumented immigration is not the only reason for falling wages, and
legalization is not the only avenue to raising them. 128 One of the problems facing
undocumented immigrants is non-payment for work performed. And while
undocumented immigrants are more vulnerable to this unjust practice due than others,
they are not the only ones who suffer from it: it is a problem confronting millions of U.S.
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citizens. 129 A promising legislative proposal that would address wage problems for both
immigrants and native-born workers is the Wage Theft Prevention Act. This legislation
would offer stronger protections to U.S. workers who are trying to get paid money they
are owed by employers. A similar act was passed in New York in December 2010; efforts
should be increased to pass a federal law on this matter, and immigrant rights groups
would be wise to take it up as an immigration issue and join forces with others to pass
it. 130
In recent years, many worker protection bills have been forwarded to protect
workers. Many of these can and should be supported by the Church as part of its
immigration agenda. These bills aim to achieve, among other things, greater safety in the
workplace and greater protections for workers trying to organize unions. Earlier, I
discussed above the high rate of immigrant deaths in the workplace. Worker safety is an
issue for all workers, not just immigrants. While 393 Latino immigrants died in the
workplace last year, over five thousand workers total died. 131 Bills aiming to improve
workplace safety, such as the Protecting American Workers Act of 2007-2008, should be
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supported as part of a comprehensive immigration ethic. 132 So should bills aimed at
protecting workers’ rights in the workplace, such as the Employer Free Choice Act. 133
In addition to wage and worker protection issues, a common good immigration
ethic requires mutual efforts to improve education. Education issues are much more
complex, encompassing such diverse issues as pedagogy, teacher evaluations, classroom
size and school size, school funding, and charter schools. It is outside the scope of this
dissertation to evaluate the myriad of recent proposals. However, the main point here is
that the Catholic Church should examine and forward proposals for how to improve the
educational opportunities of all students in public schools. Evaluations of those proposals
should be guided by a common good analysis.
I have identified some additional policies and policy areas for inclusion in a
Catholic immigration policy agenda that is guided by the common good. The Church as a
whole should be advocating for policies such as these. Policy proposals should be
discussed and decided by lay leaders of affected communities, and efforts should be led
by lay people as well as priests.
In light of the difficulty of getting any such legislation passed on the national
level, both citizens and immigrants should work on state and local levels around common
issues. These issues should be directed at the areas identified in the Common Good Index
132
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as needing improvement, including immigration policies, wages and education, but also
extending to other issues of concern such as health care and violence. There are many
issues on which immigrant and native-born residents can work jointly. Joint efforts will
build human capabilities, and they will also build solidarity between citizen and noncitizen communities. Such local action is supported by CST’s principle of subsidiarity,
which calls for issues to be adjudicated on the most local level possible. 134
In my own work as a community organizer between 1988 and 2003, I worked
with coalitions in which immigrants and non-immigrants worked together on a variety of
issues, for example winning new school buildings for overcrowded schools and achieving
universal health insurance for Illinois’ children (KidCare). I saw how these joint efforts
increased solidarity between immigrants and non-immigrants. A study of grassroots
solidarity between African American Latino immigrant workers likewise demonstrates
that solidarity between Blacks and Latino immigrants is not only possible but in many
communities a reality. 135 Gordon and Lenhardt point to both workplace-based efforts and
community-based efforts. They offer that there are certain ways of effectively promoting
solidarity between the two groups. One is identifying real shared interests. Another is to
discuss each group’s social positioning and history, in order to foster increased
understanding. Third, such efforts should be supported by community organizations,
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churches and unions and not just left to individuals. 136 The Church, though its hierarchy
and lay members, has the opportunity play a pivotal role in increasing solidarity between
immigrants, including undocumented Mexican immigrants, and non-immigrants, and it
can realize that role through promoting and working on issues of common concern as part
of its immigration agenda.
Next Steps
When I first undertook this process, I thought that the numbers for the Common
Good Index would lead to clear-cut solutions for the thorny problems presented by
immigration. I hypothesized that overall, human functioning capabilities would decline
significantly in the absence of immigration. Instead, I find that the picture is not so clear.
The CGI(P) demonstrates mixed results, and that the overall effect of recent
undocumented Mexican immigration on the common good is slightly negative.
However, a look at the CGI(P) scores of the United States and Mexico and of
some vulnerable sub-populations militates against an anti-immigration stance, while
calling for solidarity between immigrants and other vulnerable groups in the United
States – African Americans, Latinos, and low-wage workers in general. This solidarity
requires not only that U.S. citizens support rights for undocumented immigrants, it also
requires undocumented immigrants to support issues of importance to U.S. Blacks,
Latinos and low-wage workers. It also requires all groups to seek areas of joint concern
and join forces to address them.
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In the next chapter, I explore implications of a common good ethic and a
Common Good Index for immigration ethics in Catholic thought. The Common Good
Index helps point to areas of concern and directs one’s attention in solution-making
toward ensuring human capabilities for all people. And through its inclusion of the
preferential option for the poor, it helps to guide a moral community toward proper
interpretation of the Common Good Index results and toward appropriate solutions. The
specific common good approach developed and implemented in this dissertation has
shown itself to provide a more robust, balanced ethical analysis than the bishops’
framework of solidarity with the immigrant. In the Conclusion I review the contributions
of this approach and the Common Good Index. I also review their weaknesses and
present directions for further development.

CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
I began this dissertation with a critique of the immigration ethic used by the U.S.
and Mexican bishops in their pastoral letter Strangers no Longer. An analysis of the
Bishops’ letter demonstrates that their central ethical framework for immigration ethics is
solidarity with the immigrant. While that framework accords with biblical injunctions to
love the immigrant and CST’s emphasis on the rights of immigrants, it leads to a
misinterpretation of the preferential option for the poor and has led the bishops to
selectively ignore evidence that immigration has harmed certain vulnerable, unskilled,
U.S. populations. I argued that a better framework for immigration ethics is the common
good, in part because immigration ethics today is largely focused on immigration law and
according to Catholic social teaching the purpose of the law is the common good, and
also because the common good as a central moral principle militates against favoring one
vulnerable population to the disregard of others. This shift in moral framework comprises
the first contribution of this dissertation. The benefits of using the common good become
even more fully illuminated through the development and application of a specified
common good approach, as discussed below. This approach yields some significant
improvements over the bishops’ ethical framework.
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I created a specified common good approach in order to facilitate use of the
common good as the central moral principle. In this method, the common good is first
more precisely delineated via defining human flourishing (toward which the common
good is directed) through a set of human functioning capabilities. Secondly, the specified
common good evaluates situations through a Common Good Index (CGI), which
measures human flourishing in society through measuring human functioning
capabilities. The Common Good Index incorporates a range of sociological indicators
that indicate the presence of minimum levels of capabilities among the population. The
indicators are: uninsurance, homicide, poverty, wages, high school drop-outs, infant
mortality, carbon dioxide emissions, voter turnout, unemployment, teenage births,
suicide, and the importance of God in one’s life. The indicators are scaled to create CGI
scores between 1 and 100, and the overall CGI score is created through averaging the
individual scores.
This quantification of the Catholic social principle of the common good
constitutes the second contribution of this dissertation. In quantifying the common good,
it becomes possible to use this principle with more precision and accuracy than previous
elaborations have allowed. The tool’s specificity forces its user to attend concretely and
specifically to a number of measures, and to do so for each affected population. The CGI
makes unlikely the kind of oversight that the bishops are guilty of: ignoring the negative
effects of immigration on poor U.S. residents. The mathematical nature of the instrument
itself forces a rigor in its use and therefore in the application of the principle of the
common good.
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Lest this exercise be seen as outside of Catholic tradition, I demonstrated that it
falls within the example of early twentieth century theologian John A. Ryan, who
quantified the principle of a living wage. Just as Ryan’s work focused on defining some
very concrete requirements of human dignity, like having enough to eat and to wear,
Common Good Index numerically calculates some very concrete minimum requirements
for the common good. The focus is on minimum levels of wellbeing, because the
common good’s attendant preferential option for the poor insists first on basic wellbeing
for all before focusing on higher levels of flourishing for some.
I call this ethical methodology – evaluating a social situation through the
framework of the common good, using the CGI – the “specified common good
approach.” This framework is superior over the bishops’ in four ways. First, it maintains
a balance of concern for all poor populations involved, including both immigrants and
native-born members of the host society. This balanced focus supports a more
comprehensive (and therefore appropriate) application of the preferential option for the
poor and promotes solidarity with all poor communities, not just immigrants.
Secondly, it is more precise and accurate, because it requires a quantitative
analysis. The bishops’ error of ignoring the effect of immigration on poor U.S. residents
is unlikely to happen when evaluating immigration through the framework of a specified
common good, because the approach is too exacting.
Third, it has a clearly defined aim: to maximize human capabilities. The
specificity of aim and analysis allow one to identify where particular capabilities are
being compromised, which prompts one to investigate why those capabilities are being
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compromised, and what can be done to improve those capabilities. In the case of
immigration, this line of questioning promotes a more comprehensive set of solutions:
one that includes immigration policies per se, but that also include other types of policies
directed toward the fulfillment of particular capabilities, for example wage or education
laws.
Fourth and finally, the specified common good approach facilitates solidarity
between marginalized groups. Whereas the bishops’ solidarity with immigrants urges a
one-way solidarity in which other groups support issues affected undocumented
immigrants, the specified common good approach calls for proposals and actions aimed
at increasing human capabilities for all vulnerable populations, immigrant and nonimmigrant alike. It promotes an understanding of common issues facing immigrant and
non-immigrant communities, and it facilitates the generation of common solutions
between those communities.
With its focus on human functioning capabilities, the specified common good
approach identifies areas of concern outside of the contentious arena of immigration. The
working relationships formed through such efforts facilitate the breaking down of barriers
and the opening of hearts and minds to the needs, perspectives and policy proposals of
other groups. The implication is not only that non-immigrants will become more inclined
to support immigration issues such as legalization, but that immigrants will learn to
support issues of other communities – notably African American, Latino and working
poor communities – as well.
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Evaluation of Immigration through a Specified Common Good Approach
In Chapter Four, I used the CGI to evaluate how recent undocumented Mexican
immigration trends (defined as the influx of undocumented Mexican immigrants, coupled
with immigration policies contextualizing that immigration) have affected the common
good, in order to develop of an appropriate ethical response. Using eight out of the twelve
indicators (due to incompleteness of data for the other four), I determined that recent
immigration trends have slightly diminished the international common good.
While this result seems simple, it hides more complex internal dynamics, which
are revealed through a CGI analysis by nation and subgroup. Undocumented Mexican
immigrants certainly improve their opportunities for achieving their basic needs and
capabilities by immigrating. In some cases their capabilities rise dramatically as a result
of immigration – their income increases by a factor of 2.5, their infant mortality rates
drop by two-thirds, and their high school drop-out rate declines by 40 percent and their
homicide rate is reduced by 30 percent. However, losses in other areas of capability
dampen their overall improvement: voter participation drops to zero due to their inability
to vote in the U.S., teenage pregnancy rises by 20 percent, the suicide rate is almost 10
percent higher and the rate of uninsurance remains the same as in Mexico.
The result is similar for Mexican residents: overall positive, but with uneven
effects on individual indicators. Immigration improves the incomes of Mexican residents
by nearly 18 percent and improves infant mortality of migrant-sending communities by 3
percent. It depresses mental health, however, as evidenced by a 2.4 percent increase in
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suicides among migrant-sending families. And it fails to produce expected gains in
education.
While undocumented immigration from Mexico overall benefits Mexican
residents and undocumented Mexicans, it poses an overall risk to the United States
public, causing 1 and 4 percent declines in the educational levels of Blacks and Latinos,
respectively, (who have been negatively affected by their undocumented Mexican peers’
lower educational attainment) and as high as a 9 percent reduction in wages of unskilled
workers (although other research shows as small as a negative 0.5 percent wage effect).
In other words, undocumented Mexican immigration results in a decline in wellbeing for
poor U.S. residents. The injury to the average poor U.S. family due to immigration is
smaller than the average rise in capabilities that an undocumented Mexican immigrant
family realizes through immigrating. However, the harms to the U.S. population are not
insignificant, and they cause a net decline in the international CGI score due to the
greater U.S. population size.
The strengths of the specified common good approach are demonstrated through
its application to this immigration example. This methodology provides evidence for the
bishops’ claims around undocumented immigration’s positive effects on immigrants and
Mexico, but it has also enabled the identification of a problem that has been hidden from
the bishops’ view: the harm to U.S. workers resulting from immigration. Furthermore,
this approach has identified particular areas of concern: areas of low human functioning,
especially where immigration has caused a decline in human functioning. Poor U.S.
residents, who are disproportionately Black and Latino, suffer drops in wages and
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education due to immigration. Undocumented Mexican immigrants, meanwhile,
experience a drop in their electoral participation and increases in teen birth and suicide
rates over their Mexican counterparts. Furthermore, even though immigrating has vastly
benefited undocumented Mexican immigrants in the areas of income, infant mortality and
education, these indicators all still fall well below the average for the United States. This
disparity points to the need to address these issues.
In terms of policy recommendations, most of the immigration policies forwarded
by the bishops would certainly improve the wellbeing of undocumented Mexican
immigrants (as well as other undocumented immigrants) and would thus be supported by
the specified common good approach. One exception to this is a guest worker program,
which research shows leaves immigrant workers in a vulnerable economic and social
position, not unlike their undocumented immigrant peers. Furthermore, some of these
policy recommendations, seen through the lens human capabilities, are revealed to be in
the interest of the U.S. community, as is the case with legalization, which would increase
wages for both undocumented immigrants and low-wage workers in general.
A specified common good framework forwards solutions beyond just immigration
policies, however, because it encourages joint action around mutual problems
experienced by both undocumented immigrants and U.S. citizens, especially those
exacerbated by immigration: wages and education. In addition, it promotes cooperative
efforts around improving all areas of human capability in need of improvement. One that
particularly stands out in this case is health insurance. Efforts to improve all capabilities
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will be most effectively initiated at a community level and determined by community
leaders, as indicated by the principle of subsidiarity.
Technical Evaluation of the Common Good Index
Having applied the Common Good Index to this complex issue, I turn to a
technical evaluation of the Index and examine how it might be improved. The Common
Good Index, through measuring human capabilities, creates rigor and specificity to
ethical evaluations. However, there are some limitations that should be noted and
addressed in order to ensure that it generates the most accurate analysis and conclusions.
The first data limitation is that there are many indicators that would be ideal to
include in the Index, but that cannot be included due to lack of data gathering. On the
international level, for example, child maltreatment data is not widely available. 1 For this
reason, it was omitted from the Common Good Index, even though it would be a key
indicator of emotional health and of the ability to raise children in a stable, supportive
environment. Furthermore, even when data is widely available across nations, it is not
always available for sub-populations. For this reason, I omitted carbon dioxide emissions,
unemployment and the importance of religion, which are unavailable for undocumented
Mexican immigrants, from my analysis in Chapter Four. In addition, data is not always
available on the effect of a given issue, a fact that led to the elimination of one more
indicator, poverty, from the calculations used in the immigration application in the last
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World Report on Violence and Health, (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2002),
http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/summary_en.pdf.
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chapter. This limitation is a common one to indicator projects, and as data collection
improves, it will become less of an issue.
Another data limitation is that even when information is available on a particular
indicator, such information is not always commensurate across nations. This is true for
the high school drop-out figures. First of all, the school systems are different. But
secondly, the high school drop-out rate for Mexico is measured in terms of individuals
who are 25 – 64 years old, while the U.S. measure drop-outs among 18 – 25 year olds,
which is quite different. Poverty is also difficult to compare internationally. 2 As
discussed in Chapter Four, the poverty measurement for Mexico is determined through a
completely different formula than for the United States, and it is unclear how truly
comparable those measurements are. This limitation is addressed through qualifying the
results in the narrative, but like data gaps, improvements in internationally comparability
will increase the accuracy of the CGI.
Lastly, this method is restricted by how long it takes data to be published. Data is
difficult to obtain data for recent years. In this immigration study, for example, the latest
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data available on suicide, for example, is for the year 2007. 3 And the latest compilation of
high school drop-out rates from the U.S. Census Bureau ends likewise in 2007. 4
Data limitations are suffered not only by the CGI, but by well-known index
projects such as the United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI). International
organizations such as the United Nations recognize that there are many gaps in data
collection, and are working on improving data collection, aggregation and harmonization
processes. 5 As improvements are made in these areas, the Common Good Index will be
able to be used more easily and with greater precision.
Another area of improvement for the Index concerns the choice of indicators. The
main issue with the indicators chosen for the CGI is that not all of them show progress in
developing nations, because progress made in those countries would likely fall below the
level of the indicator baseline. For example, in a country with a high illiteracy rate, you
can measure social change more effectively through literacy rates or primary school
graduation rates than high school graduation rates, because the latter will move at a much
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slower rate than the former. 6 In another example, gender equality in education may be a
more relevant indicator of family stability and wellbeing in developing nations than
teenage birth rates. 7 While the indicators in the Index have been chosen because they
represent the minimal level of attainment necessary for the fulfillment of human
capabilities, using only these indicators constrains the CGI’s use as an international tool.
Furthermore, the indicators chosen may not be sufficient to evaluate specialized
areas of concern. For example, if someone wanted to examine the effects of a certain
environmental policy regarding water usage on the common good, the one environmental
indicator, carbon dioxide emissions, will not be at all helpful in doing so. Rather, a
different indicator, and perhaps a different set of indicators, would need to be chosen to
shed light on whether or not those policies improve people’s relationship with the
environment or harm it. While the indicators chosen reflect a breadth of impact, they do
not go deep enough to evaluate every situation.
The United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI) suffered a similar
problem, in that it failed to shed light adequate light on different levels or aspects of
development: women’s development and progress in industrialized versus developing
nations. It responded by adding three accompanying indexes: the Human Poverty Index
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for Developing Countries (HPI-1), the Human Poverty Index for Selected OECD
Countries (HPI-2), and the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI). 8 Each one of the
additional indexes contains the same categories as the original HDI: a long and healthy
life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. However, the indicators within those
categories differ in order to make them more relevant to the population at hand, and in
addition one category has been added for the HPI-2: social exclusion. 9 This strategy is
potentially applicable to the CGI. I recommend further investigation to see how it might
be applied.
In spite of its limitations, the Common Good Index is a valuable tool for
determining the status of the common good in society and how a given situation or policy
affects that status. It provides enough information about human functioning to evaluate
the level of human capabilities and the common good in society at many different levels,
both nationally and among given populations. As data collection processes improve and
as further work is done to improve the choice of indicators the CGI will become even
more accurate and useful as a tool for measuring the common good.
Moving Forward
As outlined above, a specified common good approach offers many advantages
over the bishops’ framework of solidarity with the immigrant. Even beyond immigration,
however, its use is promising for a wide range of social issues. It is particularly salient for
economic issues. As Pope Benedict XVI recognized, “economic activity … needs to be
8
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directed towards the pursuit of the common good,” and cannot be approached “through
the simple application of commercial logic.” 10 The specified common good could be used
to evaluate past and pending trade agreements, government budgets proposals,
international aid, and other economic policies. Through this approach, economic policies
will be evaluated first and foremost by their effect on people’s human functioning
capabilities.
This method can be furthermore applied to other specific issues directly indicated
by the CGI indicators, for example around uninsurance, unemployment, homicide
prevention or high school drop-out prevention. The specified common good approach
mandates in these cases a more sophisticated analysis than is usually performed. A moral
evaluation of a proposal to cut health insurance, for example, usually stops at a
denunciation of such a cut. A CGI evaluation of a proposal to cut health insurance
coverage would certainly illuminate the decline in human capabilities stemming from
such a cut, including declines in the very direct indicator of uninsurance and other
affected indicators such as infant mortality. However, the CGI also takes into account
other dynamics resulting from such a cut. It has been argued, for example, that small
businesses lose employees due to high health care costs, raising unemployment. This kind
of factor is also taken into account in a specified common good analysis, rendering fuller
moral analysis and conclusions.
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The specified common good approach developed in this dissertation has the
potential to be used widely. As demonstrated in the case of undocumented Mexican
immigration and suggested in the above health care example, the specified common good
approach allows for all sides of a debate to be quantifiably taken into account, thereby
enabling a more comprehensive, detailed, accurate and compelling evaluation of a social
issue. It has the additional benefit of fostering a two-way solidarity, as concerns on all
sides of a debate are taken into account and mutual interests are identified. With its
specification through the Common Good Index, the common good becomes a rigorous
ethical framework ready to take its place at the center of social ethics.

APPENDIX A
INDICATOR STATISTICS
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Definitions
1.

Electoral participation rate = Percentage of population who voted

2.

High school drop-out rate
a. (U.S., African American, Latinos) = Percentage of population aged 18-64
who have not graduated and are not currently enrolled.
b. (Mexico) = Percentage of population aged 25-64 who have not completed
upper secondary school.
c. (Undocumented Mexican immigrants) = Percentage of population aged
25-64 who have not completed upper secondary school.

3.

Homicide rate = Number of homicides per 100,000.

4.

Household income = Median household income in Purchasing Power Parity (U.S.
dollars).

5.

Infant mortality rate = Number of deaths before age one, per 1,000 live births in a
given year.

6.

Suicide rate = Number of suicides per 100,000.

7.

Teenage birth rate = Number of births per 1,000 women.

8.

Uninsurance rate = Percent of population lacking private or public health insurance.
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Table 12. Real Indicator Statistics (2006), With Undocumented Mexican
Immigration

Mexico
Electoral
Participation
High school
drop-out

African
Americans

U.S.

Latinos 406

Undocumented Mexican
Immigrants

58.0

43.6

35.9

19.3

0.0

66.7

11.0

13.0

26.2

40.9

11.0

6.2

23.6

8.0

7.6

$14,280

$48,201

$31,969

$37,781

$36,000

16.2

6.7

13.5

5.5

4.9

4.3

10.1

5.1

6.0

4.7

Teenage birth

82.3

41.9

63.7

83.0

99.0

Uninsurance

49.8

15.8

20.5

34.1

50.0

Homicide
Household
Income
Infant
mortality
Suicide

Sources of Real Indicator Statistics
Mexico
1. Electoral participation: Eleccion de Presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos,
(Mexico, D.F.: Instituto Federal Electoral,
2010), http://www.ife.org.mx/documentos/OE/participacion2006/reportes/circ.html
(accessed January 30, 2011).
2. High school drop-out: Country Statistical Profiles 2010: Mexico, (Paris: Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010), http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx.
3. Homicide: Tenth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal
Justice Systems, Covering the Period 2005 - 2006, (United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime), http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-andanalysis/CTS10%20homicide.pdf (accessed January 30, 2011).
4. Household income: Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares
(ENIGH) 2006, (Mexico, D.F.: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e
Informática,
406

Latinos includes all residents of Hispanic descent, regardless of race.
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2007), http://ceidas.org/documentos/Centro_Doc/Resultados_ENIGH_2006.pdf
(accessed December 18, 2010). Purchasing Power Parity numbers from enn World
Table, (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania), http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php (accessed
December 15, 2010).
5. Infant mortality: OECD Health Data 2010 - Selected Data: Health Status (Mortality),
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
2010), http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx (accessed January 30, 2011).
6. Suicide: OECD Health Data 2010 - Selected Data: Health Status (Mortality),
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
2010), http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx (accessed January 30, 2011).
7. Teenage birth: Adolescent Birth Rate, per 1,000 Women, (United Nations, 2010),
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx (accessed December 20, 2010).
8. Uninsurance: Secretaria de Salud de Mexico, Indicadores Basicos de Salud, 20002004, (Mexico, D.F.: Organización Panaméricana de la Salud: Oficina Regional de la
Organización Mundial de la Salud), http://sinais.salud.gob.mx/indicadores/ (accessed
January 30, 2011).
United States
1. Electoral participation: Table A-1: Reporting Voting and Registration by Race,
Hispanic Origin, Sex and Age Groups: November 1964 to 2008, (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Census
Bureau), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/historical/in
dex.html (accessed January 30, 2011.
2. High school drop-out: High School Dropouts by Race and Hispanic Origin: 1980 to
2007, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census
Bureau), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/education.html (accessed
January 2, 2011).
3. Homicide: Deaths: Final Data for 2006 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Disease
Control, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57_14.pdf (accessed
January 30, 2011).
4. Household income: HIES - Household Income and Expenditure Statistics,
(International Labor Organization Department of Statistics,
2010), http://laborsta.ilo.org/ (accessed September 12, 2010.
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5. Infant mortality: OECD Health Data 2010 - Selected Data: Health Status (Mortality),
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
2010), http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx (accessed January 30, 2011).
6. Suicide: OECD Health Data 2010 - Selected Data: Health Status (Mortality),
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
2010), http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx (accessed January 30, 2011).
7. Teenage birth: Teenagers—Births and Birth Rates by Age, Race, and Hispanic
Origin: 1990 to 2007, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau,
2010), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0084.pdf (accessed
May 25, 2010).
8. Uninsurance: Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance
Coverage in the United States: 2008, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau,
2009), http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-236.pdf (accessed February 18,
2010).
African Americans
1. Electoral participation: Table A-1: Reporting Voting and Registration by Race,
Hispanic Origin, Sex and Age Groups: November 1964 to 2008, (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Census
Bureau), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/historical/in
dex.html (accessed January 30, 2011).
2. High school drop-out: High School Dropouts by Race and Hispanic Origin: 1980 to
2007.
3. Homicide: Deaths: Final Data for 2006.
4. Household income: Money Income of Families—Median Income by Race and
Hispanic Origin in Current and Constant (2007) Dollars: 1990 to 2007,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau,
2010), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0681.pdf (accessed
November 25, 2010).
5. Infant mortality: WISQARS Injury Mortality Reports, 1999 - 2007, (United States
Center for Disease Control: National Center for Injury Prevention and Control,
2010), http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate10_sy.html (accessed January
30, 2011).
6. Suicide: WISQARS Injury Mortality Reports, 1999 - 2007, (United States Center for
Disease Control: National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 2010).
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7. Teenage birth: Teenagers—Births and Birth Rates by Age, Race, and Hispanic
Origin: 1990 to 2007.
8. Uninsurance: DeNavas-Walt et al., Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage
in the United States: 2008.
Latinos
1. Electoral participation: Table A-1: Reporting Voting and Registration by Race,
Hispanic Origin, Sex and Age Groups: November 1964 to 2008.
2. High school drop-out: High School Dropouts by Race and Hispanic Origin: 1980 to
2007.
3. Homicide: Deaths: Final Data for 2006.
4. Household income: Money Income of Families - Median Income.
5. Infant mortality: Deaths: Final Data for 2006.
6. Suicide: "Suicide in the U.S.: Statistics and Prevention," U.S. Department of Human
Services, National Institute of Mental Health,
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/suicide-in-the-us-statistics-andprevention/index.shtml (accessed February 29, 2010).
7. Teenage birth: Teenagers—Births and Birth Rates by Age, Race, and Hispanic
Origin: 1990 to 2007.
8. Uninsurance: Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States:
2008.
Undocumented Mexican Immigrants
1. Electoral participation: Eleccion de Presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos,
(Mexico, D.F.: Instituto Federal Electoral,
2010), http://www.ife.org.mx/documentos/OE/participacion2006/reportes/circ.html
(accessed January 30, 2011).
2. High school drop-out: Between Two Worlds: How Young Latinos Come of Age in
America, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center,
2009), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/117.pdf (accessed November 5, 2010).
3. Homicide: Gopal K. Singh and Robert A. Hiatt, "Trends and Disparities in
Socioeconomic and Behavioural Characteristics, Life Expectancy, and Cause-
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Specific Mortality of Native-Born and Foreign-Born Populations in the United States,
1979–2003," International Journal of Epidemiology 35 (2006).
4. Household income: Jeffery S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized
Immigrants in the United States, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center,
2009), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf (accessed March 9, 2010).
5. Infant mortality: Robert A. Hummer et al., "Paradox Found (Again): Infant Mortality
among the Mexican-Origin Population in the United States," Demography 44, no. 3
(2007).
6. Suicide: Singh and Hiatt, "Trends and Disparities.
7. Teenage birth: Undocumented immigrant teenagers are 1.45 times as likely as U.S.
born Latino teens to give birth. Latino teenage birthrate from Teenagers—Births and
Birth Rates by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1990 to 2007.
8. Uninsurance: Statistical Profiles of the Hispanic and Foreign-Born Populations in the
U.S.: 2008, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center,
2010), http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=120 (accessed January 30,
2011).
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Hypothetical Indicator Statistics (2006), Without Undocumented Mexican
Immigration: “Worst Case Scenario” (Highest Wage Effect)
Calculations and Definitions
1. U.S. figures include all U.S. residents except undocumented Mexican immigrants.
This figure therefore includes other immigrants, including undocumented immigrants
from countries other than Mexico. The baseline scores were determined by
subtracting out the undocumented Mexican immigrant scores from the total scores,
proportionately to their population. Then any immigration effect (i.e. percentage
change due to immigration) was multiplied to that baseline number.

USS = IE *
Where

(USP*USS) – (UMIP*UMIS)
(USP-UIP)

USS = United States score
IE = Immigration effect
USP = United States population
UMIS = Undocumented Mexican immigrant score
UMIP = Undocumented Mexican immigration population

2. African American scores were determined by multiplying the real African American
scores (with immigration) by the immigration effect (i.e. percentage change due to
immigration).

AAS = IE * AAS
Where

IE = Immigration effect
AAS = African American score

3. Latinos includes all residents of Hispanic descent, regardless of race.
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4. Latino citizen scores include all U.S. Latino residents except undocumented Mexican
immigrants. This figure thus includes other immigrants, including undocumented
immigrants from countries other than Mexico. Each score was determined by
subtracting out the undocumented Mexican immigrant score from the total real Latino
score, proportionately by population. Then any immigration effect (i.e. percentage
change due to immigration) was multiplied to that baseline number.
(LP*LS) – (UMIP*UMIS)
(LP-UMIP)

LCS = IE *
Where

LCS = Latino citizen score
LS = Latino score
IE = Immigration effect
LP = Latino population
UMIS = Undocumented Mexican immigrant score
UMIP = Undocumented Mexican immigration population

Table 13. Hypothetical Indicator Statistics (2006)

Mexico
Electoral
Participation
High school
drop-out

African
Americans

U.S.

Latinos

58.0

44.6

38.6

32.3

66.7

9.5

12.9

17.2

11.0
$12,138

6.2
$48,442 –
$49,743

23.6
$32,289 –
$32,768

8.06
$38,348 –
$38,914

16.2

6.7

13.5

5.6

4.2

10.2

5.1

6.2

Teenage birth

82.3

39.0

63.7

68.0

Uninsurance

49.8

15.0

20.5

31.3

Homicide
Household
Income
Infant
mortality
Suicide

Sources of Hypothetical Indicator Statistics
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Most U.S. and Latino indicator statistics have changed solely as a result of the
subtraction of the undocumented Mexican immigrant population from the original
calculation. Two indicators have changed through immigration’s effects on U.S. citizens:
Household Income and Education. The same two indicators have changed for the
African American community as a result of immigration. Two indicators have changed
for Mexico as a result of immigration: Household Income and Suicide. The sources for
these changes are listed below. The other statistics in this chart are derived from the
sources identified above, in “Real Indicator Statistics (2006), With Undocumented
Mexican Immigration.”
Mexico
1. Household Income: Mexican household income has increased by 8 percent as a result
of the departure of migrants from the labor force. 407 Remittance income accounts for
7.3 percent of Mexico’s income. 408
2. Suicide: The suicide rate among migrant-sending families is 1.67 times higher than
the average. 409 The final statistic does not change from the original real number, due
to rounding effects.

United States

407

Esquivel and Huerta-Pineda, Remittances and Poverty in Mexico: A Propensity Score
Matching Approach.
408

Remittance figure from Informe Anual. Total income figure from Encuesta Nacional de
Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH) 2006.
409

McKenzie, "Beyond Remittances: the Effect of Migration on Mexican Households."

197
1. High school drop-out: Immigration has caused a 4 percent increase in the Latino
drop-out rate, and a 1 percent increase in the African American drop-out rate due to
the effects of poorer peer performance. See citations below.
2. Household income: Undocumented immigration has caused between a 0.5 and 3.2
percent decline in U.S. wages. 410
African Americans
1. High school drop-out: Immigration has caused a 1 percent increase in the African
American drop-out rate, due to the effects of poorer peer performance. 411
2. Household income: Black wages have declined between 1.0 and 2.5 percent due to
undocumented immigration. 412
Latinos
1. High school drop-out: Immigration has caused a 4 percent increase in the Latino
drop-out rate, due to the effects of poorer peer performance. 413
2. Household income: Latino wages would rise 1.5 and 3.0 percent in the absence of
immigration. 414
410

Lower figure from Orrenius and Zavodny, Does Immigration Affect Wages? A Look at
Occupation-Level Evidence. Upper figure from Borjas, "The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping:
Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market."
411

Betts, "Educational Crowding Out: Do Immigrants Affect the Educational Attainment of
American Minorities ".
412

Borjas et al., "Immigration and the Economic Status of African-American Men."

413

Betts, "Educational Crowding Out: Do Immigrants Affect the Educational Attainment of
American Minorities ".
414

Figures for Latinos calculated based on assumption of a similar wage effect on the Latino
community as the African American community, although slightly higher due to findings that the group
whose wages are most affected by immigration are previous immigrants, who are predominantly Latino.
Lower figure from Orrenius and Zavodny, Does Immigration Affect Wages? A Look at Occupation-Level
Evidence. Higher figure from Borjas et al., "Immigration and the Economic Status of African-American
Men."

APPENDIX B
CGI(P) SCORES
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Calculations and Definitions
1. The Common Good Index scores are determined by the following formula:

I =
Where

1 (MAi – Xi)
∑ 10 (MAi – MIi)_
x 100
n x 10

I = Index score
Xi = social indicator value for that year
MAi = maximum value of Xi during Model Year
MIi = minimum value of Xi during Model Year
n = number of indicators.

2. International CGI(P) scores are determined through adding the U.S. and Mexico
scores proportionately to their populations.

IS =
Where

(USP*USS) + (MP*MS)
(USP + MP)

IS = International score
USP = United States population
USS = United States score
MS = Undocumented Mexican immigrant score
MP = Undocumented Mexican immigration population

3. U.S. Citizens includes all U.S. residents except undocumented Mexican immigrants.
This figure thus includes other immigrants, including undocumented immigrants from
countries other than Mexico. It was determined by subtracting out the undocumented
Mexican immigrants from the total.

USCS =
Where

(USP*USS) – (UMIP*UMIS)
(USP-UIP)

USCS = United States citizens score
USS = United States score
USP = United States total population
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UMIS = Undocumented Mexican immigrant score
UMIP = Undocumented Mexican immigration population
4. Latinos includes all residents of Hispanic descent, regardless of race.
5. Latino citizens includes all U.S. Latino residents except undocumented Mexican
immigrants. This figure thus includes other immigrants, including undocumented
immigrants from countries other than Mexico. It was determined by subtracting out
the undocumented Mexican immigrant scores from the total, proportionately to their
population.
LCS = (LP*LS) – (UMIP*UMIS)
(LP-UMIP)
Where

LCS = Latino citizens score
LS = Latino score
LP = Latino population
UMIS = Undocumented Mexican immigrant score
UMIP = Undocumented Mexican immigration population

Table 14. Correspondence of CGI(P) Indicator Names with Indicators Used
Name of CGI
Indicator
Electoral Participation

Indicator Used

Education

Voter Turnout
High School
Drop-out

Safety from Violence

Homicide

Household Income

Household Income

Infant Life

Infant Mortality

Emotional Wellbeing

Suicide

Age of Mother

Teenage Births

Health Insurance

Uninsurance

Table 15. Real CGI(P) Scores (2006), With Undocumented Mexican Immigration

Latinos

Latino
Citizens

Undocumented Mexican
Immigrants

37.3

17.7

30.9

0.0

94.3

91.4

77.2

86.1

61.4

92.2

92.2

70.1

89.9

89.8

90.4

20.9

82.8

83.3

53.1

63.7

64.3

60.5

94.7

89.6

96.5

96.5

91.5

97.4

97.3

97.9

75.5

87.7

71.1

70.8

85.4

82.9

82.2

86.6

Age of Mother
Health
Insurance

79.8

67.3

84.1

84.7

75.1

67.0

73.3

60.4

75.3

50.2

84.2

85.0

79.5

65.9

68.7

50.0

CGI(P) Scores

75.8

61.4

80.9

81.3

72.9

70.2

74.1

63.4

International i

U.S.

U.S.
Citizens

African
Americans

Mexico

Electoral
Participation

46.3

57.1

42.4

43.4

Education

78.0

33.7

93.5

Safety
Household
Income

90.2

84.6

66.7

Infant Life
Emotional
Wellbeing
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Table 16. Hypothetical CGI(P) Scores (2006), Without Undocumented Mexican
Immigration

International

Mexico

U.S.

African
Americans

Latinos

Electoral
Participation

47.3

57.1

43.5

37.3

30.9

Education

78.2

33.7

95.2

91.5

86.9

Safety
Household
Income

90.1

84.6

92.2

70.1

89.8

64.9 – 66.6

16.8

83.3 – 85.7

53.7 – 54.6

64.8 – 65.8

Infant Life
Emotional
Wellbeing

94.6

89.6

96.5

91.5

97.3

75.5

88.0

70.8

85.4

82.2

Age of Mother
Health
Insurance

80.4

67.3

85.4

75.1

73.3

75.3

50.2

85.0

79.5

68.7

CGI(P) Scores

75.8 – 76.0

60.9

81.5 – 81.8

73.0 – 73.1

74.2 – 74.4

APPENDIX C
MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM SCORES USED FOR CGI(P) CALCULATIONS
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Definitions
1.

Electoral participation rate = Percentage of population who voted

2.

High school drop-out rate
a. (U.S., African American, Latinos) = Percentage of population aged 18-64
who have not graduated and are not currently enrolled.
b. (Mexico) = Percentage of population aged 25-64 who have not completed
upper secondary school.
c. (Undocumented Mexican immigrants) = Percentage of population aged
25-64 who have not completed upper secondary school.

3.

Homicide rate = Number of homicides per 100,000.

4.

Household income = Median household income in Purchasing Power Parity (U.S.
dollars).

5.

Infant mortality rate = Number of deaths before age one, per 1,000 live births in a
given year.

6.

Suicide rate = Number of suicides per 100,000.

7.

Teenage birth rate = Number of births per 1,000 women.

8.

Uninsurance rate = Percent of population lacking private or public health insurance.
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Table 17. Minimum and Maximum Scores Used for CGI(P) Calculations

Lowest
International
Performance

Country of
Lowest
Performance

Highest
International
Performance
Score

Electoral
Participation

0

Cuba

98

Malta

HS Drop-out

98

Germany

5

Burkina Faso

Homicide
Household
Income

79

S Africa

0

Myanmar

$2,976

Kazakstan

$57,576

Switzerland

Infant Mortality

138

Afghanistan

2

Suicide

35

Belarus

0

Iceland
Honduras,
Haiti, others

Teen birthrate

244

Niger
Not indicator
for developing
countries

3.8

Uninsurance

0

100

Country of
Highest
Performance

Netherlands
Canada, Japan,
most of
Europe
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Sources of Minimum and Maximum Scores Used for CGI(P) Calculations
1. Electoral participation: Voter Turnout Database, (Stockholm, Sweden: International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance,
2010), http://www.idea.int/vt/viewdata.cfm# (accessed December 17, 2010).
2. High school drop-out:
a. Minimum: "On the Line - Education in Burkina Faso," (England: 2010),
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/coolplanet/ontheline/explore/journey/burkina/prtedu
c.htm (accessed December 17, 2010).
b. Maximum: Education at a Glance 2010: OECD Indicators, (Paris: OECD,
2010),
http://www.ecs.org/html/offsite.asp?document=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Eo
ecd%2Eorg%2Fedu%2Feag2010 (accessed December 17, 2010).
3. Homicide: Tenth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal
Justice Systems, Covering the Period 2005 - 2006, (United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime), http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-andanalysis/CTS10%20homicide.pdf (accessed January 30, 2011).
4. Household Income: HIES - Household Income and Expenditure Statistics,
(International Labor Organization Department of Statistics,
2010), http://laborsta.ilo.org/ (accessed September 12, 2010).
5. Infant Mortality: Mortality Rate, Infant (per 1,000 births), (The World Bank,
2010), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN?order=wbapi_data_val
ue_2009+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc (accessed January 30,
2011).
6. Suicide: Country Reports and Charts Available, (World Health Organization, 2003),
http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide/country_reports/en/ (accessed
December 17, 2010).
7. Teenage birthrate: UNFPA State of the World Population 2006A Passage to Hope:
Women and International Migration, (New York: United Nations Population Fund,
2006), http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2006/pdf/en_sowp06.pdf (accessed January 5,
2011).
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